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This thesis examines the issue of parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs, 
and the implications that this had for British foreign policy, in the period 1911-12. 
The struggle for control of policy between Sir Edward Grey and the parliamentary 
Radicals is considered from two perspectives: with reference to the Radicals' 
arguments for both review and reform of policy; and with reference to the strategic 
realities facing Grey which dictated policy in this period. 
The background to the events of 1911-12 is discussed giving particular attention 
to three areas - reappraising Britain's strategic position and policy vis a vis the states 
system in the light of recent historiographical debate; examining the fundamental 
principles of the Radicals and their previous agitation concerning Parliament and 
foreign policy; and summarising the key events of summer 1911. 
The parliamentary struggle is examined with reference both to parliamentary 
questions and debates, and to relevant private papers and diplomatic documents. The 
major issues of contention are considered: most notably the Agadir Crisis and Anglo-
German schism, the Persian Question and Anglo-Russian collusion, the issue of 
excessive secrecy in diplomacy, the controversial 'balance of power' question and 
diplomatic bias, and the constitutional rights of Parliament respecting foreign policy. 
The struggle for control of both specific diplomatic initiatives and the principles which 
underwrote policy during this period focuses attention upon the confrontation 
between the moral imperative (the need to operate policy commensurate with 
principles of conscience) and the practical necessity (the need to subordinate 
conscience to considerations of grand strategy). Having assessed the respective 
parliamentary performance of the protagonists, and the success of their arguments, 
this study concludes that despite evidence of wilful abuse of Parliament, the 
diplomatic situation confronting Grey justified both his conduct and policies; that 
despite an unassailable moral position, the Radical failure to offer practical solutions 
to serious diplomatic crises and undermining of Grey's position despite this renders 
their position unsustainable; and that minimal parliamentary involvement was in the 
circumstances desirable. 
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CHAPTER I : BRITAIN IN T H E STATES SYSTEM BEFORE 1914 
SOME REAPPRAISALS 
To achieve an accurate assessment of the role of Parliament vis a vis foreign 
affairs, it is necessary to consider both the nature of the policies operating at that 
time and the diplomatic and strategic considerations that underwrote them. Recent 
work in this field has sought to examine the premier interests and responsibilities of 
Britain, and her ability to meet and sustain them, in the light of available military 
resources and prevalent strategic considerations.' The findings of these studies have 
brought into question the nature and aims of Grey's Entente diplomacy, and tend to 
encourage a revision or at least a review of the traditional interpretation of Britain's 
ante bellum position. This introductory chapter seeks to consider Britain's position 
within the states system in the light of the historiographical perspective, as a necessary 
forerunner to the analysis of the role of Parliament in foreign affairs. Recognising 
that any parliamentary intervention into the world of foreign affairs had clear 
implications for the wider field of international relations, close examination of 
parhamentary intervention, with particular reference to the questions posed, answers 
extracted, and arguments advanced in Westminster, may help provide further insight 
into Britain's position within the states system, and thus contribute towards a 
resolution of the ongoing historiographical debate. At the same time, if the wider 
diplomatic considerations at stake can be identified and evaluated, the impact which 
prolonged parliamentary interference had upon Britain's diplomatic position may be 
evaluated, thus providing a clear indication as to whether increased parliamentary 
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involvement was either practical or desirable: and thus help explain the nature and 
progress of the Radicals' parliamentary campaign to that effect. The extent to which 
awareness could exist in Westminster, both of premier policy considerations and of 
the practical limitations precluding action, or indeed of the impact made upon 
Britain's diplomatic position of open debating of issues, reflects upon the overall 
question of the role of Parliament. As such, it is necessary to outline as far as is 
possible exactly what such considerations were, and to provide a clear background 
upon which to base an analysis of the parliamentary struggle. 
Before any survey of the diplomatic field is attempted, one element in particular 
about the nature of foreign affairs during this period, and indeed the subsequent 
historical assessments that have been attempted, requires clarification. The use of 
specialist terminology in scientific study necessitates accurate definition of terms used 
- historical study is no different. In the case of the foreign affairs and diplomatic 
history of this period, two terms in particular require careful consideration, both in 
terms of meaning and appHcation. They are, respectively, 'balance of power' and 
'great power'. Both the contemporary figures involved in the diplomatic and political 
field and subsequent students of the period argue that these elements were central 
factors in Grey's policy, and examine Britain's international position in terms of these 
descriptive and yet ambiguous phrases. It is therefore necessary to determine, in the 
context of this discussion, exactly what these terms were taken to represent; the 
extent to which they were operated upon as central elements in the great diplomatic 
game; and how Britain fitted into a diplomatic system in which they actually applied. 
Defining 'great power' status is possible only if the context in which it is being 
apphed is remembered. Britain was undoubtedly 'great' in some ways. Her position 
as a premier commercial nation involved in a vast carrying trade is not disputed here. 
Her status as the world's single largest naval power (especially if a Eurocentric 
perspective excluding the United States is adopted) provides another example of 
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British 'greatness'; although here, ironically, contemporary commentators judged her 
position as weak because she proved unable to sustain a naval level equal to the 
combined forces of the next two respective naval powers.^ However, for the field of 
international power politics, a much broader base of definition is required. A 
meaningful definition can only be advanced if the nature of power is seen in the 
context of the period under consideration; and if a nation's power is taken in its 
entirety, as opposed to distinct component parts, as it related to the states system of 
that time. Martin Wight has provided a workable definition along these lines^ 
Great powers are powers with general interests ie. 
whose interests are as wide as the states system itself ... 
[and possess] an ability to protect those interests by 
force. And this means a readiness to go to war.'' 
It is along the lines of this working definition that this study seeks to examine the 
Foreign Secretary's diplomacy and the concomitant parliamentary disquiet of the 
period 1911-13. The current historical debate over the exact nature of British policy 
pre-1914 needs to be considered in light of this definition: as do both the diplomacy 
of Sir Edward Grey and the parliamentary struggle which dominated the 18 month 
period between the Agadir Crisis and the end of the parliamentary session of 1912, 
insofar as they relate to that debate.^ That the period of Grey's ministry witnessed a 
significant transition in the nature of British diplomatic considerations, and that 
diplomacy was therefore prone to consequent crises of realignment, is widely 
accepted. The parliamentary struggle for the control of foreign affairs began once a 
number of sleeping concerns over policy direction were awakened. Changes in 
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Britain's diplomacy and her dealings with other powers were perceived by those not 
fully aware of prevailing strategic considerations (and consequently of options open to 
policy makers) to contradict both political traditions and the nation's best interests. 
These changes seemed to be incompatible with continuing 'great power' status. 
However, i f Wight's definition of 'great power' status is applied to the situation, and 
recent research into Britain's ability to guarantee primary interests in time of conflict 
(either in terms of imperial defence or continental commitments)* is considered, a re-
evaluation of status is encouraged with Britain threatened by strategic weakness and 
material shortcomings. The very shifts and 'failings' in policy that provoked criticisms 
of Grey and accusations that British honour, prestige and, consequently, status were 
being compromised may now be placed in a context where that status was already in 
jeopardy. As such, and given the activity of this period in both Houses, the 
parliamentary perception of role and Britain's actual 'great power' status is an 
element which this study seeks to pursue. 
As with 'great power', the value of 'balance of power' as specialist terminology 
depends upon the context in which it is used and the extent to which it may accurately 
be applied. This term provides the historian with a greater problem of definition, 
because varied and inconsistent application over the years has led to ambiguity and 
confusion. Indeed, much work has been attempted to overcome this problem, with 
mixed results.' For the purposes of this study it is necessary to understand the context 
in which the protagonists of 1911-12 saw the 'balance', and to assess the extent to 
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which it can be applied as an element in the overall issue of foreign affairs conduct 
and control. 
Once more, Wight is able to offer a concise explanation, this time of the 'balance' 
The balance of power is the principle of what might be 
called the mechanics of power politics; and the 
mechanistic metaphor is useful for describing 
international relations provided that we do not suppose 
that it exhausts everything that can be said about 
them.' 
Wight recognises that a variety of definitions can be advanced for the 'balance', 
and examines them closely. In doing this, he is able to provide a distinction between 
the existence of a distribution of power amongst states in a common system, and the 
operation of deliberate poMcies intent on manipulating elements within the 
distribution. He argues that the operation of a states system in which power 
distribution is an issue of contention tends to result in the operation of a series of 
policies by the involved states aimed at revising or preserving inequalities in the 
distribution of power so as to maximise advantage. It is in these terms that a 
'balance', as a system of power distribution under constant revision and flux, appears 
most attractive and applicable to the ante bellum diplomacy of the European powers. 
However, in terms of the parliamentary struggle for control of foreign policy of 
1911-1912, the 'balance of power' became a political issue, seen as synonymous with 
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the operation of a definite and manipulative policy, rather than as a definition of the 
existing distribution of power. The deliberate manipulation of the states system 
through a conscious design, with the purpose of maximising national power and 
influence, was an issue of considerable political controversy in Britain. It was one 
thing to accept that the policy makers saw the British position in terms of a states 
system where power was unevenly distributed, and formulated their policies to 
respond to the exigencies of that situation.'" It was quite another to infer that Grey 
was engaged in a policy that manipulated that states system by means of subtle yet 
aggressive diplomacy, seeking maximum advantage for Britain at all costs and with 
scant regard for the position of others. Such a policy was reviled by Liberals for being 
contrary to existing principles of conduct. It provoked untoward antagonism between 
states detrimental to commercial and economic interests and necessitated wasteful 
expenditure on excessive defences. It also tended to entangle the nation in political 
commitments with other powers contrary to the spirit of free trade and international 
harmony, and created a series of unavoidable responsibilities which impaired the 
ability of Parliament to exercise its legitimate functions and therefore undermined the 
basis of democratic control of policy." Nevertheless, it would be wrong to infer that 
even the most worried Liberals were unaware that a distribution of power was an 
inescapable reality; that Britain's role as a power lay within such a system; and 
consequently that her diplomacy needed to reflect such an awareness. As a leading 
Radical admitted: 
I never thought that we could detach ourselves from 
our sympathies and duties to the rest of the world.'^ 
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It remains to be seen how the 'balance of power' can best be applied to the 
consideration of Britain's diplomatic position and foreign policy during Grey's 
ministry. The principles of a 'balance' policy were clearly elucidated by officials at 
Whitehall;" but whether or not claims or denials as to the operation of any such 
poHcy can be upheld is less clear. It is necessary to understand how Britain's position 
in the states system was perceived by those interested in foreign affairs, and how in 
consequence it was felt policy should reflect that position. As the consideration of 
'great power' status offered above has suggested, Britain's position vis a vis the states 
system in the ante bellum period has recently come into question. That a change in 
defensive and diplomatic orientation occurred in the first decade of the twentieth 
century is not disputed. However the reasons behind the nature of the change, and 
exactly against who or what, and why, the changes were directed, has been brought 
into question. I f the policymakers of this time were dictated to by perceived material 
inadequacies and a concomitant inability to meet essential strategic defensive 
requirements as a result of political and socio-economic reasons which allowing for 
domestic and diplomatic considerations it was arguably impossible to admit, then 
policy should be viewed not as manipulative or a result of premeditated. 
Machiavellian design; but rather as an unavoidable and necessary response to matters 
of grave importance. As Wight recognises: 
The operation of the balance of power is true to states 
in proportion to their strength, confidence and internal 
cohesion." 
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As such, i f it is possible to discover exactly what interests were deemed to be under 
threat, and exactly which power or powers dominated the minds of the policy makers 
(and why), a better idea of how the 'balance' can be applied to Grey's diplomacy may 
be attained.'' 
Furthermore, the mechanistic model of the 'balance' is important to this study 
because, having accepted that 'internal cohesion' is an important element in the 
position of any power operating within the state system, the 'balance' in operation can 
be used to examine how the parliamentary situation played an important role in the 
wider context of power politics. The impact and success of the parliamentary struggle 
for control of foreign affairs had potentially crucial implications for Britain's position 
in the states system. It undoubtedly had an impact upon Grey's ability to pursue 
diplomatic initiatives seen as vital to maintaining levels of power and status. It also 
reflected to interested parties abroad the extent of domestic faith and satisfaction in 
security and policy. In this way, the struggle helped influence perceptions of strength 
that determined beliefs in current and indeed future scopes for action by Britain, 
perceptions which arguably had a greater say in determining the relative influence and 
power devolved to Britain (her status) than did the existing but often unknown levels 
of material resources. The issue of the 'balance of power' therefore occupies a 
central position in this study; as an issue of contention in the parliamentary struggle 
(and in which ironically Parliament unwittingly exerted influence over both the 
'balance' and foreign policy), and also as an explanation of certain seemingly 
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incongruous elements in policy, given that relative power distributions were an 
accepted part of the states system, but were often only partially understood because 
rarely given definite substance by detailed information. Indeed, considering the issue 
of availability of information, it was ironic for Sir Arthur Nicolson to lament: 
So many people regard the maintenance of the 
equilibrium...as merely an abstract principle... they do 
not understand [the nature of current diplomacy and 
our position].'* 
Recent work has inferred that in fact misunderstanding and ignorance, playing 
upon erroneous perceptions rather than established fact, indeed that abstraction both 
domestically and abroad, was a crucial factor in Grey's defence of national interests 
and preservation of status." As such, the words of Richard Cobden appear to ring 
true: 
The theory of the balance of power is a mere chimera 
- a creation of a politician's brain... without definite 
form or tangible existence... words which convey sound 
without meaning.'* 
What were the main considerations that underwrote Grey's foreign policy? With 
which 'model' of ante bellum policy do the more controversial diplomatic initiatives 
which attracted parliamentary scrutiny appear to sit most comfortably? Two main 
historiographical views have been advanced seeking to explain the nature of British 
poHcy. The standard or 'traditional' interpretation" seeks to portray foreign policy as 
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having been a self-contained institution, to a large extent free from considerations of 
domestic pohtical competition. It is seen as having been formulated and controlled by 
an elite, led by the incumbent Foreign Secretary, which adhered to a set of established 
principles and traditions, and argued for continuity above party politics. The Ententes 
of 1904 and 1907 respectively marked a shift by the policy makers from an Imperial to 
a Continental orientation, with an emphasis upon countering moves which it was 
feared pointed towards a German hegemony in Europe; a hegemony taken to be 
inimical to British interests and policy principles. The result of the diplomacy of this 
period was that Britain, through the military contacts made with the French to secure 
Franco-Belgian security, became irretrievably tied to a set of continental 
responsibilities. 
An alternative approach has been suggested by Keith Wilson, who has attempted 
to challenge the traditional interpretation and proffer an explanation in some respects 
similar to that offered by the Fischer school in their exposition of German policy in 
the same period.^ He has argued that due consideration should be paid to domestic 
issues and pohtical constraints before any assessments are attempted, and that much 
of what has been previously deduced about policy is in fact based upon mistaken 
interpretations of the contemporary sentiments held by the elite - that a series of 
'manufactured myths' were used to obscure worrying frailties in the position of Britain 
as an imperial 'great power', and that these 'myths' have continued to obscure the 
truth ever since. Wilson contends that policy was based upon a tacit acceptance that 
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the diplomatic and military resources of Britain were insufficient to provide for both 
imperial security and a continued defence of much-vaunted principle; that Russia and 
not Germany was and continued to be seen as the single largest threat to Britain's 
position"; and that the policy of involvement in the affairs of continental Europe was 
pursued as a means to secure good relations with Russia - the only way to secure a 
viable defence of the Empire. The securing of sound Anglo-French relations, as well 
as removing areas of tiresome colonial friction, is seen as having been an essential 
prerequisite to any improvement in Anglo-Russian relations; even though the paltry 
value of British support was clearly illustrated as the French sought to improve their 
position against their bugbear, Germany. Wilson sees British policy under Grey as 
having been one of necessary bluff, the maintenance of a facade of greatness and 
status by means of association with those who most threatened her. This pretence of 
greatness was in turn the basis for domestic interpretation of her place within the 
system of power politics; and that the 'myths' sustained to obscure the actual 
weakness of Britain's position to foreign powers (both friends and foes) also had the 
same effect upon the domestic audience. As a result, the reality of the position, 
dictated by limited material resources and a consequent restriction upon the ability to 
act, proved increasingly difficult to reconcile with the arguments voiced in support of 
action based on the 'myths' of greatness; and that in consequence the pursuit of 
policy was made all the more difficult. 
In his study British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905-15^^ David French 
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provides an extra contribution to the debate by examining the political economics 
upon which poHcies pertaining to national security and defence were based, and 
viewing the international position of Britain in this light. Political economy may best 
be defined as the operation of government upon the material resources available to it. 
French argues that changes in the nature and composition of Britain's economic 
position in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when viewed in the context of her 
interests and responsibilities as an imperial and commercial Great Power, created a 
situation where Britain faced potential disaster should she become embroiled in any 
large-scale war." Put simply, the relative decline of Britain as an industrial power and 
her loss of self-sufficiency in key economic areas^^ and the concomitant dependence 
upon international commerce and finance as the major sources of relative national 
prosperity, meant that the material resources upon which Britain's position as a 
pohtical and mihtary power were based were significantly weaker than had previously 
been the case. The dependence upon commerce that had developed apace during the 
industrial expansion of the later nineteenth century, and Britain's position via the 
Bank of England at the centre of the world's financial system as 'the world's only free 
market in gold', underwrote the continuing prosperity of the nation; and consequently 
provided the basis of wealth and material resources upon which national security 
depended." French argues that these two areas were thought to be more susceptible 
to collapse than had the previous bases of national wealth and security," and that if 
the outbreak and course of any war should cause a significant disruption to either 
commercial or financial stability, in spite of safeguards to the contrary,^' then the 
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premier sources of finance for the conducting of war and defence would be 
compromised. Moreover, it was feared that the surplus resources which had in the 
past been diverted to finance and sustain wartime defences had been eroded by 
increases in peacetime public expenditure (blamed by some upon the Liberal reforms 
of the period^), and that it was not possible to make good the shortfall by further 
fiscal measures without risking potentially severe socio-economic consequences^. 
Fears that, if a war situation should arise, Britain would not be able to sustain a 
financial commitment commensurate with her position were increased. In short, she 
would be unable to defend all her domestic and imperial interests. It was feared that 
Britain's means would prove unequal to the burden of sustaining a war effort and 
maintaining the level of supplies needed to protect basic levels of domestic economic 
consumption, and that failure to achieve the latter would be to provoke a socio-
economic crisis from which revolution and national collapse could well arise^. This 
had clear implications for Britain's international standing; should such weakness be 
perceived by rival powers, her diplomatic position could easily be undermined by 
hostile or ambitious powers applying pressure which she could not resist - and she 
would be forced into submission. In summary, the political economics of the British 
Empire at this time dictated that diplomacy should be aimed at reducing as far as 
possible the need for defence expenditure, that crises should be avoided at all costs; 
and that a policy of rapprochement and co-operation with erstwhile rival powers be 
pursued as the best method by which to make sure that the first two necessities were 
secured. 
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French tends to accept without adequate critical scrutiny the traditionalist 
interpretation of the foreign policy of this period. He argues that the Ententes were 
created to effect a reduction in potential areas of conflict; but that, presumably as a 
result of her position as a major economic power and apparent attempts at securing 
continental hegemony, it proved impossible to reach terms with a 'hostile' Germany, 
and that subsequent strategic planning against Germany showed a recognition that she 
was regarded as the premier threat to Britain's position.'^ In the light of Wilson's 
work^^, such an argument appears to require reconsideration. The traditional 
approach fails to assess or compare the bases for contact or the respective relations 
existent between Britain and Germany, and Britain and Russia, to a satisfactory 
degree. The respective, relative threats posed, and more importantly if French's work 
is allowed for, the different circumstances for and likely consequences of any conflict 
between Britain and those powers deemed to threaten her require further 
consideration. As has already been suggested in the discussion of the 'balance of 
power' question, it is necessary to consider how the relative distribution of power that 
the pohcy controllers thought existed affected the nature of that policy^^ The 
question arises: who or what were the primary considerations and influences, the 
dynamic elements in the diplomatic system that held the attention. Was the fear of 
German designs upon continental hegemony the over-riding concern facing Grey, and 
if so why? Was Germany the state most likely and able to carry out a conflict against 
Britain that would result in the disaster that French suggests had come to dominate 
British fears? Did the Anglo-Russian Entente reflect a fear of Germany, or a 
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recognition that the Russian threat was of potentially and indeed practically greater 
significance? And did the 1907 Entente mean that any Russian threat had been 
removed, or reduced in importance to a tertiary position in policy considerations? It 
is important to remember that the 'balance of power' was prone to constant change as 
different events and political considerations came to the fore.^ Any event in the 
diplomatic field could provoke a change in the overall distribution of power in the 
states system. Every dispute between powers could upset the equilibrium, and offer 
an opportunity for a tertiary power to intervene seeking advantage. This was often as 
much a consideration as was the original issue of contention. As a result, it is 
necessary to allow for an interaction between all considerations rather than to use 
specific issues and events as evidence in any over-hasty categorization of relations; for 
example, into 'phobia' or 'philia' brackets as over-riding policy considerations. Only 
then can the relative importance of issues at stake and the nature of diplomatic 
relations be properly assessed. 
The options open to the government in trying to improve the security position 
were limited. French argues convincingly that, as a result of fears that higher taxation 
in peacetime would reduce the financial reserves available for any war situation, an 
increase in taxation was deemed to be dangerous. The introduction of tariff reform 
for revenue purposes was opposed by the Liberal Party, Treasury and Foreign Office 
alike, all of whom maintained that free trade must remain as a policy cornerstone.'^ 
Put simply, it was all but impossible to use increased expenditure to resolve the 
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security dilemma. As a result, two alternatives were available. The government could 
admit that, as a result of increasingly finite resources, it could no longer undertake to 
meet all the responsibilities it had previously upheld, and that as a result certain areas 
of policy commitment would have to be abandoned. Policy would undergo an 
economisation until sustainable levels of commitment had been reached. 
Unfortunately, such a course was itself fraught with both domestic and diplomatic 
dangers. To concede that the existing level of responsibilities was beyond the means 
of Britain would have diminished influence and prestige and, more seriously, led to a 
re-evaluation of the distribution of power and a reduced status for Britain. It would 
have reduced the amount of diplomatic influence Britain could exert, and risked 
encouraging other rival powers to exploit the areas of weakness which had been 
exposed, thus jeopardising the security it sought to achieve. In any case, the 
dependence upon commerce would still preclude any economisation upon the defence 
of trade routes or free access to foreign markets, because any loss of trade, even if 
only relative to other powers, would put the ability to secure necessary levels of 
income (sufficient to maintain a level of influence) or guarantee essential supplies in 
jeopardy.^ As the naval issue shows, it proved impossible to publicly economise away 
existing traditions such as the Two Power Standard for fear of adverse political 
reactions." Similarly, it is clear that Grey could not concede influence over areas such 
as Persia i f the result appeared to be the abandoning of principles and, worse, an 
increased threat to Indian and thus imperial security. To do so would be to arouse 
domestic political passions^ and to encourage foreign powers to believe that further 
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exploitations of weaknesses elsewhere could bear fruit. In both cases, and in the light 
of Wight's evaluation of important elements in international power politics already 
discussed, such domestic and international disruptions could only further harm 
Britain's position vis a vis the distribution of power.'' As a result of this inability to 
economise openly, and the recognition that increased expenditure on security could 
not be sustained without compromising the very basis of national wealth, it became 
necessary to use diplomacy itself to cover for any shortfall, to obscure areas of 
weakness. 
One problem that exists in dealing with antagonistic models seeking to outline 
emphases in policy is a tendency of those models to mutual exclusivity. My intention 
here is to illustrate the size and nature of the problem facing Sir Edward Grey and 
those in charge of foreign affairs, to attempt to ascertain what the primary 
considerations at stake at the time of the parliamentary struggle for control of policy 
were before examining the struggle itself. Germany was of course a cause of concern, 
although given Wilson's approach it is less certain that she dominated matters to the 
extent outlined by previous studies. The problem posed by Anglo-Russian relations 
and the Great Game in Central Asia appears to have been equally persistent. The 
threat of conflict in Central Asia, indeed of any developments that could compromise 
the security of India and reveal areas of weakness within Britain's position, was taken 
extremely seriously. Such a confrontation was undoubtedly seen as potentially 
disastrous as any Anglo-German dispute;"*" the geographical factors and relative naval 
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and military dispositions involved meant that it was more likely to undermine Britain's 
status than any confrontation with Berlin. Even if Beryl Williams is correct in 
'1 doubting whether or not Russia had any designs upon India, and that the Central 
Asian issue was used to exploit British fears so as to secure concessions elsewhere,"' 
the fact remains that Russia was seen in Whitehall as being the power best equipped 
to exploit British weakness (with obvious repercussions in other areas of diplomacy). 
The 1907 Convention had reduced the immediate threat of any confrontation, but as 
McLean recognises, its failure to produce a lasting settlement in Persia, an area where 
the long term interests of the two powers were arguably irreconcilable,"^ meant 
increasingly that it was seen as no more than a temporary working agreement which 
would require later revision."' French's arguments concerning material weakness 
apply at least as much to any scenario involving war in Asia, because of the strain that 
such a commitment far from home and with the cost of supplies thus increased would 
place upon the imperial socio-economic position. It was also realised that any such 
conflict would most likely encourage interventions or exploitations of her weakness by 
other ambitious powers which would make her position all the more untenable. 
Moreover, it was feared in Whitehall that even if Russia did not become embroiled in 
a war with Britain, a future with Russia not tied to an Anglocentric Entente could 
prove as disastrous. Grey was well aware that the fears of Curzon and the Indian 
lobby for Indian security could well be realised should no obstacle be placed in the 
way of a Russian annexation of Persia, Russian penetration to the Persian Gulf, and 
the creation of a contiguous Anglo-Russian frontier. In such circumstances a vast 
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increase in the size of the Indian Army would be required to secure adequate 
defence. However, the concomitant increases in expenditure which this would 
engender, added to those resulting from the ongoing naval arms race to which for 
strategic and political reasons Britain remained committed, would have made the 
financial burden intolerable"" - unless sacrifices were made elsewhere, such as in 
domestic reform or in terms of higher taxation, both of which were potentially fraught 
with danger and liable to provoke electoral disquiet."" 
Keith Neilson has shed further light on the nature of Anglo-Russian relations 
during this period by no means inimical to Wilson's view by illustrating how the over-
riding need for cordial relations tended to engender 'wishful thinking'."^ 
The need for accurate information in order to pursue a 
rational foreign policy is obvious...but those who 
gather, collate and interpret information shape, in 
many ways, the answers which it provides [because] 
their political 'taste' [has] a subtle yet profound 
influence upon...decisions which are made."' 
Whilst accepting that concern existed over Central Asia, Neilson is unconvinced 
that British policy towards Russia at this time was the product of the Russophobic 
belief that a Russia free from any Anglocentric diplomatic system would inevitably 
pursue an anti-British policy because their respective interests were seen to be 
inimical. Instead, and differently from Wilson (who sees apparently Russophilic 
diplomacy as being the result of exactly the fears outlined above, and a concomitant 
recognition that Britain would in the long term be hard pressed to resist), he argues 
along traditional lines that the threat perceived in Whitehall was caused in the light of 
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Germanophobia, that a rapprochement between Russia and Germany was to be 
avoided for fear of a shift in favour of continental German hegemony."* This aside, 
Neilson recognises that the principal consideration was that Britain needed close links 
with Russia, and that, because the Foreign Office was unable to offer binding 
guarantees in the form of military commitment or political alliance, for obvious 
reasons,"' she was forced to convince Russia that the Entente was of value by 
professions of loyalty and examples of good faith alone. As such. Grey's diplomatic 
position and room for manoeuvre were severely restricted.'" The ability to maintain 
lasting good relations depended upon two factors. It was necessary to provide 
evidence that diplomatic co-operation could profit both Russia and Britain, and that 
good faith and loyalty could convert into material advantage. It was also essential to 
show sceptical elements both in Britain^' and Russia" who were eager to secure the 
collapse of the Entente that apparent socio-political differences or traditions of 
mistrust were not obstacles precluding contemporary co-operation." As such, it was 
necessary to attempt to control and regulate the nature of information upon which 
perceptions as to respective political attitudes concerning the Entente were based; and 
to persuade respective critics that Russian reactionism and British Radicalism were 
neither representative of government attitudes nor influential over pohcy operation. 
As two Whitehall permanent under secretaries commented: 
A reactionary government in Russia would meet with 
no sympathy at all in this country, and it would be 
impossible to grow closer to Russia in any way.'" 
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If our affairs at home develop in a direction which the 
Emperor may consider to be ultra-democratic and as 
indicating instability...he will most probably be disposed 
to seek comfort in more conservative quarters.'' 
Neilson argues that these two goals, the achievement of a situation which 
'liberahsed' reports of Russia and 'conservatised' the nature of Britain, and provided 
definite examples of good faith, tended to cloud official perceptions of the truth. 
Because the Foreign Office needed Russia to be a loyal political ally and to move 
towards a more liberal socio-political system, and tended to rely almost exclusively 
upon evidence from such Russian liberal sources as could provide assurances to that 
effect, British officials were prone to misinterpretation and 'wishful thinking' as to the 
real nature of Russian politics. In this way, the extent of the Tsar's liberal inclinations 
came to be exaggerated;'* and evidence that elements in the Russian bureaucracy 
undertook measures incompatible with the Entente ignored, their actions taken to be 
unrepresentative of official policy, and excused away as being unavoidable problems 
to be expected in any system as monolithic as that of Nicholas' Russia." A discussion 
of the realities of Russian politics and the nature of the bureaucracy is not required 
here. Suffice to say that Neilson's arguments as to 'wishful thinking' can surely be 
compared with Wilson's ideas of a series of myths as being an example of an exercise 
intended to conceal problems at the heart of Britain's security. They tend to sustain 
the view that the British Foreign Office was forced by circumstance to take 
declarations of principle in favour of the 1907 Convention at face value, and therefore 
to trust Russian initiatives in good faith; because it was too unpleasant to consider 
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any implications to the contrary. Nicolson epitomises the position which the Foreign 
Office, officially at least, saw itself as obliged to adopt:-
I have not read this document [memo on apparent 
Russian violations of the 1907 Convention] but if, as I 
assume, it contains criticism of Russian procedure in 
Persia, it is largely based on prejudices and false 
assumptions.'* 
The need to provide security in the light of material inadequacies and political 
constraints was, then, the over-riding factor that dictated the diplomacy of the ante 
bellum years and, with specific regard to this study, the period immediately post-
Agadir. Wight has argued that powers in a position of weakness tend to gravitate 
towards the dominant power in the prevalent states system;^' and although it would 
be improper to attribute too much to coincidence, it is certainly interesting in the light 
of Wilson's work that it was towards Russia that Grey aimed his diplomatic overtures. 
As the American Lewis Einstein recognised in a contemporary review of the situation: 
The Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian negotiations 
...smoothed out through diplomatic means the ... rivalry 
of a century. But between Germany and England 
similar adjustment is impossible. Their antagonism 
presents nothing concrete ... there is no real difficulty.** 
The major strategies of imperial defence had to be based upon tangibles, upon 
where and against whom conflict was both most likely and potentially most dangerous. 
Once a need to minimise defence expenditure had been recognised, and diplomacy 
became the only plausible medium by which to ensure that the scope for conflict was 
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reduced (and therefore the need for vast defence expenditure lessened), it was natural 
that the diplomatic moves to secure imperial security should be with those powers 
who provided the greatest threat. Grey sought to persuade erstwhile protagonists that 
mutual advantages would accrue to both sides should friction be removed and friendly 
co-operation provide the basis for future relations. However, and at the same time, 
he had to ensure that Britain's position within any Entente relationship should not 
appear to be of excessive weakness. She had to appear ready to promote equitable 
negotiated compromise where conflicting interests emerged; but also had to be able 
to command respect commensurate with a position of 'great power' status, a nation 
both veiling and able to use her resources to support allies and defend specified 
interests. In the light of her precarious position, two main considerations determined 
the scope for diplomatic initiative.*' Pohcy had to be designed and operated to allow 
for the fact that Britain operated within constraints of finite resources which she dare 
not compromise. However, because she was bound by involvement within the states 
system of the time to diplomatic links with other powers, and that as a result of her 
finite resources she was forced to secure friendly links with powers who threatened 
her interests, it was vital that she maintain a pretence of strength so that her viability 
as a premier power (and thus value as an ally or ability to command respect as a 
rival) was not compromised. Should Britain's weakness and inabihty to meet certain 
levels of commitment become obvious, then the value of her support to her Entente 
partners and the continued mutuality of advantages initially accrued by those 
rapprochements would come into question and the British security dilemma reassert 
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itself all the more seriously. It must be remembered that under the auspices of the 
'balance of power' it was natural for nations to maximise personal advantage. Grey 
had to allow for the fact that the failure to sustain an appearance of vitality and 
power within the states system would be to encourage or force other powers to effect 
a redistribution of power at her expense. His policy therefore acted to prove how 
influential Britain remained, and to obscure areas of weakness by minimising the 
nature of emerging conflicts. He was well aware that Britain's position was fixed not 
by empirical evidence available to the policymakers at home, but how other powers 
thought Britain could and would act:-
[In the great affairs there is much more] in the minds 
of events (if such an expression may be used) than in 
the minds of the chief actors.*^ 
It was the need to ensure that perceptions of Britain as a 'great power' were 
maintained, and that the minds of the chief actors would fail to appreciate that a 
security dilemma had effectively compromised her ability to meet Wight's yardstick of 
great power status, that best explains the foreign policy of the period. Both the 
'manner' and the 'matter' of policy aimed at preserving a fagade of greatness, and in 
this rests the 'myth' interpretation of Wilson. The Ententes were not directed 
outwardly against a hostile threat, but inwardly against a threat born of weakness. 
Grey was forced in his conducting of Entente diplomacy to meet a variety of 
requisites. He had to convince the other powers that Britain would supply diplomatic 
aid in support of her friends commensurate with prevalent circumstances, buttressed if 
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necessary by viable military and economic sanctions." He had to appear as the 
champion of negotiated compromise, ready to accept assurances offered by friends in 
good faith, to act as the advocate for the advantages of peaceful co-operation.*" He 
also had to convince all other powers that where various specified interests existed, 
Britain would defend them over and above other agreements so as to prevent their 
being compromised; and that any such defence would be sufficient to force the issue.*' 
In summary, Grey had to achieve a working balance between these factors so as to 
convince the Entente powers that co-operation with Britain was worthwhile, and 
therefore to make certain that his diplomacy was able to secure the level of defence 
which finite material resources could not. It is a paradox that at the same time the 
Ententes enabled Grey to adopt an attitude in his diplomacy that inferred that British 
prestige remained undiminished, reflecting the fact that imperial security had been 
greatly enhanced, he was (at the same time) constrained by a need to ensure that the 
Ententes themselves survived so that the real weakness of the British position was not 
exposed. This, then, is what Wilson suggests to be the 'Fiction of the Free Hand',** 
the fact that for all the statements made to the contrary that sought to perpetuate the 
idea that British policy was commensurate with her position as an independent 'great 
power', Grey's diplomacy in reality reflected a recognition that Britain's status as a 
'great power' rested with the maintenance of good relations with those who 
threatened her the most. The potential consequences for this policy of a protracted 
parliamentary intervention into affairs of policy could therefore only contribute 
towards the exposure of issues and problems that Grey sought to limit, and a 
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questioning of the bases of his diplomacy by all those involved in power politics. This 
could in turn lead to an undermining of Britain's position unless either Grey could 
fend off criticisms (obscuring once more the weaknesses of his position) or another 
practical line of policy could be provided as a viable alternative given her fundamental 
interests. 
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Chapter I I : 'MATTER' A N D 'MANNER' IN BRITISH FOREIGN 
POLICY: T H E FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE OF 
NOVEMBER 1911 
1. The Agadir Crisis and the Radical Campaign for the Control of Foreign 
Affairs 
When we hear that there was a time when we were on the eve of 
war...then indeed democracy has the right to ask...that the people 
shall be clearly informed before such a crisis is reached, 
and...shall be allowed to express their opinions with the facts 
before them and decide for themselves whether action shall be 
taken or not... 
It is intolerable that the country should be kept in the dark and 
misled. Now that the policy of secrecy and mystery presents itself 
as a serious national danger it is the plain duty of politicians...to 
deliberate as to how this method of conducting foreign affairs can 
be altered and corrected. 
- Arthur Ponsonby, Democracy and the Control of Foreign Affairs, 1912 
The events of the summer of 1911 surrounding the Agadir Crisis have 
attracted a great deal of attention from historians. Seen perhaps as the dress 
rehearsal for the Great War, the war scare of 1911 had far-reaching 
consequences for far more people than those directly involved in the dispute 
over Morocco and the respective imperial interests of Germany and France. 
Once it became clear exactly how serious the extent of Franco-German schism 
had become, and how close an escape the European powers had had from 
escalation and military confrontation, some form of reaction became inevitable. 
In Britain, no less than anywhere else, serious questions were raised about the 
nation's involvement in an affair in which it had little justifiable or visible 
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grounds for interference. Stephen Koss has gone so far as to argue that 'it was 
the Agadir Crisis and not the outbreak of war three years later that convinced 
[Radical pohticians] of the need for a foreign policy more responsible...to 
pubhc opinion'.' In the wake of Agadir, a concerted effort was made by 
Radical MPs in Westminster to force the issue of the conduct of foreign affairs 
onto the political agenda, and a campaign was undertaken to attempt to force 
a reform of the machinery by which policy was formulated and implemented. 
This campaign is of particular interest to those concerned with the nature of 
diplomacy at this time, and its interaction with domestic politics. However, 
before this campaign can be assessed, it is necessary to place both it and its 
initiators into context with the time in question. 
The involvement of Radical MPs in the foreign policy issues of this 
period has been extensively researched. It is fair to trace their general position 
back to a House of Commons debate of 19th March 1886, in which Henry 
Richard had proposed the following motion:-
That in the opinion of this House it is not just or expedient to 
embark in war, contract engagements involving grave 
responsibilities for the nation, and add territories to the Empire 
without the knowledge and consent of Parliament.^ 
The failure of that motion, by a mere four votes, followed by a long 
period in which Radicalism was a substantial minority in the House, forced a 
change in approach by those concerned about the lack of parliamentary 
involvement in foreign affairs. The Radicals were forced to accept Gladstone's 
not unsympathetic argument that, although it was worrying that Parliament 
30 
could not act to check misguided policy (because it lacked both the information 
and the opportunity to pass judgement), it was impractical for the House to 
attempt to assume executive functions when it was already overburdened with 
legislative duties. The two roles could not be combined with any degree of 
practicality.' Having accepted this, the Radicals sought to ensure that the 
legislature remained in close contact with the executive, so as to guarantee that 
the latter should remain ever aware of the attitude of those from whom it 
derived its authority. Agitation that emerged over specific issues therefore 
tended to be of a substantive as opposed to a procedural nature. Richards 
describes the change in approach as being towards public campaigns of 
criticism, which could be advanced by direct challenges within the existing 
pattern of debates, as opposed to separate initiatives launched from beyond 
the scope of current business."* Morris concludes that the Radicals set up stall 
as the moral guardians of liberal principle, dissenters against any policy which 
threatened to compromise sacred ideals.^ 
The studies of Radical involvement in specific campaigns against certain 
pohcy issues reflect not so much direct opposition to official positions, but 
rather concern that those positions held scope for abuses contrary to Liberal 
principles. Weinroth argues that the Radicals championed the Entente of 1904 
with France insofar as it promoted peaceful co-operation and rapprochement, 
hinting that a 'family of nations' in which the need for arms and scope for war 
would be concomitantly reduced could be realised. It was only once the 
Tangiers Crisis had caused fears of German ambition that Radical 
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commentators perceived an anti-German bias incorporated within the Entente, 
and complained that Britain had become entangled within a 'balance of power' 
mechanism contrary to the spirit of a 'family of nations'. Only at this stage did 
the Radicals adopt a more hostile view towards the nature of Anglo-French 
relations,* The attempts by Courtney and Avebury's 'Anglo-German 
Friendship Committee', and Sir Thomas Barclay's 'Brotherhood Alliance', to 
promote closer Anglo-German relations were intended to foster the spirit of 
continental rapprochement which the Radicals had hoped the Entente would 
be the first step towards. The lack of political grounds for complementing the 
Anglo-French Entente with an Anglo-German Entente, which frustrated the 
diplomatic moves for Naval disarmament, did not deter Radical hopes. Such 
failures were taken to reflect the fact that the spirit of the original Entente was 
being abused for illiberal 'balance of power' considerations, and convinced 
Radicals that their duty was to restore and expand that spirit so as to defuse 
the dangerous situation that the isolation of Germany had caused.' 
The 1907 Convention with Russia aroused Radical suspicion because of 
the nature of that country's regime. In spite of favouring general 
rapprochement, the fact remained that the Tsar's Empire was the antithesis of 
all that liberal idealism held dear, and this tended to encourage the Radicals' 
fears that close Anglo-Russian relations could only be maintained at the 
expense of Liberal traditions. The nature of Anglo-Russian co-operation in 
Persia was seen to reflect a bias towards pro-Russian and imperialistic 
tendencies, and not the championing of a small, constitutionally inclined state 
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against the oppression of larger illiberal neighbours that the Radicals hoped 
for. The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-09 merely encouraged fears that the Ententes 
had entangled Britain into an alliance, anti-German in character, and 
dominated by two allies: one, France, which harboured deep-seated resentment 
towards and distrust of a German Empire which had prospered at her expense 
(both in terms of territory and prestige); the other, Russia, which in appearing 
to follow a dangerous Pan-Slav policy, threatened to destabilise the 
international status quo. Although not bound by overt military obligations or 
diplomatic guarantees, the nature of Grey's diplomacy convinced his Radical 
colleagues that under his guidance Britain had ceased to be an impartial 
arbiter between the Powers, and had instead become a willing participant in 
the 'balance of power' game which had prompted the division of Europe and 
spawned the bloc alliances which seemed to have emerged.* Arguments that 
his initiatives merely continued an accepted line of policy which had evolved 
irrespective of domestic party political considerations did little to placate his 
critics. It was this 'balance' scenario that the Radicals sought to avoid; and this 
that eventually sparked off the struggle for control of foreign policy in 1911. 
As they had feared, developments suggested that the executive had grown 
increasingly apart from the legislature, to the point where policy was being 
initiated without due attention being paid to the wishes of those from whom 
authority was derived. Suspicions of this kind existed before the summer of 
1911. The impact caused by the events of that summer, the outburst of 
indignation that followed the Agadir Crisis and which prompted the subsequent 
agitation for change in policy control, need to be considered. Why did the 
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Agadir Crisis have such a profound effect upon the domestic political scene in 
Britain, and consequently upon foreign policy? 
Ironically, it is possible to cite the slackening of concern over foreign 
affairs during 1910 and the early part of 1911, and the absence of any overt 
crisis at that time, as the main reason for the furore which arose after Agadir. 
After the Bosnian Crisis and its aftermath, a period of relative calm occurred 
in which diplomacy tended to encourage optimism even in Radical quarters. 
During this period Russia and Germany reached their agreement at Potsdam 
which, although dealing principally with the right to construct railways in the 
Near and Middle East, was seen by Liberals as evidence that the Entente 
powers could reach an amicable modus vivendi with Germany. Similarly, it was 
felt that the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty of early 1911 provided a 
precedent for a style of diplomacy which would encourage universal 
rapprochement and compromise. There was little to suggest that confrontation 
was near, or that Britain's foreign policy was incompatible with long term 
international peace and co-operation.** Furthermore, the domestic political 
scene in Britain conspired to distract attention away from the realm of foreign 
affairs.'" 1910 and 1911 had been dominated by the issue of the power of the 
House of Lords and parliamentary reform. The months prior to the Agadir 
Crisis saw the country hit by a wave of strikes, in which serious rioting 
provoked the government into deploying troops against strikers. Moreover, it 
is by no means certain that the general public was particularly concerned with 
foreign affairs developments which, to the uninformed observer, had apparently 
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little to do with domestic matters. What is certain is that after the general 
elections of 1910 the Radicals' scope for agitating against their own ministers 
was greatly reduced. With up to a 33% reduction in the number of Liberal 
MPs, and with the government dependent upon the Irish vote in the Commons, 
the Radicals were forced to support Asquith's cabinet or otherwise risk letting 
Balfour and the Unionists in. It would seem that, until the extent of the crisis 
in late summer 1911 was appreciated, domestic and parliamentary attitudes 
towards foreign affairs reflected a combination of complacent optimism, 
enforced quiescence and loyalty to political responsibilities, and general lack of 
interest. Even Radical MPs who had previously stirred up trouble in the 
House seem to have recognised that little could be gained from any outbursts 
of rhetoric. As Morris says, right up to the Crisis and even during its 
diplomatic height, 'like Hamlet, conscience seemed to have made cowards of 
them all ' ." 
The events of the summer of 1911, once fully appreciated, changed 
everything.'^ Again ironically, a change in domestic circumstances occurred 
simultaneously with developments in the international arena. The domestic 
issues which had helped divert attention during 1910 and early 1911 were now 
at least partially dealt with: and the relative calm which had prevailed in the 
diplomatic field during the same period was shattered. The Agadir Crisis 
removed at a stroke the circumstances which had rendered Radical arguments 
vis a vis foreign policy impotent and unattractive. Just as the dominant issues 
at home (the passage of the Parliament Bill and the rail and dock strikes) were 
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resolved, the collapse of the relative detente between Britain and Germany, 
and the perceived threat of war, occurred - and grabbed the attention of both 
the public and the politicians. For those who had never conceded defeat to 
the Foreign Secretary over pohcy, who had held fast to their convictions as to 
how policy should be conducted, the opportunity to force a review of affairs for 
once with the ful l attention of the politically interested focussed upon the 
international scene must have seemed heaven sent. The days in the wilderness, 
when their arguments had been laid aside, were over. 
As Morris has shown, the revival of Radical fortunes in the struggle for 
control of foreign policy did not occur immediately." In the period 1st to 27th 
July, during which the diplomatic activity surrounding the crisis reached its 
height, and indeed for much of the summer when 'war fever' and military 
activity reached unprecedented levels, the Radicals were prevented from 
launching any attacks upon Grey or the Foreign Office. It was not until the 
end of the summer of 1911 that the domestic political scene had quietened 
sufficiently to enable the Radicals to attack a minister without fear of upsetting 
other legislation or policy with which they were concerned. Furthermore, they 
were as much bound by more general political considerations as any other 
party or faction - and could not afford to be seen to be unpatriotic, ergo 
unsupportive, when the crisis was at its height.'" The lack of dissent from the 
back-benches during the foreign affairs debate of 27th July 1911 can best be 
explained by two factors: the political constraints outlined above: and 
ignorance. Indeed, the second of these two factors was to provide Grey's 
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critics with a powerful weapon in their later agitation. His failure to provide 
sufficient information at the height of the crisis to defuse a situation which he 
was later to claim had been blown out of all proportion merely seemed to 
uphold the traditional Radical arguments claiming that the executive had 
assumed excessive power over policy, to the extent where the supervisory 
powers of the democratically elected legislature had become meaningless. 
Their initial failure to offer anything other than patriotic support, when their 
subsequent activity seemed later to suggest that they should have intervened 
earlier to repair the serious abuses of power which, they argued, had caused 
much of the summer's crisis, merely gave weight to this position. Finally, it is 
important to remember that, with Parliament in recess during the summer 
months, the opportunity to place Grey under pressure afforded by direct 
questioning was removed, and even though the break enabled Radicals to 
embark upon initiatives whilst free from their duties in the House, the closure 
of the parliamentary stage until the Autumn doubtless helps explain the delay 
between the crisis period and the initiation of the Radical campaign. 
As soon as they were afforded the opportunity to examine the events of 
the summer free from the constraining factors of July and early August, the 
Radicals began to perceive serious anomalies in the British position that Grey 
and other officials proved unable to explain away. The reasons given for 
British involvement in what on first examination appeared to be a Franco-
German matter appeared at best to be unconvincing. The Radicals could find 
no material interests of sufficient importance to justify the extent of British 
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intervention. Moreover, the apparent bias displayed in favour of France during 
the summer seemed to contradict the principles of legality and justice to which 
Grey claimed he was bound. It was the French who had provoked the Crisis 
with their encroachments into Morocco: the German demands for 
compensation were therefore to be expected, even supported when the terms 
of the 1909 Franco-German Agreement were allowed for. Grey's staunch 
opposition to the German position, and refusal to condemn his Entente partner 
for what seemed to be a similarly aggressive policy (pursued at Moroccan 
expense), caused concern. What really provoked Radical fury, however, was 
the speech delivered by Lloyd George at the Mansion House on 21st July and 
its implicit refusal to tolerate German snubbing of defined British interests.'^ 
Although at first applauded as a staunchly patriotic exposition Britain's 
position, the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech attracted increasingly 
vituperative criticism once the circumstances of its release were considered. 
There had been no obvious threat to commercial interests at the time of its 
release, and the obviously provocative tone which Lloyd George seemed to 
have displayed towards Germany in his strong attack upon displays of coercive 
brinksmanship, seemed anything but consistent with the circumstances existing 
at the time of its release. The fact that up to that point he had been seen as a 
senior spokesman for pacifism merely increased Radical ire; he now seemed to 
have betrayed his convictions and his erstwhile supporters in one stroke. The 
Germans had quite naturally believed that as he was a senior cabinet minister, 
Lloyd George's speech had to represent the position of the British Government 
p< (which it did): and in the face of such hostility, their alienation was only to be 
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expected. What had the Chancellor hoped to achieve? The only explanation 
which seemed to make sense to the Radicals, if Lloyd George had not 
committed a blunder of incredible incompetence, was that the speech - and, 
indeed, the entirety of Grey's diplomacy in the summer months - had been a 
calculated attempt to bolster up France against Germany (which it was). This 
in turn only made sense if the 1904 Entente had committed Britain to such a 
policy, for the circumstances of July 1911 (and the lack of material interests 
involved) hardly seemed to have done so. If this was the case, then the 
criticism and fears which the Radicals had expressed in the wake of the 
Tangiers Crisis, and their long standing opposition to entangling alliances, 
assumed new importance. 
Matters were not helped by the nature of British diplomacy concerning 
other developments occuring in the summer. In the case of both the Italian 
invasion of Tripoli and the renewed Russian interference in the domestic 
affairs of Persia, Grey showed little inclination to undertake the stringent 
diplomatic measures needed to champion the position of the weaker and (in 
Persia's case at least) consfitutionally-minded states against the wanton 
aggression of powerful European countries harbouring imperial ambitions. 
This may have been consistent with the listlessness displayed by Whitehall 
towards the French incursions into Morocco, and in particular the expedition to 
Fez of December 1910 which had sparked off German protests. It hardly 
mirrored the reacfion shown to the despatching of the 'Panther' to Agadir and 
the subsequent demands issued by the Germans. Considerations of Realpolitik 
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which shaped Grey's policy initiatives during the summer of 1911 are 
immaterial here. Even though his diplomacy may have been determined by 
very real policy considerations of which his critics had little inkling, and which 
historians have only recently come to appreciate, the fact remains that it is 
what the Radicals saw and believed at that time, rather than the reality of the 
situation, that motivated them into action. What is certain is that, of the four 
Powers with whom Britain could have become embroiled, given the events of 
the summer of 1911, only one - Germany - was treated in an openly hostile and 
aggressive manner. Perceived bias in the conduct displayed was bound to 
provoke a reaction from the Radicals. Reports of military preparations and 
the likelihood of war could only but attract concerned attention. However, the 
nature of the later attacks upon the Foreign Secretary stemmed principally 
from his failure to explain away these anomalies in terms of the circumstances 
in which they occurred. Without satisfactory explanations, his critics could only 
draw their own conclusions. The bias shown in favour of France and Russia, 
not justified by the activities of those Powers in the summer of 1911, could only 
be explained if Britain had by dint of the 1904 and 1907 Ententes committed 
herself to the supporting of these 'allies', irrespective of the cost to tradition or 
principle. The acquiescence displayed towards Italy vis a vis Tripoli was less 
easy to link to covert commitments, but was nevertheless in stark contrast to 
the Agadir line. It seemed that Grey did not want to antagonise the Italian 
government over an affair of such low material importance. Al l the evidence 
from the summer of 1911 pointed to a 'balance of power' infrastructure within 
which Britain's role had become fixed as the result of her Entente 
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commitments - public or secret. Her traditional role in the states system, that 
of the impartial liberal arbiter, had been sacrificed, without popular mandate, 
for what, in the circumstances of the Agadir Crisis, must have seemed little 
better than Esau's 'mess of pottage'. 
From August 1911 onwards, the Radicals increased their agitation over 
foreign affairs, seeking to expose policy initiatives incompatible with what they 
argued was the 'correct' policy for Britain, and demanding explanations where 
such anomalies were uncovered. After two of the leading Radical MPs, Noel 
Buxton and J H Whitehouse, had returned from a fact-finding visit to Berlin, 
Buxton despatched a memorandum to Asquith, calling upon the Government 
to reassure Germany that British policy was neither Germanophobic in 
orientation, nor, by dint of the Anglo-French Entente, an obstacle to an Anglo-
German rapprochement.'* Another leading Radical agitator. Lord Courtney, 
urged the Foreign Secretary to issue a statement recognising Germany's 
position." Arthur Ponsonby, who with Buxton was to spearhead the Radical 
campaign in Parliament, supplied the press with information about military 
preparations for war; claims echoed by Buxton in the November edition of 
Contemporary Review. At the same time, the National Peace Council, the 
Anglo-German Friendship Society, and the New League of Universal 
Brotherhood all began to campaign for improved relations with Germany, and 
against the increases in armaments and militarism which, they believed, 
increased the likelihood of war. Articles in the Economist and Concord 
examined the economic grounds for Anglo-German co-operation and the 
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probable cost to the British economy if Grey's apparently anti-German policy 
were to continue. Labour organisations, ever sympathetic to Radical 
carhpaigns of this nature, criticised the Foreign Secretary for the cold, illiberal, 
secretive manner in which he was handling affairs. It was time, they argued, to 
institute measures that would oblige the Foreign Secretary to release 
information on demand, thus reducing the chance that any more 
unrepresentative policy initiatives would be undertaken.'^ 
Of greatest significance for the parliamentary agitation which was to 
follow, however, was the creation of an organised campaign vehicle - the so-
called Liberal Foreign Affairs Committee. This body was created following a 
meeting of the leading Radical critics at the New Reform Club on 14th 
November 1911. Arguing that the upholding of prestated principles foreign 
policy was the only sure way in which real national interests could be secured, 
this Committee became the platform for Radical agitation up to the outbreak 
of the First World War. Its aims were simple: to focus attention upon the 
principles which underwrote policy initiatives; and to secure greater access to 
official information as an insurance that those principles were upheld by 
policy." A similar, but shortlived, committee was started by Courtney. Whilst 
echoing the calls for Anglo-German rapprochement, this group sought to 
reaffirm traditional Liberal ideals; the upholding of the twin principles of 
'independence and integrity' for all states, support for all nations attempting to 
establish constitutional government, and opposition against moves to commit 
Britain to alliance blocs or a 'balance of power' system. As with the Liberal 
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Foreign Affairs Committee, an increase in the supply of information vis a vis 
policy was demanded.^" Last, but by no means least, the appointment of Sir 
John Brunner to the presidency of the National Liberal Federation saw the 
revitalisation of that organisation as a check against the Government's practice 
of using the power of the Whips to coerce its supporters into a mere rubber-
stamping of its policies. Brunner sought to champion calls for increased 
liberalism in foreign policy at regional levels, involving the N.L.F. in campaigns 
over issues in that field." 
The wave of indignation and concern reached even to the cabinet, for 
even at that level Radical idealism was able to count upon sympathy, i f not 
unreserved support. Certain ministers noted for such sympathies reacted 
angrily when it became clear that they had been excluded from a meeting of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence on 23rd August 1911, in favour of a 
smaller 'Inner Cabinet' group dominated by Liberal League ministers (although 
Lloyd George and Churchill, ertswhile Radicals, had been present). This 
meeting had included sensitive discussions about the Entente with France, and 
in parficular about possible military co-ordination in the event of a war against 
Germany. A serious split in Asquith's cabinet was avoided, but only after the 
Prime Minister fashioned a compromise at the crucial cabinet meeting of 15th 
November 1911 in which it was agreed that future decisions on policy would be 
initiated only after full cabinet approval had been granted." 
However, the concerns and demands of Radicals both in and out of 
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Westminster could not be so easily deflected. The revival of their interest and 
arguments, given new vitality by both the incidence and seriousness of 
developments noted in the summer of 1911, prompted those who had long 
harboured doubts about the nature of foreign policy to campaign for a review 
of the machinery of policy; and, if justified, to secure a reform of the same. 
And, for once, they could campaign whilst the attention of a concerned 
domestic audience was focused upon the issue. 
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2. The Debate of 27th November 1911: Grey's Statement of Policy 
The debate of 27th November 1911 marked a recognition by those in the 
government responsible for the formulation and control of foreign policy that the 
increasingly persistent expressions of Radical dissatisfaction which followed the Agadir 
Crisis could not be ignored. Although stability within the Liberal Cabinet had been 
restored by Asquith's compromise of 15th November 1911," the need to answer 
criticisms of policy emanating from the Radicals^" and to justify both the nature and 
the conduct of policy that had provoked them, became irresistible. As suggested 
above, the concatenation of events during the summer had encouraged the revival of 
Radical concern, and prompted calls demanding a general statement and discussion of 
pohcy." The debate of the 27th November 1911 was the product of this environment 
of tension and criticism, of the uncertainty and suspicion that the unexplained events 
of the summer had engendered. As Morris explains:-
The debate arose mainly as a result of their [the 
Radicals'] activities, and the public anxieties fostered 
by their insistent propaganda.^ 
Before attempting a closer analysis of the debate of 27th November, it is necessary 
to clarify and reiterate several points at the heart of the argument. It is possible to 
identify and distinguish between two facets of foreign policy which attracted particular 
attention: specific issues and events which constitute the operation of policy (the 
'manner' of policy); and the fundamental determinants of policy, both material and 
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theoretical (the 'matter' of policy) which dictate the nature of its practical 
application." As has already been discussed, a great deal of the criticism levelled 
against Grey was prompted by the events of the summer, in which specific instances 
of inconsistency in the operation of policy were perceived by Radical spectators.^ 
Considering the seriousness of the crisis of the summer, and the belief that there had 
been a real threat to peace and stability, it is hardly surprising that these anomalies 
and inconsistencies in policy 'manner' provoked some form of parliamentary backlash. 
However, these anomalies, taken in isolation, hardly explain the extent of outrage that 
poured forth - unless taken in conjunction with an altogether wider and more 
perturbing development. Radical interest in foreign policy, indeed in any policy, was 
motivated to a large degree by principle, and the conviction that these should be 
upheld by those in government at all fimes.^' Their opposifion to certain initiatives, 
such as a manipulative 'balance of power' policy, was based on a belief that they were 
incompatible with a Liberal or democratic policy infrastructure. Isolated examples of 
illiberal or flawed policy 'manner' might attract general but transitory Radical dissent, 
or even, as McLean notes, prolonged agitation by a few interested individuals.^ The 
concatenation of events in the summer and autumn of 1911 which showed evidence of 
flawed policy 'manner' attracted a sustained and organised campaign of dissent far 
beyond the norm. With evidence from such a wide range of sources, and of such 
serious import, that poHcy 'manner' had been neither consistent in approach nor 
compatible with stated material interests and principles, the Radicals concluded that 
the flaws in policy 'manner' were symptomatic of a serious malaise which arose from 
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the 'matter' of policy. The nature of Britain's diplomatic involvement in the Agadir 
Crisis, when compared and contrasted with that displayed during the concurrent 
developments in Tripoli and Persia, pointed to a significant abuse of executive 
authority. It was easy to believe that the nation, kept in a state of ignorance by the 
policy controllers, had been committed without due mandate to a policy line 
compatible neither with material interest nor political tradition. This, then, was the 
basis of the Radical assault: policy 'matter' had been dictated without consideration of 
the wishes of the legislature (the democratically elected representative of the popular 
will), and consequently policy 'manner' had brought Britain to the brink of a war, and 
sacrificed her traditional role as upholder of justice and Liberalism, to no obvious end. 
To the Radicals, who had long argued that the material and theoretical interests upon 
which policy was based had to be representative of, accountable to, and therefore 
safeguarded by the will of the majority (through the medium of Parliament), all the 
evidence pointed towards the need for a review and reform of the policy mechanism. 
Foreign policy 'manner' and 'matter' had to represent the interests of the democratic 
consensus." This, then, was the cornerstone of the Radical campaign. This was the 
position that Sir Edward Grey had to contend with in his speech to the House on 27th 
November 1911. 
For Grey, the debate provided a chance to strike at the roots of the Radical 
agitation, and to counter the domestic furore which was causing considerable difficulty 
for the Foreign Secretary as he sought to uphold his overall diplomatic position and 
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follow a consistent line in a variety of theatres.'^ Criticism from his own backbenchers 
meant more to Grey than parliamentary weakness (with the Foreign Secretary 
increasingly having to rely upon Conservative support for his conduct); the domestic 
expressions of dissent and concern did little to help uphold his and Britain's credibility 
abroad. This threatened to have a damaging effect upon the attitudes of foreign 
powers, upon their assessments upon the value and stabihty of her Entente 
relationships, and consequently upon her position in the European distribution of 
power. Grey's Entente partners could be expected to re-evaluate their positions vis a 
vis the respective agreements made with Britain, seeking to accrue maximum 
advantage from any developments in the British position. Moreover, attempts to 
stabilise relations with non-ahgned or estranged powers could hardly be expected to 
prosper whilst domestic agitation placed Grey's position as the undisputed voice of 
British diplomacy (and thus her 'internal cohesion') in question.'^ The Foreign 
Secretary was well aware of these considerations, and the consequent need to restore 
domestic calm and faith so as to minimise any disruption in his diplomatic position.^ 
The statement delivered on 27th November 1911^' was intended to meet these 
requirements, to offer sufficient explanation and information to show that the policies 
in operation and the events of the recent past were entirely compatible with the 
defence of national interests and traditional pohcy considerations. By systematically 
rebutting the charges levelled against both the context and conduct of his policies. 
Grey sought to go beyond the defence of his record; he attempted to show that his 
critics were unable to offer any alternative capable of sustaining viable levels of 
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defence for national and imperial interests. The debate came to focus upon the 
conflict between the moral imperative (the need to follow a policy compatible with 
principles of conscience), and the practical necessity (the extent to which constraints 
of practical diplomacy meant that some compromise on principle became necessary). 
In short, the issues came to be: were the policies of the Foreign Secretary justified by 
the circumstances facing Britain; and did the arguments of his Radical critics reflect a 
sufficient awareness of those circumstances - did they provide a practical alternative 
which could cater for both the dictates of conscience and of reality? By examining the 
issues raised in the debate itself, and assessing the relative merits of the statements 
made, a clearer understanding of the position in Westminster may be reached, an 
understanding that will enable an evaluation of exactly how far foreign policy was 
understood and influenced by Parliament, and as a result of how far such an influence 
was desirable given the nature of the interests at stake. 
The Foreign Editor of The Times Valentine Chirol reported the statement 
delivered by Grey as having been one of 'transparent sincerity'.^ It is certainly fair to 
say that the Foreign Secretary seized upon the opportunity afforded by the debate, 
offering what Asquith described as 'an exposition ... of policy ... on the subject of 
Morocco ... with fullness and precision'"; and thus carried the attack to the critics of 
both policy and conduct who were to follow. Nor did he attempt to shirk his 
responsibilities to the House by restricting the parameters of debate and thereby 
dodging questions of an awkward nature. Although he admitted to intentionally 
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limiting his statement to issues pertaining to the Agadir Crisis and the Anglo-German 
schism (for reasons clearly given), he also expressed a wish not to limit possible areas 
of discussion that went beyond his own coverage.^ In fact, documentary evidence 
suggests that Grey would have been only too happy to have avoided any difficult 
subjects of discussion, especially those which dwelt upon matters fundamental to 
Entente stability^' - but he was well aware that, should he appear unwilling or unready 
to consider the other concerns voiced by the Radicals, he would risk further and 
enduring parliamentary interventions potentially damaging to his overall diplomatic 
position.'*' It must be remembered that this position left him little room for 
manoeuvre. His scope for revealing the considerations that dictated the nature of 
policy, and consequently his ability to explain his conduct, was extremely limited. He 
actually attempted to show how such constraints limited his options, and therefore 
how his conduct could be justified as being commensurate with existing and 
unavoidable diplomatic exigencies."*^ However, Grey knew that a failure to answer 
questions in as full and open a manner would hardly suffice to reduce the fears and 
suspicions that underwrote the vocal expressions of dissent which were of such 
potential danger. In a letter, to one of his Radical critics, Arthur Ponsonby, of 20th 
December 1911, following the conclusion of the debate, Grey was to lament the 
problem that faced him in this:-
[As regards foreign affairs, a Minister] must even 
suppress the things most essential to his own defence 
when he is attacked."^ 
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Grey's statement had to be more than a resume of events that clarified points of 
material interest. It had to be an apology for the very bases of his foreign policy, 
both 'manner' and 'matter', a counter-attack capable of showing that the charges of 
malpractice levelled against him were undeserved because in the light of practical 
constraints little in the way of alternative options existed for the operation of British 
diplomacy. Criticisms that failed to provide practical suggestions for change could 
thereby be shown as misguided because they failed to consider all the issues implicit 
in an overall foreign policy position. But in doing this Grey had to make sure that he 
did not compromise his position either at home or in a wider diplomatic context. He 
had to be careful not to offend Liberal sentiment by appearing excessively 
Machiavellian in the pursuit of practical policies; nor to arouse Conservative concern 
by bringing into question issues of national security and influence. At the same time, 
and in a similar vein, he had to take care not to provoke adverse reactions abroad, 
either by contravening diplomatic etiquette and presenting an overly aggressive front, 
or by reveahng information central to policy issues without due consideration for other 
interests not under scrutiny but of no less importance.''^ 
In the light of such constraints, Grey's statement can indeed be interpreted as 
worthy of the praises it received. His account of the summer's diplomatic initiatives 
was clear and concise, to a large but by no means complete degree repairing 
omissions as to specific events and conduct which Grey claimed had been the cause of 
the misunderstandings and scaremongering outbursts of concern.*' The later sections 
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of the Foreign Secretary's initial statement, which dealt with domestic and diplomatic 
considerations that in combination had engendered much of the strains and tensions 
of the summer and autumn, and with the discussion of British foreign policy which 
sought to examine both the 'matter' and 'manner' which constituted his diplomacy, are 
of particular interest to any study analysing the practicality of policy. Nevertheless, 
because the Agadir Crisis had been the dynamic factor behind the Radical campaign, 
and because it was the diplomatic handling of this specific issue that Grey had to 
explain in order to retain a semblance of credibility, it is with the Foreign Secretary's 
statement about Agadir that this study shall begin. 
Concentrating on the issues central to the Agadir Crisis, the Foreign Secretary was 
nevertheless able to address the bulk of the more general criticisms levelled against 
his policies. Grey qualified his position over Morocco by arguing that British 
diplomacy had been concerned at all times with the defence of definite interests which 
were already recognised in international agreements - specifically, strategic and 
economic interests confirmed by the 1904 Anglo-French Agreement,"*' but which 
Germany had wrongly assumed had been waived in 1904. This German 
misinterpretation had underscored the Anglo-German rift from 4th July 1911 until 
27th July 1911, a rift caused mainly by the failure of the two powers to clarify their 
respective positions, or to concede any recognition that they had done so. Britain, 
apparently faced with attempts to exclude her from negotiations which not only 
concerned her interests but also threatened to compromise them, and with an 
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apparent reluctance on the part of Germany to respond to requests for a recognition 
of those interests, had reacted sharply, attempting to persuade Berlin that she would 
not tolerate any ignoring or infringement of her declared interests. However, at no 
time were any demands made for a role in negotiations involving matters beyond 
those interests. Lloyd George's Mansion House Speech, with its declaration of the 
British position couched in the strongest terms, proved sufficient to provoke a 
response from Germany.''* The consequent diplomatic exchanges were able to secure 
such clarifications and recognitions as were deemed necessary, and at the same time it 
was agreed that a normalisation of relations should be encouraged by public 
statements aimed at restoring calm and promoting goodwill."' With the statement of 
the Prime Minister to the House on 27th July 1911 to that effect, the schism had been 
repaired and rapprochement begun."* 
Using the crisis as a backdrop, Grey attempted to consider the lessons which could 
be derived from the course and nature of events. He argued that, given the high level 
of tension and excitement that had erupted as the public became aware of events, the 
success of achieving a negotiated settlement and thereby averting the threat of 
coercion and conflict itself merited applause. I f any bitterness still lingered, and 
indeed if any rift in Anglo-German relations persisted, it was due primarily to the 
intervention of misinformed individuals who, motivated by their own perverse 
interpretations of events, sought to exploit the existence of tension and criticise the 
content and conduct of diplomacy, thereby forcing a review and possibly even the 
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reform of the machinery of policy formulation and control. This issue came in for 
particular attention from Grey:-
It is as i f the world were indulging in a fit of political 
alcoholism, and the best that can be done by those of 
us in positions of responsibility is to keep cool and 
sober."' 
His statement was aimed not only towards alleviating sources of tension, but was 
also a direct attack upon such agitations, which conspired against the normalisation of 
affairs by misrepresenting the issues at the heart of the crisis and thus perpetuating 
instability. I f Grey appeared to claim a special responsibility or proprietary rights in 
discussing the management of foreign affairs, he argued that it was because he felt 
duty bound to counter rash, uninformed and unofficial expositions that undermined 
diplomatic relations.'" This statement was an official response outlining what the 
government believed had been the cause and nature of problems. By at last providing 
a clear exposition outlining the considerations behind policy. Grey was able to counter 
the scaremongering critics; and at the same time attempt to shift at least partial 
responsibility for the prolonged tension upon those who had indulged in the general 
bout of 'poHtical alcoholism'. 
Given that the Foreign Secretary was so scathing about the impact which 
misinformed opinions had upon diplomacy, it is hardly surprising that he also sought 
to clarify the reasons for the long delay in, and the incomplete nature of, the release 
of official information. As Noel Buxton was quick to point out, this was itself in part 
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responsible for the problems of scaremongering because it encouraged rather than 
discouraged further speculation.'* Grey had already excused his failure to keep the 
House informed at earlier dates for several reasons. The revelation of potentially 
sensitive material during the course of Franco-German negotiations, or indeed before 
the ratification of any agreement that resulted from then, would threaten the 
successful conclusion of the negotiations." The Germans had themselves requested 
that specific information be kept secret about events in Morocco during the July 
exchanges," and Grey made no apology for adhering to conventions of diplomatic 
etiquette and keeping silent.'" However, several other political factors not mentioned 
in the debate can also be given as reasons for earlier silence. The Cabinet rift of 1st 
November to the 15th November has already been mentioned, although as Wilson 
recognises the actual weight the rift had in delaying a statement cannot be proven." 
Grey had also held hopes of entering the debate from a position of strength: after the 
publication of the Secret Articles of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 had 
weakened the Radical position; and, if possible, with a motion offered by the official 
Opposition who he knew would, in the main, refrain from turning a foreign affairs 
debate into a party political contest.'* Although unable to secure the latter, the 
publication of the Secret Articles on 24th November had the desired effect, 
successfully countering claims that the government was guilty of pursuing clandestine 
agreements or compromising national independence by undermining her ability to 
pursue any course of policy she wished." At the simplest level, this conveyed an 
impression that Grey was willing to concede information and that accusations of 
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excessive secrecy were without basis. In Parliament it gave the Foreign Secretary the 
opportunity to exploit several points. By associating the conduct of current affairs 
with the 1904 Unionist ministry, he was able to secure a recognition of both 
consistency in foreign affairs and the subjugation of party affairs to the national 
interest; a sentiment echoed by Lansdowne (through Bonar Law), who had been 
consulted prior to both publication and debate.^' As a result. Grey was able to adopt 
the position of a statesman defending national interests rather than that of a politician 
exploiting them for political gain. The role of secrecy could therefore be defended 
from a position of relative strength. The articles that were published helped this, 
because it was possible to show that they merely complemented the basic outlines that 
the open treaty expressed, providing for an easier adoption of mundane principles 
already known. Britain was not committed by any documentary responsibility to 
France, and consequently the fear that Britain could be dragged into a war in which 
she had no interest or justification for involvement was rebuffed.'" Radical critics of 
the Entente could still accuse the Foreign Secretary of pursuing a course of diplomacy 
not strictly upheld or defined in treaties. However, their ability to accuse Grey of 
conducting a secret diplomacy that removed the 'free hand' and threatened to commit 
Britain via treaty responsibilities had been damaged. 
However, i f the arguments of commentators upon the diplomacy of the ante 
bellum period are considered, this aspect of Grey's speech warrants criticism, and 
upheld as evidence that the Radicals' claims about deliberate misleading by officials 
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were justified. Wilson argues convincingly that Grey's diplomacy throughout the 
Agadir Crisis had been determined not by anti-Germanism, but by a need to ensure 
that French poHcy did not wreck the modus operandi upon which the 1904 Entente 
depended.*" It is surely correct to point to the German response to French incursion 
as the dynamic factor that provoked the British intervention of 21st July 1911*': the 
opposition to German territorial claims in Morocco, and the resistance shown to the 
threat of an agreement dictated by Berlin between Germany and France, which 
excluded Britain from an area of expressed interest, cannot be explained in any other 
light. What dictated such a response, however, can be questioned. 
Officials in Whitehall were certainly critical of the French policy which had enabled 
Germany to seize the initiative with the despatching of the 'Panther', and were 
angered by subsequent initiatives undertaken from the Quai d'Orsay which threatened 
to adopt a course incompatible with responsibilities due under the 1904 Agreement.*^ 
However, at no time did the British show any inclination to question the Entente as 
the basis for continuing foreign policy. The threat of a conference, to settle the 
dispute, marked the extent to which Britain threatened an 'abandonment' of the 
French; and this concession, that France may have to concede ground under the 
auspices of an international forum, cannot hide the fact that at any conference she 
could count upon both Britain and Russia for support.*' A l l the evidence available 
suggests that British policy was intent upon preserving the Entente against all threats: 
internationally, against French indiscretion and German opportunism, and 
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domestically, against criticism of foreign policy 'manner' and 'matter'. The security 
dilemma which had prompted the adoption of the Entente system in the first place 
meant that, in spite of the difficulties which arose under its auspices, the 1904 
Agreement (and indeed the 1907 Agreement with Russia) remained as the best 
guarantee of Britain's position in the states system.*" Britain needed cordial relations 
with France to offset an acute strategic crisis; she had therefore to convince the 
French that any advantages accrued from such cordiality would be reciprocal. 
When it is remembered that this strategic crisis was basically imperial in 
orientation, Wilson's assessment of the French position at this time explains the 
attraction which the Entente held for both powers. He paints a clear picture: 
Though France was militarily stronger than England, 
she was more vulnerable in European terms. The 
weakness of weaker states puts stronger states almost 
entirely at the disposal of their dependents. Once a 
stronger state had adopted the interests...of a weaker 
state as its own, then [its] foreign policy...could not 
change...[and] was no longer its own foreign policy, but 
that of the weaker state.*' 
Wilson argues that, in European terms, France had become dependent upon the 
support of the British, who enjoyed a relative strategic advantage. However, in 
imperial terms, the positions were reversed. Britain needed an end to agitation in the 
colonial field to alleviate the crisis over imperial defence which had built up.** 
Rapprochement with France, a definite threat prior to 1904, achieved this; and, 
moreover, made the chance for agreement with Russia (according to Wilson, the real 
target of Entente diplomacy) all the greater. The Entente provided reciprocal 
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advantages. France gained British support vis a vis Europe: Britain secured French 
co-operation vis a vis Empire. It is with this arrangement that the events surrounding 
Agadir were concerned. Grey was forced, in spite of reservations about French 
initiatives, to steer a course for the Entente through the minefields of domestic and 
international politics, in order to preserve the diplomatic agreements upon which 
Britain's imperial security was based. Had Grey failed to support the French in the 
way he did, manoeuvring both France and Germany into an agreement commensurate 
with French strategic and political interests, he could not have expected the French to 
remain loyal to the Entente. The fact that the dispute was resolved with both the 
Entente and continental peace intact marked a considerable achievement. 
But, crucially, the Foreign Secretary could not achieve this diplomatic success 
whilst placating domestic critics concerned with apparent diplomatic bias and 
manipulative 'balance of power' policy. Had Grey outlined the strategic 
considerations at stake, he would have simultaneously been forced to reveal politically 
sensitive material; most damagingly, about the reciprocal weaknesses and strengths of 
Britain and France upon which the Entente was based.*' The political furore which 
this would have provoked was too much to contemplate. It was much easier to 
engage in a poHcy of half truth and deception, to protect the Radicals from 
themselves. By stressing the part played by German dynamism, and judging the 
nature of Anglo-French relations (using the publication of the secret articles of the 
1904 Agreement, in conjunction with the already published texts, to show that no 
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written commitments had been made, thereby hiding the unspoken intent behind the 
words), Grey used the short-term 'manner' of policy to hide the 'matter' at stake: the 
reciprocal weaknesses of France and Britain and consequent interdependence that 
made the Entente both strategically indispensable and politically indefensible. Grey 
was not in the business of revealing any information which could expose the frailty of 
Britain's diplomatic position. The debate was called to enable the Foreign Secretary 
to put an end to domestic unrest that, by bringing into question areas of British 
involvement, undermined his diplomatic position. By removing the ability of critics to 
point out inconsistencies and failings within his diplomacy. Grey sought to maintain a 
position commensurate with the upholding of British interests. It is possible to argue 
with the benefit of hindsight that his explanations were not always complete or honest, 
but that is to miss the point here - a restoration of 'internal cohesion' was of 
paramount importance.** As a result, any area in which an effective counter to 
criticisms could be provided and the fagade be upheld should be viewed as a success. 
Now let me say a word upon the general aspects of 
what I consider is the proper foreign policy of this 
country.*' 
The success of Grey's defence rested with the extent to which he could persuade 
the House that his Entente policy was indeed the best suited to serve and uphold 
British interests and traditions. Put simply, he had to dispel fears that the Ententes 
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represented a balance of power policy incompatible with either Liberal principle or 
national interest. The Agadir Crisis had increased fears that, as a result of 
associations with other powers (over which Parliament had little or no control), 
Britain had become embroiled in conflicts which had nothing to do with her material 
interests or political principles. Grey was bound to admit that the Ententes with 
France and Russia denoted some form of commitment; however, he was quick to 
argue that they were not of a binding military nature, nor could they be used to force 
Britain into moves contrary to her specified prevailing interests. The Entente system 
as outlined by the Foreign Secretary was a system which had ended previous 
antagonisms between the powers. Negotiations now provided mutually advantageous 
solutions to problems which had previously been resolved by force, or merely 
remained unsolved. The result of these settlements had been the creation of ties of 
goodwill, based on a recognition that cooperation accrued more advantage to both 
sides than did coercion.™ This meant that areas and issues in foreign affairs where 
conflicting interests and contiguous pressures, be they territorial, strategic or economic 
in orientation, could be eased without destabilising international relations. Moreover, 
and because the agreements (and thus advantages they provided) were dependent on 
the maintenance of mutual gain and therefore cooperation, it became possible to 
exert moderating diplomatic influences on friendly powers so as to promote greater 
liberalism and international stability. It was possible to divert allies of mutual interest 
from any policy which threatened to compromise the Ententes by failing to consider 
the interests of their partners.'' Similarly, the ability of a bloc of cooperating states to 
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present a united diplomatic front against other powers as a deterrent, against those 
who threatened to impinge on established interests or destabilise the states system by 
their actions, permitted the use of coordinated diplomacy to encourage negotiated 
resolution of outstanding issues instead of conflict." In this way. Grey was able to 
argue persuasively that the positive elements of the 1904 and 1907 Agreements were 
sufficient to justify their existence, and indeed that they were wholly compatible with 
the preservation of British interests without having committed Britain by binding 
treaty agreement to the individual whims of other powers. 
Grey's position was strengthened by the ease with which he was able to turn the 
tables upon his Radical critics. His attack upon what he portrayed as ill-considered 
expressions of concern that had done little to improve Anglo-German relations 
undoubtedly carried weight. More damning, however, was his castigation of the policy 
of isolation which those who opposed the Ententes, because of the apparent 
commitments they entailed, argued should be upheld for the sake of tradition." The 
Foreign Secretary argued that any move towards effective isolation that an 
abandonment of the Ententes would effect would not be a constructive shift in policy, 
but rather a negation of policy.^" Any abandoning of the friendly associations or the 
agreements that had been made in the Entente treaties would not only be to sacrifice 
the obvious advantages that cooperation and mutual compromise had secured, but 
also the value of prestige and trust, and the concomitant diplomatic influence abroad, 
which such a volte face would engender. Nor would it lead to any improved relations 
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with those powers like Germany previously outside the Entente system for, as Grey 
noted, 'one does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones'." The 
resulting isolation would be neither splendid nor stable. To adopt such a line would 
be to refuse to accept pragmatism and its dictates as the basis of diplomacy, and to 
subjugate policy to the whims of nebulous principle which could in no way uphold the 
national interests to a satisfactory degree. Agadir had proven that British interests 
had been defended because of her role in the diplomatic system as an aligned power. 
To achieve a similar position of influence as an isolated nation facing uniform 
suspicion and mistrust would require the operation of policies (such as conscription) 
inimical to other much-vaunted Radical principles, and would only promote 
confrontational antagonism of exactly the sort his critics pinned upon the Ententes. 
but on an increased scale. More to the point, the necessary cost of providing such an 
influence would prove incompatible with existing domestic policies''^ (if indeed they 
could be sustained at all"). Grey had no hesitation in seizing upon the inherent 
problems that the Radical alternative to active association displayed:-
I cannot imagine a more impossible statement of 
foreign poHcy ... no allies, friendly with all, and feared 
by all.™ 
Even if it is accepted as Weinroth suggests that the Radicals were not anti-
Entente, but merely opposed any binding commitment in excess of friendly 
cooperation™, the fact remains that those agreements of 1904 and 1907 would have 
been placed in jeopardy had British policy not displayed an awareness of and 
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tolerance towards the hopes and interests of both the French and the Russians. And 
it is certain that Paris and St Petersburg were after more than the friendly relations 
and rhetoric that the Radicals offered in return for the securing of stable contiguous 
frontiers. Grey argued that his Entente policy reflected awareness of this, and he was 
able to refute the basis for a Radical alternative as a result. Consequently, he was 
able to promote the 'matter' of his pohcy as being the best means for securing 
national interests and international stability. 
Grey was at pains to argue not only that the Ententes served the best interests of 
the nation without compromising any essential principles, but also that his policies and 
the events of the summer did not reflect any anti-German prejudice in Whitehall. As 
has already been shown, the Foreign Secretary explained that the Agadir Crisis had 
caused a r i f t with Berlin as the result of misunderstanding, which had been 
compounded because ignorant scaremongers had publicly poisoned relations.*' Grey 
wished to complement his defence of the Ententes by persuading his critics that they 
were not directed against Germany, or that they provided any insurmountable 
obstacle to the establishment of good Anglo-German relations. Grey contended that 
the Entente ties precluded any policy of antagonism towards other powers because 
such moves invariably proved to be detrimental to the interests of partner states." It 
was natural for Germany to be concerned by an Entente bloc and to make defensive 
naval and military preparations in case of future conflict; it was natural that such 
preparations should arouse apprehension abroad. As to the future, it rested with 
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Germany to reassure the other powers that her moves were purely defensive, and to 
enter into dialogue to solve outstanding problems in the same way as had the Entente 
powers. The Foreign Secretary posed a rhetorical question for his audience:-
Is the policy I have sketched out necessarily a bar to 
good relations with Germany? I do not believe it is.^ 
Several points about Grey's position towards Germany require clarification if his 
defence to the House of Commons is to be put in perspective. Keith Wilson has 
argued persuasively that the traditional view of Whitehall as being anti-German is 
unconvincing, and that the bias that Buxton claimed was so damaging to relations was 
in fact Anglomania rather than Germanophobia." The Foreign Office was bound to 
defend British interests at all times, had adopted rapprochement diplomacy and 
concluded the Ententes, in order to secure a viable defence of interests threatened by 
contrary French and Russian positions. However, it had been found even before the 
1904 Anglo-French Agreement that it was either impossible or impractical to reach 
such a rapprochement with Germany.^ It is important to remember that the extent to 
which Grey had been able to tie France and Russia to friendly compromise 
agreements had been determined principally by two factors: the amount of ground 
conceded, and the relative position of those powers in the states system at the time.** 
Germany, both in 1904 and in 1911, had neither common nor conflicting interests 
upon which a compromise of mutual gain could be worked with Britain, nor a 
predilection borne out of relative weakness for sacrificing policies inimical to British 
interests. Indeed, as the works of the Fischer school have suggested, and Berghahn in 
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particular, the success of German government policy, of the Tirpitz stratagem and 
Weltpolitik. depended upon a series of results in political, economic and military areas 
diametrically opposite to the interests of Britain.^ Whitehall was aware that Germany 
was a constant threat not in a direct military sense, but as the power most likely to 
drive a wedge between the Entente powers and therefore to reopen the British 
security dilemma.*' Crowe was fond of explaining German diplomacy in terms of the 
belhcose pronouncements of a Prussian Minister at Hamburg:-
Germany's policy always had been and would be to try 
to frustrate any coalition between two states which 
might result in damaging Germany's interests and 
prestige, and Germany would, if she thought that such 
a coalition was being formed ... not hesitate to take 
such steps as she thought proper to break up the 
coalition.^ 
Nicolson remarked later at the time of the Haldane Mission:-
Of course the idea at the back of the German mind. 
Emperor and Chancellor ... is to detach us from our 
friends.'" 
Even more revealing is the comment of Jules Cambon, French Ambassador to 
Berlin, which Goschen reported to Nicolson prior to the outbreak of the Agadir Crisis 
on 29th Apri l 1911:-
I f [Germany] sees any likelihood of [British] support 
being withdrawn or given grudgingly she will at once 
proceed to make trouble and turn the situation to her 
advantage.*" 
However, an awareness of the existence and nature of conflicting aims did not 
mean that the attitude adopted was bound to be one of hostility. As the relationship 
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with Russia over the Central Asian question shows, years of mistrust and competition 
were not insurmountable obstacles to the creation of friendly relations. The attitude 
with which powers came to be treated was determined mainly by the extent to which 
those powers threatened Britain's position, and whether grounds for compromise and 
cooperation and therefore mutual advantages sufficient to secure a defence of vital 
interests could be exploited. In the case of Russia, the fact that such grounds were 
found did not reduce the fact that Russophobia had been a major spur to agreement.' 
In the case of Germany, it was felt that the cost of such an agreement would be too 
high and only at the price of the other Ententes, which it was feared would be 
devalued by the terms of any conceivable Anglo-German treaty.*^ This did not mean 
that areas of conflicting interest were not appreciated, (or the German position not 
understood), for of course there were efforts made to effect a rapprochement." 
However, dealing with peripheral issues whilst failing to settle major areas proved 
insufficient; and Britain could not be expected to compromise her international 
position by conceding crucial interests without sufficient recompense, such as 
Germany proved unwilling to offer. Churchill was to sum up the position nicely in 
January 1914:-
We have engrossed to ourselves an altogether 
disproportionate share of the wealth and traffic of the 
world ... our claim to be left in the unmolested 
enjoyment of our vast and splendid possessions, mainly 
acquired by violence, largely maintained by force, often 
seems less reasonable to others than to us.** 
I f Germany was one of the more vociferous 'others' whom it proved impossible to 
satisfy with concessions, then the apparent reaction of Britain to her machinations 
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merely reflected a weighted response intent not on antagonism but on self-defence. 
The attitude held by those in control of British foreign policy was therefore as Grey 
had summed up in 1910:-
The answer to such statements [of bias] is that [we] are 
pro-British and not pro-German or pro-anything else.** 
When informing the House about the 'manner' and 'matter' of his policy, Grey 
could not be completely candid for fear of compromising his position either at home 
or abroad. He could not attempt to explain policy away in terms of phobia or philia, 
or of relative strengths and weaknesses, indeed in any way as an element in a wider 
diplomatic 'game', for fear of conceding information detrimental to Britain's position 
or fuelling domestic suspicions that he was pursuing the Liberal anathema of a 
manipulative 'balance' policy. However, by establishing that the Ententes were not 
binding militaristic alliances but the instruments of rapprochement and friendship, and 
that no good could come from sacrificing friendship for political gain. Grey was able 
to show that the British position vis a vis Germany was not fixed by Machiavellian 
design, but by loyalty to existing agreements not incompatible with German interests 
as expressed publicly by Berlin. Moreover, by declaring that Britain posed no real 
obstacle precluding Germany from joining such a system, as long as no existing 
agreements were compromised in the process, and remembering that the secret 
elements of the Entente had been revealed, Grey was able to transfer at least part of 
the onus for reaching a compromise to Germany, by making it clear that she must 
offer acceptable terms as the basis for rapprochement with the entire Entente bloc. 
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If, as was anticipated privately in Whitehall, no such terms were to be forthcoming, 
then the failure could not be pinned completely on any obvious anti-German pro-
Entente bias on Britain's part, but upon a German inability to reach a compromise 
with a set of existing and publicly amicable relations. 
What conclusions can be drawn about Grey's performance in the debate of 27th 
November 1911? His speech provided the House with a clear narrative of the 
diplomatic activity during the crisis month of July. Moreover, it had also delivered a 
riposte to his Radical critics, inferring that their failure to grasp the issues at stake or 
understand the wider nature of policy considerations, and their misleading and fanning 
of public opinion, had helped develop a short term misunderstanding into a full-blown 
schism. However, the very nature of the task that the Foreign Secretary had been 
forced to confront, given that his scope for revealing both diplomatic evidence and the 
disposition of British interests was severely restricted, conspired to deny him complete 
success. His private expressions of regret as to necessary, unavoidable secrecy were 
well founded.** Grey was unable to convince the Radicals as to the true nature of the 
premier considerations that had dictated the nature of his diplomacy over the specific 
issues that attracted concern. As a result, both the 'manner' and 'matter' of his policy 
remained in question, and the criticism was not reduced to a level commensurate with 
a satisfactory degree of Wight's 'internal cohesion'." 
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With specific regard to the parliamentary struggle for control over the formation 
and conduct of policy, it is sufficient to suggest that circumstances conspired against 
Grey's attempt to remove the basis of criticism - circumstances compounded by the 
nature of Britain's position within both the Ententes and the states-system. The 
actual influence that the Foreign Office proved able to exert over Entente partners 
was far less than Grey would have wished, and not to the degree intimated in the 
debate.** As evidence emerged that French and Russian initiatives in foreign affairs 
were incompatible with the spirit of their respective agi'eements with Britain, the 
Foreign Secretary was left open to censure. He was constrained from acting 
decisively to curb those initiatives for fear of jeopardising those essential ties. 
Furthermore, he was forced to offer a modicum of diplomatic support, which France 
and Russia felt they were entitled to, for fear of bringing into question the value of 
their existing Anglophile policies.** Unfortunately, as has already been intimated, it 
proved impossible to offer that support and convince domestic observers that 
fundamental British interests and political principles were being upheld: and, by 
appearing to support the Entente powers whilst attacking other powers not closely 
tied to Britain, Grey was taken to be conducting an at best inconsistent double 
standard diplomacy, and at worst a 'balance of power' policy incompatible with the 
Gladstonian attitudes inherited by the Radicals."* This was especially true in the case 
of the Foreign Office attitude towards Germany."" In fact, the Foreign Office felt 
quite strongly that if anyone was the victim of a deliberate 'smear' campaign, 
motivated by 'balance of power' considerations, then it was Whitehall itself. Crowe 
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for one was quite convinced that the Germans were unscrupulously using the press to 
encourage the Radicals' misunderstanding and to hide their own initiatives:-
The German government is conveying through the 
Liberal press to the British public what the former 
wants it to believe ... I do not think these efforts to 
influence ... remain so fruitless.^"^ 
Grey was to reflect that the use of the press as a means by which to influence 
opinions was a nuisance for the diplomat who had to undertake sensitive diplomacy, 
stating that 'a Press Bureau is used to make mischief.'"' However, it was impossible 
to counter either the German press or the Radical accusations without recourse to the 
sort of information that itself could collapse the diplomatic position. Asquith's 
staunch support of Grey in the House against the Irish MP John Dillon's accusations 
of a marked increase in Foreign Office secrecy was almost certainly a recognition of 
this problem, a wish to explain the implicit problem of opening to democratic debate 
issues which by their nature necessitated confidentiality.'*' However, it was precisely 
because the Foreign Secretary was unable to provide the sort of answers sought by 
the Radicals that they argued the case that Ramsay MacDonald put so eloquently:-
In view of what has taken place ... it is about time for 
this House to insist upon knowing something more 
about foreign affairs than it has done hitherto."" 
Concomitantly, and although it is possible with the benefit of hindsight to agree 
with Grey that they were bereft of any practical alternatives or solutions as concerns 
both the 'matter' and 'manner' of policy, the fact is that the Radical position was 
basically unshaken by the unsubstantiated rhetoric of the government. The Radicals' 
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ignorance vis a vis the premier policy considerations that Grey's diplomacy sought to 
defend, which today, in practical terms, makes their position difficult to uphold, made 
their contemporary position irresist^le. Orwell's axiom that 'Ignorance is Strength' 
can scarcely have been better illustrated.^"* 
As the arguments contained in the letter which Buxton and Ponsonby published in 
The Times of 22nd November 1911 and the statement of purpose issued by the newly 
formed Liberal Foreign Affairs Group on 6th December 1911 show, the issue of 
excessive ignorance and the consequent inability of MPs to address themselves 
properly to foreign affairs was of paramount concern to the Radicals.'"' The shortage 
of information which made them prone to misinterpretation, and provided the basis 
for many of the unsubstantiated criticisms which Grey found so easy to deflect, 
ironically meant that the Radicals could criticise perceived failings of policy without 
fear of later censure. Any evidence which emerged belatedly to disprove their 
contentions was seized upon as proof of the Foreign Office's monopoly on 
information and its refusal to publish details unless it suited the official position."* 
This, the Radicals argued, was an abuse of executive power, especially if the Foreign 
Secretary insisted upon blaming serious deteriorations in diplomatic affairs such as 
Agadir upon those to whom information was restricted. Buxton clearly expressed this 
position:-
I hardly think the Foreign Secretary was justified in 
attributing to mischief that clarification [to which] may 
be assigned that motive of bringing forward the facts.'"* 
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Buxton argued that the major point brought forward by the events of the summer 
was the misunderstanding of the diplomatic situation caused by failures in the 
exchange of information between Britain and Germany. The fact that his attempts to 
portray the successive crises of the summer almost exclusively in the light of Anglo-
German considerations, or that the basis outlined for a rapprochement between the 
two powers display the classical failings of the Radicals' position - (the inability born 
of ignorance to respond in pragmatic fashion to vital considerations of policy) does 
not diminish this argument. Indeed, it was this very ignorance, with its impact upon 
the ability to offer valuable objective criticism, that strengthened the subjective 
argument that the Radicals advanced against excessive secrecy. Even where problems 
over both the practicality and desirability of a more open diplomacy were raised, as 
was the case in the contribution to the debate of Mark Sykes,"" the obligation of the 
Foreign Office to provide sufficient information to allow the democratically elected 
representatives of the people to assess affairs could not be ignored. Al l the critics of 
both specific and general issues in policy expressed a similar regret and hope; that 
information relevant to the understanding and assessment of policy had not been 
suppHed in sufficient quantity, and that as a result of the events of the summer of 
1911 which had clearly illustrated the dangers of such widespread ignorance, that 
more information would be forthcoming.'" Asquith's claim that existing parliamentary 
procedure already catered for the debating and constitutional control of policy by the 
House failed to satisfy Grey's critics, who not only feared that affairs were being 
mismanaged, but also that they were being denied their constitutional right to' 
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scrutinise policy conduct, and that as a result the role of Parliament was being 
subverted."^ As Sir Henry Dalziel, Liberal MP for Kirkcaldy Burghs, illustrated, the 
practical ability of a Parliament to alter events which had already been set in motion 
without prior knowledge of the issues that had provided the spur to action was far less 
than the constitutional function available might suggest."^ Furthermore, and as 
Ponsonby was to point out in his pamphlet 'Democracy and the Control of Foreign 
Affairs', the fact that Parliament, as the legislative body, was ultimately responsible to 
the people for any binding legal commitments meant that, unless diplomatic 
agreements were not laws as such, the failure of the executive to submit diplomatic 
agreements and treatise in their entirety to Parliament effectively entailed legislature 
by decree. His citation of the constitutional expert Bagehot did little to quell the 
fears: 
Treaties are quite as important as most laws, and to 
require the assent [of Parliament] to every word and 
not to consult them on the essence is ludicrous.'" 
However, even in the one area where Radical criticism carried significant weight, 
the Radicals failed to achieve more than an airing of their grievances. In spite of 
suggestions by MacDonald for an enquiry into the formation of a Committee on 
Foreign Affairs intended to provide Parliament with direct access to Foreign Office 
sources,"' the Radicals were unable to overcome the arguments voiced in favour of 
the existing constitutional processes or the objections to any suggested concession to 
specific MPs of extra powers for 'vetting' the activities of the Foreign Office. Just as 
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their attacks on specific areas of policy foundered because of interpretative 
inaccuracies and impractical bases of criticism, so their arguments for a greater access 
to information, and consequently an increased ability to ensure that policy was in the 
public (or at least national) interest failed to progress towards implementation 
because the theoretical position they advanced proved impossible to translate into a 
practical form."* That is not to say that the Radicals failed to achieve any success in 
the debate; far from i t . ' " The debate was the platform from which the campaign for 
the restoration Parliament's supervisory function vis a vis foreign policy was launched. 
Even i f the immediate aftermath of the debate did not witness the establishment of a 
new machinery for ensuring the release of information to Parliament for scrutiny 
(even the most ambitious Radical had known that such a coup would be rejected 
unless and until proven necessary), by provoking thought and outlining an agenda for 
consideration, they nevertheless established a position from which they could at least 
pressure Grey into concessions on issues of principle central to their philosophical 
position. 
The very nature of both Radical dissent and the official Whitehall position meant 
that the issues raised in the debate, subjective and objective, invariably became 
interwoven; and that as a result in many cases it becomes impossible to distinguish 
between them. The Radical attacks upon the 'matter' of Grey's policy were triggered 
by what was seen as evidence of material failings in policy, as events appeared to 
place not only material interests, but also national honour and prestige in jeopardy.'" 
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At the same time, concerns that were voiced over specific issues of 'manner' carried 
an implicit questioning of 'matter' of which it was after all a material expression. In 
some cases, such as the issue of secrecy and information release, the two factors 
became inextricably confused, both as an example of how policy was being mishandled 
in application, and indeed as proof that it was in itself flawed."* They believed that 
no matter what transpired, a reaffirmation of democratic control was needed to 
ensure that the interests of the majority were upheld and that schisms and 
confrontations not compatible with those interests be avoided.'^" They were at the 
same time interested in repairing apparent breaches and injustices that the misuses 
and unsuitability of the previous diplomacy had caused, but were primarily concerned 
with restoring to Parliament its position as the overseer of policy. Ponsonby, although 
not a speaker on 27th November 1911, was well aware that Parliament could not 
exercise an executive role in the field of diplomacy, both because of the limited time 
available to the House and because any en clair discussion of ongoing developments 
could only damage the political position of Britain in the states-system.'" However, 
and because as Ponsonby later noted, the legislative body Parliament was responsible 
for the consequences of any applied policy,'" the Radicals believed that it should be 
kept aware of both the direction and development of policy so as to be able to 
intervene to prevent any repetition of an Agadir scenario - where the secret and 
unexplained nature of policy had placed an ignorant nation in danger for reasons 
inconsistent with the interests at stake. If the Radical position is seen in this light, of 
pointing at examples of 'manner' apparently inconsistent with what was thought to be 
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Britain's position, and of arguing that Parhament should be able to intervene to 
protect that position and ensure that policy 'matter' (as effectively the legislation that 
legitimised the executive function of diplomacy) worked to that end, then their 
position both during and after the debate should be seen as one of moral strength 
undamaged by the weakness of the practical inadequacies which their ignorance 
caused. 
The debate of 27th November ended without resolving the issues which the 
Foreign Secretary had sought to explain, at an effective impasse. The positions of the 
respective protagonists had been clearly established, but both had been unable to 
force a decisive capitulation from the other. Grey had been prevented from 
dismissing the criticisms levelled against his conduct of British policy because 
circumstances constrained him from revealing too much information. The Radicals, 
although able to exploit the problems facing Grey which weakened the effectiveness 
of his explanations of both diplomatic events and policy principles were unable to 
convince the House that the situation merited the changes they advocated, or that 
they could offer a practical set of alternatives for both the content and conduct of 
poHcy. The respective strengths and weaknesses of the two sides complemented each 
other to a point where neither could claim a sufficiently large advantage to allow a 
complete vindication of their position. It is possible with hindsight to argue that 
Grey's approach offered the best option available given the position facing Britain at 
the time, and that the Radical criticisms were unhelpful and counter-productive. 
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Grey's reflection upon the inability of a public which could not know all the issues at 
stake to conduct effective statesmanship certainly appears to have some justification.'" 
However, the Radicals should not be castigated for attacking what remained 
unexplained abuses because hindsight suggests that those 'abuses' were of an 
unavoidable nature. The Radicals saw their arguments as well-founded, given that the 
information available to them did not appear to tally with Grey's 'tranquilising 
statements' and explanations. The success or failure of their campaign and the 
vindication of their ideological position would depend upon the evidence emerging 
from future diplomatic exchanges, and the extent to which policy proved to be 
compatible with national interests (of which Liberal principles were seen as an 
integral part), or continued to display apparent flaws and inconsistencies. The debate 
had provided the Radicals with a platform from which to assail Grey, to force him 
either to adopt such policies as satisfied them, or to secure sufficient support by which 
to achieve the reforms of the policy mechanism they thought necessary. Indeed, as 
the later stages of the debate on the 27th November, and more substantially the 
continuation of the debate on 14th December 1911 clearly shows, once the theoretical 
positions had been established in the discussion of the Agadir Crisis and related 
policies, the Radicals forced Grey to examine other ongoing diplomatic activity, most 
notably that surrounding the Persian Question.'"" It is through an examination of this 
crisis and the parliamentary role therein that the Radical and Foreign Office positions 
established on 27th November can best be assessed, and an examination of the extent 
to which a tangible influence was exerted and desirable in the light of the overall 
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diplomatic position can be undertaken. 
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Chapter I I I : PARLIAMENT A N D THE PERSIAN QUESTION 1911-12: 
T H E RADICAL POSITION 
The outlook in foreign affairs is so serious... blunder after 
blunder has been made ... if only the company were better 
educated and there were not so much concealment and 
mystery. 
Ponsonby letter to Lloyd George, September 1912 
As we have already seen, in the period following the Agadir Crisis, 
Radicals in the British parliament were quick to criticise both the content and 
conduct of Grey's foreign policy. Their campaign agitating for an increase in 
official information for the legislature, seeking to insure that policy would again 
be made accountable to Westminster, was fully underway by the time of the 
debate of 27th November. However, their interventions into the murky world 
of foreign affairs could only hope to succeed should the Radicals prove able to 
sustain a consistent barrage of dissent against substantiable examples of 
misconduct by the Foreign Office. It was one thing for the Radicals to claim 
that the Foreign Secretary had provoked their assault:-
The Foreign Secretary's silence during this 
period of serious international unrest [summer 
1911] is the chief cause for the recent agitation 
for more information and greater publicity.* 
and predictable that they should demand the issuing of official statements and 
papers, for the government to clarify matters and restore confidence in 
Britain's position as a peaceful, non-aligned nation. It was quite another 
matter to build upon and exploit the apparently settled issue of the 'manner' of 
policy as the basis for a review and revision of the 'matter' of policy.^ As Grey 
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was only too pleased to argue, the Moroccan dispute and Anglo-German 
relations had been repaired by the time the Radical campaign gained 
significant momentum. It was, therefore, greatly to the advantage of the 
concerned Radicals that 'the Persian pot again began to bubble'.^ The re-
emergence of a Persia in crisis at this time provided policy critics with an 
established vehicle with which to assess and challenge ongoing British 
diplomacy. Here was a nation in which Britain had a declared and long-
standing interest; and, under the terms of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, 
a degree of responsibility. Various elements in the Persian question conspired 
to provide the Radicals with the perfect combination with which to test both 
the 'manner' and the 'matter' of Grey's diplomacy. To them it was clear that 
Russia was involved in worsening the problems facing the Persian government: 
Russia, Entente partner of Britain but reactionary Empire traditionally disliked 
by British Liberals. Indeed, it increasingly appeared that the 1907 Convention, 
the basis of the Entente and in which Britain had supposedly an equal status 
with Russia vis a vis Persia, was being used as a pretext for Russian abuses in 
Persia; and the British Foreign Office, far from restraining their St Petersburg 
counterparts, appeared only too willing to acquiesce or conspire in Russian 
moves. I do not propose at this point to study the principles of Grey's Entente 
poHcy in the light of the developments in Persia, or to study and assess the 
determinants and consequences of Grey's Russian diplomacy. This chapter 
aims to outline the nature and direction of parliamentary involvement in the 
Persian Question in the light of the Radical attempts to reassert the 
supervision of foreign policy by the legislature. By examining both debates and 
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parliamentary questions, it may be possible to determine the extent to which 
policy changes were demanded, to assess the practicality of such alternative 
lines of policy as were advanced, and to gauge the extent to which any 
influence can be said to have been exerted over the Foreign Secretary. 
The Persian Question and the related issue of Anglo-Russian relations 
was not, of course, a new topic of discussion in Westminster. The Radical wing 
of the Liberal Party, the Labour MPs in Westminster, and, perhaps ironically, 
some Conservative Imperialists afraid for imperial security and the Indian 
frontier in particular, had expressed concern over the government's moves in 
1907. Many had been disturbed by the prospect of an alignment with 'a 
regime which denied its subjects constitutional reform and maintained its 
authority by means of secret police and arbitrary justice'." The secrecy which 
had prevailed during the negotiations with Russia had merely served to 
exacerbate fears and suspicions. In 1908, Keir Hardie's motion attempting to 
censure Edward VII's visit to Reval had attracted the support of 59 MPs (who 
were rewarded in turn with exclusion from a subsequent Royal garden party). 
1909 witnessed agitation during the return visit of the Tsar, to Cowes.' It was 
the situation in Persia, though, that made the position of Anglo-Russian 
relations so delicate, and gave the Radicals a vehicle with which to challenge 
the value of continued Entente co-operation. The period 1906 to 1909 saw 
civil war and revolution in Persia as democratic nationalists challenged the 
incumbent royalist autocracy.* Almost inevitably, the cause of the former 
attracted the sympathy of British Liberals, and the Radicals especially. Persia 
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had been a major cause of diplomatic rivalry and tension between Britain and 
Russia for decades before 1907, and as such already held the attention of those 
interested in international affairs.' The 1907 Convention served to attract 
increased attention from those Radical elements naturally suspicions of 
Whitehall and supportive of the democratic and anti-Russian forces at work in 
Persia. As such, it was natural that as McLean suggests, 'Persia thus developed 
into a test case of Grey's Liberal principles'.* The Radicals were able to use 
Persia as a barometer, a gauge as to exactly how valuable the Convention and 
resulting Entente would prove in upholding of fundamental Liberal principles. 
A t the same time, they were able to assess Grey's Liberal mettle, by measuring 
the extent to which he used what they believed to be his considerable influence 
to secure a victory for the revolutionary and democratic cause. 
The events in Persia during the period 1907-11 whilst the Convention 
was in operation have been studied in depth elsewhere.' It is sufficient at this 
juncture to point out that developments in Persia during those years tended to 
uphold the suspicions and fears of the British Radicals. The activities of 
Russians, such as Colonel Liakhoff, the pro-Shah leader of the Persian 
Cossack Brigade who played a prominent role in suppressing the national 
assembly in 1908, did little to alter the view that the traditional, oppressive 
policies of St Petersburg remained. The failure of Whitehall to offer any 
sustained counter to such Russian abuses tended to encourage the Radicals' 
belief that the Foreign Office saw the preservation of the newly won Entente 
as of more importance than the defence of principle and the assistance of 
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'struggling nationalities'. The Radicals responded with the formation by 
Browne and Lynch, of a Persian Committee in October 1908, intent on 
applying pressure for a stronger pro-Persian diplomacy both in Parliament and 
in public.'" The Committee was kept abreast of events in Persia with 
information from Browne's contacts with Persian exiles, Russian 
correspondents, and ex-students in the British consular and diplomatic service; 
and as such was able to offer both rapid and well-informed commentaries on 
Persian affairs." A t the same time, some Conservatives, afraid of possible 
Russian penetration to the Persian Gulf and Indian frontier, seen to undermine 
long term imperial security, and of the effects on British commercial and 
private interests that increasing chaos would cause, began to voice concern that 
Grey's handhng of affairs was inadequate.'^ As markets in the south began to 
close, and unchecked regional banditry plagued communications, their concerns 
multiphed. The fall of the Shah in 1909 was followed by an apparently 
unopposed Russian occupation of northern Persia, to 'safeguard lives and 
property', and provided more evidence for claims that either the Convention 
was failing to achieve its brief, or that, in acquiescing so readily to Russian 
moves. Grey was guilty of pursuing a Machiavellian policy incompatible with 
Liberal principles. However, as we have already seen, several factors 
concerning domestic politics in Britain combined to permit Grey a respite from 
constant scrutiny and criticism in 1910." Moreover, Persia, in the wake of the 
successful nationalist revolution, was permitted a respite from civil upheaval, 
and enjoyed a period of relative stability in which it was hoped a securely 
based constitutional system could be established. The result of these factors 
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taken together was, for Grey, a period relatively free from challenges to his 
Anglo-Russian and Persian policy." 
The Agadir Crisis restored Radical attention to foreign affairs in 
general, and later to Persia in particular, with a vengeance. No sooner had the 
House of Commons returned from the summer recess (on 24th October 1911) 
than Grey found himself bombarded with demands for information about 
recent events. I f the Moroccan Crisis initially held centre stage, then concern 
over recent events in Persia ran it a close second, and indeed increasingly came 
to the fore as once again the premier issue in the Radical-Foreign Office 
struggle. Some measure of the concern felt over Persian affairs can be gauged 
when it is realised that in the month prior to the foreign policy debate of 27th 
November 1911 (initiated by Grey, who vainly attempted to concentrate upon 
issues related to Agadir'') some 42 questions and supplementaries were tabled 
on Persia.'* Whereas the Foreign Secretary was able to answer his critics from 
a position of relative strength vis a vis Morocco and Anglo-German relations 
because that crisis had passed and consequently the scope for a sustained 
campaign had been curtailed, the developing situation in Persia provided an 
ongoing crisis which continually supplied the Radicals with fresh ammunition as 
they argued for changes in diplomatic conduct and supervision. When it is 
remembered that this parliamentary-exploited ulcer festered on right through 
the 1912 session, seriously embarrassing Grey in his relations with Russia and 
with little to suggest that a cure was imminent, it is hardly surprising that the 
Foreign Secretary chose later to admit in his memoirs that 'Persia tried my 
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patience more than any other subject'." 
From the outset, Persia provided the Radicals with issues of both 
'manner' and 'matter' with which to test Grey. The resulting struggle once 
again pitted a Liberal left concerned primarily with the defence of principle 
against a Foreign Secretary who faced a series of unavoidable problems that 
hampered his attempts to resolve diplomatic crises and placate agitated 
domestic opinion. The Radicals may not have known or appreciated the 
practical exigencies that faced Grey, and as a result were quick to incur his 
wrath because their arguments often flew in the face of what the embattled 
minister saw as being the only viable policy alternatives.'* However, and just as 
they had proven in the debate of 27th November 1911, such failings neither 
reduced nor weakened the importance of the Radical cause. One of their most 
persistent and persuasive complaints was once again that excessive secrecy was 
maintained by Whitehall, and that vital information was being kept from 
Parliament. I f one consequence of this tended to be that criticisms expressed 
ignorance and caused Grey embarrassment, then the Foreign Office had 
nobody but itself to blame." Throughout their campaign, criticisms of conduct 
and developments were accompanied by consistent demands for a greater 
supply of official information:-
In view of what has taken place ... it is about time for this 
House to insist upon knowing something more about foreign 
affairs than it has hitherto.-" 
May I conclude by making a plea that more of the fresh air 
and light of democratic opinion be allowed to penetrate into 
the stuffy darkness of diplomacy?-' 
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I do not think that we are always treated quite fairly with 
regard to foreign affairs ... we are told that we must not 
interfere ... it is indiscreet to ask ... I hope that he [Grey] will 
consult us and take the opinion of the House before arriving 
at any definite decision." 
One disaffected MP went so far as to complain that Grey appeared to 
resent the tabling of questions"; another, that the Foreign Office denied 
information, preferring instead to issue fait accompli.^'' Philip Morrell, 
designated with Ponsonby to be the spokesman for the Liberal Foreign Affairs 
Committee on Russia and Persia, and the tabler of some 80 parliamentary 
questions on Persia between October 1911 and February 1913, complained at 
the height of the agitation in the winter of 1911 that insufficient data was being 
offered by the Foreign Office, during an adjournment motion he proposed on 
the subject of Persia.^ His concern was echoed by a fellow MP:-
Really we are entitled to information of a larger and more 
ample character ... I trust that at the first possible moment we 
shall have a fu l l statement.^ 
The supplying of parliamentary papers was no less an issue of 
contention. Irish Nationalist John Dillon and Labour leader Ramsay 
MacDonald were in the forefront of demands both at question time and in 
relevant debates for greater access to documentary evidence that would permit 
a more measured and informed assessment of Grey's diplomacy by MPs." 
In itself an issue of foreign affairs 'matter', the issue of the supply of 
information to Westminster is important to any understanding of the struggle 
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for control of foreign affairs. It is necessary to remember that the Radicals 
could base their arguments and criticisms only upon such evidence as they 
could lay their hands on, and that such perceptions as they formed regarding 
developments could only be as complete and accurate as that evidence itself. 
I f their sources were prone to inaccuracy, bias, or incomplete reports, then it 
remained the responsibility of those with a greater understanding either to 
provide evidence correcting misinterpretations, or to accept criticism with the 
stoic conviction that matters would so resolve themselves as to provide a 
conclusion vindicating their position. In a letter of September 1912 to Lloyd 
George, Ponsonby complained that he and his colleagues were being kept 
uninformed as to the Grey-Sazonov talks at Balmoral, that The Times was the 
sole confidant of the Foreign Office, and that MPs were not 'likely to know 
much more after we have asked questions in the House'.^ He contended that 
a number of MPs from all parties feared that the Foreign Secretary was 
involved in a gradual partition of Persia. In the light of information 
subsequently available to the historian concerning the Balmoral meeting, 
Ponsonby's fears vis a vis partition appear to have been misplaced. However, 
taken in the context of the time, and given that accurate information 
concerning both events and policy was apparently so hard to come by, it is 
hardly surprising that the Radicals treated the Foreign Secretary's statements 
with such a degree of scepticism. When their criticisms proved unfounded, 
even counter-productive, the Radicals remained undaunted, arguing that any 
problems that they caused were due to Whitehall's penchant for excessive 
secrecy which, necessary or not, did little to improve the handling of power 
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political issues. The Foreign Office could have countered ignorant critics either 
by pursuing a consistent release of accurate information, or by providing 
successful diplomatic coups ending the diplomatic crises that provoked concern. 
Failure to provide either could only tend to fuel fears that something in 
Britain's diplomacy was amiss, be it in 'manner' or 'matter'; and that as a 
result, agitation for change was justifiable. If the practical exigencies that 
determined the attitude adopted by Grey towards the supply of information 
precluded him from issuing the answers sought by the Radicals, they were not 
to know, and could only assume the worst and continue to campaign for 
change using issues such as Persia as their justification. 
When dealing with the Persian Crisis in Parliament, the Radicals found 
themselves able to draw upon a host of 'manner' issues with which to expose 
the severe failings they feared underwrote Grey's policy 'matter'. Liberal 
attitudes towards foreign policy at this time were dominated by two basic 
principles. Firstly, it was deemed essential that any premeditated creation or 
manipulation of a 'balance of power' system, any moves to enmesh Britain in a 
series of power political commitments, or any policy that could destabilise 
international affairs by increasing tension between power blocs, should be 
opposed. Secondly, it was felt that Britain, as the premier democratic power in 
Europe, should act as liberal champion for any oppressed nationalities and 
weak states.^' Evidence from Persia throughout late 1911 and 1912 suggested 
to Grey's critics that in fact the opposite was true of his policy. The Foreign 
Secretary's moves appeared to be dominated by considerations of 'balance' 
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politics, sacrificing the independence and integrity of Persia and giving Russia a 
free hand. Russian troops had remained in Persia since 1909, but Grey showed 
little inclination to force their removal.'* The return of the ex-Shah from a 
supposedly 'secure' exile in Russia provoked Russophobe Liberals to suspect 
complicity by St Petersburg, especially when rumours reached London that 
Russian steamships had transported the ex-Shah's forces to Persia and had 
waited to assist in any withdrawal should his counter-revolution fail. Once 
more, Whitehall offered little reaction." The fiasco of the Stokes appointment, 
with an apparent volte face by the Foreign Office over the employment by the 
Persians of a former British military attache once Russian opposition to the 
move emerged, merely confirmed earlier suspicions that Grey, far from 
championing the interests of Persia, was in fact following the wishes of St 
Petersburg all too closely.'- Indeed, the only independent initiative that the 
minister sanctioned was for an increase in Britain's own military presence in 
the south of Persia - and this in spite of Persian protests against such action." 
The resulting concern and suspicion that persisted over Grey's Persian policy 
was then finally transformed into outrage by the Shuster affair. This 
unfortunate saga brought the value of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention and 
the integrity of Grey's diplomacy into serious question. Indignant Radicals 
began to fear that Persian independence, previously compromised by a pro-
Russian bias on Grey's part, was about to be replaced by an effective partition 
of that country. The consequences that such a move would entail could only 
be to Britain's cost - not the least of which would be the apparent 
abandonment of her liberal tradition and the concomitant loss of prestige.^ 
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As with the period prior to the Autumn of 1911, the events in Persia 
in the days after the clash between Shuster's treasury gendarmes and Consul-
General Pokhetonov's guards over the disputed property of Shoa-es-Sultaneh 
have been clearly outlined elsewhere.^' Similarly, the respective British and 
Russian attitudes adopted towards Shuster have been examined. The 
important point to make here is that the Radicals did not know the nature and 
extent of Russian interests and fears that were communicated in official 
transactions to Grey;'* but were able to witness the open, practical reactions to 
those fears, and took them at face value to be evidence of Russia's continued 
imperialism. Worse still for the Foreign Secretary, the Radicals were equally 
ignorant of the true British position vis-a-vis developments in Persia, and could 
only see in Grey's apparent acquiescence and tacit support for his Entente 
partner clear proof of misconduct. His answers in Parliament did little to quell 
their fears. Taken in tandem, the combination of increased military activity in 
the north of Persia and the inexplicable diplomatic coercion of the Persian 
government could only confirm Radical misgivings - all the more given their 
ignorance over other matters vital to a fuller understanding of the overall 
diplomatic position. After the Russian Ultimatum of 2nd November 1911, the 
questioning of Russian motives and actions in the House increased 
dramatically." Of greatest significance were the questions which concentrated 
upon the 1907 Convention and its compatibility with the recent events in 
Persia.'* Grey's obvious reluctance to offer any complete answers whilst affairs 
were in progress suggested to many that the Convention was being abused, no 
matter what Grey said his reasons for prevarication were, or what the 
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Convention should be seen to encompass. The Foreign Affairs debates of 27th 
November 1911 and 14th December 1911 therefore provided the Radicals the 
perfect opportunity to challenge blatant inconsistencies between their position 
and Grey's practised policy. They sought to use Grey's embarrassment over 
Persia to undermine his overall position, thus undermining his explanation of 
the post-Agadir diplomatic restabilisation, and to explode the myth that 
Parliament needed only a tacit say in foreign affairs. In short, the Persian 
Crisis became the main vehicle used by Grey's critics in their campaign for a 
restoration of democratic control of policy, and the rescuing of principle from 
the Foreign Office's neglect. 
Although Grey chose not to make a statement concerning Persia on 
27th November 1911, the Radicals and other MPs concerned in Persian affairs 
took the chance afforded by the debate to force Persia onto the agenda.^' The 
main thrust of their argument was that the 1907 Convention had failed to 
achieve its purpose - or, at least, the purpose which they had argued it should 
have. Ramsay Macdonald questioned the value of any agreement with the 
Russians which St Petersburg proved only too willing to contradict, and 
expressed concern that the Foreign Office appeared all too ready to sacrifice 
principles and Persia in order to promote material advantages. Dillon argued 
that the Convention should be applied as its original brief intended, precluding 
both British and Russian intervention, and as a guarantee of Persian 
independence and integrity. However, the Irish MP feared that this laudable 
aim had been hastily abandoned, and that the Foreign Secretary now stood 
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silently by as Russia worked to undermine the Tehran government. Mark 
Sykes, Unionist MP for Central Hull, argued that the concession to Russia of 
the premier political and strategic centres of the country was contrary to any 
upholding of its independence and integrity, and complained that the much-
vaunted improvement in frontier security which had been cited as a justification 
for the convention had not been realised. The Earl of Ronaldshay (another 
Conservative imperialist) suggested that the Convention's value rested with its 
ability to permit Persia, free from foreign interference, to recover internal 
stability under its new constitution. He was, however, worried that such a 
recovery would prove impossible should Britain continue to permit Russia to 
pursue its aggressive policies in Persia. Noel Buxton reaffirmed his fears that, 
behind Grey's Persian policy as behind his Moroccan, the spectre of the 
'balance of power' raised its ugly head. Britain could not assert any diplomatic 
influence over Russia vis-a-vis Persia because of the need for her aid in an 
anti-German alliance, and consequently remained silent whilst St Petersburg 
usurped Tehran's authority. Put simply, the Foreign Secretary's critics argued 
that his Agreement with Russia was worthless unless the principles upon which 
it was based were upheld, but that all the evidence they had pointed only to 
the negation of those principles. Grey sought to counter these claims by 
placing the Convention and recent history into a pragmatic context. The 
Agreement had always been predicated on the recognition of Russian interests 
in north Persia as they existed by 1907, and could not be invoked against 
Russian moves that legitimately sought to defend them. It had succeeded in 
reducing tension and preventing costly diplomatic conflicts between Britain and 
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Russia. By providing a framework for diplomatic co-operation and mutually 
agreeing to refrain from further expansion, the two Great Powers had indeed 
done much to strengthen Persian independence, which without the Convention 
would have been placed in increasing jeopardy. However, such claims fell on 
sceptical ears, as did Grey's argument that by ignoring specific interests 
outlined in the Convention Persian officials had themselves provoked the 
confrontation with Russia.""* The Radicals cared little for the hypotheses of the 
Foreign Secretary; they remained concerned with the practical examples of 
illiberal diplomacy which they saw in Grey's handling of Persian affairs. The 
principles behind the Anglo-Russian Agreement were under scrutiny, and 
answers were required to remove suspicions that those principles were 
incompatible with acceptable standards of honour and prestige. 
Diplomatic developments merely deepened Grey's problems. The 
Russians showed no inclination to withdraw their coercive military presence 
from north Persia, or accept Persian promises to investigate the cause of the 
dispute.'" Indeed, and in spite of the formal acceptance of the Ultimatum of 
2nd November in its entirety,""- St Petersburg escalated the crisis on 28th 
November with a second and more severe set of demands."-' MPs in 
Westminster had already expressed concern that the Foreign Office had 
attempted to influence Persia into accepting the initial Russian Ultimatum, and 
as such were party to a breach of the principle of non-intervention."" They now 
found themselves presented with evidence of direct Russian interference and 
apparent British complicity. It was bad enough that Shuster and his British 
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employee Lecoffre were to be dismissed from service in the Persian 
government. It was intolerable that the Entente powers should insist upon a 
say in the appointment of any foreign nationals to the Persian civil service. 
Such a demand contravened the fundamental rights of Persia as a sovereign 
nation. Offence was also taken at the Russian demand for an indemnity, which 
was seen as a deliberate attempt to establish a binding economic influence over 
a near-destitute Persia. To be fair to Grey, he too was in private greatly 
opposed to such moves."' Nevertheless, with a continuation of the 27th 
November debate pending, the Radicals wasted no time in questioning Grey 
over the 'manner' of his concurrent diplomacy. They also burdened the 
Foreign Secretary with the task of proving that that his diplomacy was 
compatible with the spirit of the 1907 Entente. Morrell and Dillon demanded 
to know the Foreign Office position over the use of Britain's name in the 
demand for consultation prior to any foreign appointments to the Persian civil 
service, and over the second Russian Ultimatum of 28th November in general."' 
On 4th December Morrell forced an adjournment debate on the Persian issue, 
and used the opportunity afforded to him to outline the Radical position as to 
what the Anglo-Russian Convention embodied.*' As previous critics had before 
him, Morrell declared present Russian diplomacy to be incompatible with that 
document, and insisted that the British government should protest to St 
Petersburg. The next day, Ponsonby asked if the declaration made by the 
British Minister in Tehran on 4th September 1907 on the nature of the 
Convention still represented the position of the government. When informed 
that his source was not recorded as an official communication, the MP for 
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Stirling Burghs was presented with an anomaly in Anglo-Persian diplomacy of 
potentially serious proportions, an anomaly he was only too ready to pursue.'^ 
A l l the while, the Radicals were assisted in their efforts by worried Tory 
imperialists, of whom Curzon, ex-Viceroy of India and well-respected expert on 
Asian affairs, was the most vociferous. The Radicals appreciated the 'Curzon 
factor' only too well:-
At all events in this Persian Question... a nod 
from Curzon will have more effect upon the 
Government than the frowns of our collective 
wisdom."' 
On 7th December in the House of Lords Lord Curzon heavily 
criticised Grey's Persian policy on a variety of issues.^ " He argued that 
the 'declared interests' conceded to Russia in the north of Persia had been 
excessive, and that the result of those concessions had been to encourage 
demands for administrative powers to insure the continued security of any 
'economic' advantages that those interests embodied. This, according to 
Curzon, was the first step on the road towards political influence and eventual 
partition and annexation; the very scenario that for reasons of imperial 
security the 1907 Convention had been meant to avoid. A l l the while, the 
failure of Britain to uphold the ideals and responsibihties implicit in the 
Agreement reflected badly upon her prestige and honour, and weakened her 
standing in international circles and in the eyes of her colonial subjects tied to 
Persian affairs by religious affinity (the Islamic factor). Such support from an 
authoritative source strengthened Radical claims that severe flaws in policy 
existed, and that problems in 'manner' were only evidence of errors in 'matter'. 
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Curzon's declarations on Persia provided a happy parallel for the political 
Left's campaign:-
While Russia has issued the Ultimatum, we 
seem to have incurred the odium. I cannot 
think this testifies to a very happy diplomacy. It 
throws a rather lurid light upon the halcyon days 
we were led to expect when the Anglo-Russian 
Agreement was signed." 
Because concern over such an important issue in the conduct of 
foreign affairs was seen to be wider than mere Radical Liberal disquiet, the 
Radicals were able to claim that official dismissals of their case as 
unsubstantiated and idealistic scaremongering were wrong, and that the 
problems they perceived were in fact real and in need of serious consideration. 
The debate on foreign affairs cut short on 27th November 1911 was 
continued on 14th December a greater concentration on Persian affairs, which 
had in the intervening period come to dominate the entire issue of policy, was 
inevitable." Sir Henry Norman, Liberal MP for Wolverhampton South (and a 
noted Liberal Imperialist), saw fit to challenge inconsistencies in the Radical 
arguments against diplomatic agreements, and described himself as in principle 
a supporter of the Convention. However, he also expressed grave misgivings 
about recent developments in Persia which he felt suggested that the central 
principles upon which the Agreement was based were being violated. The 
Liberal MP for Leicester, Crawshay-Williams, who claimed a professed interest 
in Persian affairs, again voiced claims that the diplomatic activity of 1907 had 
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devolved upon Britain a duty to honour her pledge to uphold Persian 
independence. It was after all demanded by Liberal principle that Britain 
support a fellow constitutional power in time of crisis. And in any case, the 
prospective threat of partition, and consequently increased problems of defence 
resulting from the creation of a contiguous frontier with Russia, would 
eventually force the government to clarify its position with regard to the 
Persian Question. Such considerations surely made it expedient to use the 
1907 Convention as a vehicle for fostering Persian recovery, so as to pre-empt 
the future problems that would otherwise emerge. The Unionist MP Baird 
echoed Radical calls for a clear statement of intent by Grey to end the 
destabilising atmosphere of uncertainty and doubt. The Foreign Secretary 
attempted to offer the clear explanation that was demanded. He also tried to 
show that Anglo-Russian policies towards Persia were entirely compatible with 
the 1907 Agreement. He again argued that the Convention had sought to 
identify and recognise respective Anglo-Russian interests as the best way to 
avoid harmful confrontations, and to allow Persia to develop in peace as an 
independent state. Those who interpreted the Convention as an acceptance by 
the Entente powers that they had become responsible for the upholding of 
Persian independence and integrity were mistaken. A l l that the Convention 
had committed Britain and Russia to was the respecting of independence and 
integrity whilst Persia instituted a programme of self-development as the basis 
for political and economic stability. Grey attempted to justify the Russian 
ultimata of November by arguing that Persia was remiss in failing to 
recognise and accept the expressed interests of her neighbours, and that she 
98 
should avoid the pursuit of antagonistic initiatives. Most importantly, he 
outlined a six point proposal for restoring internal stability to Persia, and, by 
establishing cordial relations with Britain and Russia, the means with which to 
avoid future disruptive clashes." Grey predicted that the Russian promises that 
the military occupation of the north was a provisional measure, to last only 
until order was restored, would prove good. This would prove that co-
operation on all sides under the Convention could engender definite progress, 
and vindicate his Entente diplomacy. In spite of this, the Radicals refused 
either to be placated or to accept his arguments. Ponsonby again cited the 
letter of 4th September 1907 of Spring-Rice to the Persian Foreign Minister as 
evidence that the Convention had included a guarantee to the Persians, and 
that since then this pledge had been neglected as the operation of a 'balance of 
power' policy had seen Grey favour Russia at Persia's expense. The 1907 
Agreement was not wrong in itself, but subsequent Russian abuse and British 
inaction had tainted it. Morrell attacked the Foreign Secretary for failing to 
act against Russian moves, and questioned his inaction. The attack on Shuster, 
the demand for veto over foreign civil service appointments, and the claim for 
an indemnity all pointed to unwarranted Russian interference in Persian 
institutional reform and to a blatant attempt at economic exploitation. The 
Russians were using the Convention as a screen behind which to conceal their 
increasing interference in Persia's economic and political affairs. 
The debates of 27th November and 14th December failed to resolve 
the arguments over British foreign policy in general, or as specifically 
concerned Persia, to the satisfaction of either Grey, or his critics. Because the 
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Persian Crisis itself was far from reaching a clear solution, and as a result 
neither of the Westminster protagonists could vindicate their position by 
providing conclusive evidence of either success or failure, such a resolution 
was unattainable. The struggle was once more forced to concentrate on 
assessing on-going and largely unresolved developments in the light of the aims 
of the 1907 Convention. Russian diplomatic and military coercion had already 
brought those aims into .question, as had the ready nature of Grey's acceptance 
of Russian explanations. The Foreign Secretary's defence of Russian initiatives 
did little to comfort the worried Radical-Curzonite Lobby. The information 
that emerged during December and January appeared more and more to 
vindicate their position, and to show either undue naivety or willing compliance 
on Grey's part in what Shuster was to call 'the strangling of Persia'. Parliament 
was in recess from 16th December to 14th February 1912, but events moved 
apace in Persia. The second ultimatum was eventually complied with, but only 
at the expense of a coup d'etat by the Persian cabinet who forcibly removed 
the hostile opposition of the Mejliss and suppressed the constitution. Clashes 
at Resht and Tabriz between Russian troops and Persians, and rumours of 
Russian atrocities in the north, increased fears that St Petersburg had no 
intention of reducing its military presence.-^ " The Radicals pursued an extra-
parliamentary campaign, using a resurgent Persia Committee and sympathetic 
organs of the Liberal press to maintain pressure on Whitehall and accrue as 
much ammunition against policy misconduct as they could. The new session 
opened with the debate on the Royal Address and the Radicals were again 
presented with a chance to force the Persian and foreign affairs issue on to 
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centre stage. 
The debate of 21st February 1912 on the Royal Address marked the 
peak of Radical agitation over Persia, and arguably of their campaign for 
greater parliamentary control of foreign policy." The events of the previous 
months in central Asia had provided enough material of sufficient weight to 
enable the Radicals to sustain the momentum of their post-Agadir campaign. 
Now, with evidence that Grey's policies had neither delivered the successes 
which he had so recently promised, nor remained true to sacred Liberal 
principle or the expressed aims of the 1907 Convention, his critics could launch 
a retrospective attack upon the course and nature of the Foreign Secretary's 
diplomacy. The Radicals for once enjoyed the advantage of being able to 
assess and criticise on an issue which was on-going despite having been a cause 
of concern for a significant length of time. For once, the usual prevarications 
or dismissals offered by the Secretary of State to divert their criticisms could be 
circumvented. Ponsonby, Morrell and the other Radicals were well established 
in their position, ready at any time to comment upon on any issue - and 
concomitantly Grey's position was less secure. 
Ponsonby's speech that opened the debate was perhaps the classic 
exposition upon what the Radicals understood to be the Persian Question, and 
that nation's relations with Britain and Russia.-" Grey may have denied that 
the by-now infamous Spring-Rice letter of 4th September 1907 was an official 
communication of policy, but Ponsonby was nevertheless able to argue that 
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Persia had based her understanding of the Convention upon it, and that the 
statement that 'their object...was not to allow one another to intervene' which 
outlined the intentions of the Anglo-Russian powers in their negotiations, had 
come to encapsulate Persia's reaction to i t ." The defence of the principles of 
independence and integrity, and the hopes for Persian recovery, had been 
based upon this understanding. However, the actions of Russia after 1907 and 
especially during 1911-12 had deliberately contravened those principles. 
Officials in St Petersburg had managed to provoke a crisis with Shuster, who 
had based his reformist policies upon the Spring-Rice guarantee, with the 
express purpose of increasing their influence and preventing Persian recovery 
(which could only take place if she were left free from outside interference). 
The resulting crisis had destabilised the existing regime in Persia and enabled 
Russia to sponsor a coup d'etat against the Mejliss as a result of which their 
influence, diminished since the deposition of the Shah in 1909, was restored. 
In spite of this. Grey had claimed success for his policy, notably in a speech 
given in Manchester (which Ponsonby cited with contempt):-
That which we hoped to achieve by the Anglo-
Russian Convention has been achieved, and on 
both sides the Agreement has been absolutely 
kept. 
Ponsonby also cited a Russian press article, which claimed that new 
forward interests could not be relinquished, as evidence that the Russians 
remained an expanding imperial power, and consequently argued that the 
promised troop withdrawals were unlikely. In the light of such evidence, the 
Spring-Rice interpretation of the Convention was invalid, and its entire position 
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thrown into question. Ponsonby continued this theme by arguing that the 
Anglo-Russian Joint Note of 18th February showed clearly that the Entente 
powers persisted in the policy of interference in the economic, administrative 
and political affairs of Persia.'^ He argued that it was unwise to permit the 
Entente governments to dictate terms for a loan, because as such the financing 
of developments would be less a means to encourage independent 
restabihsation, and more a political lever with which to undermine self-
government. The consequences of sacrificing Persian independence were once 
again rehearsed; as well as the cost to commerce and imperial security, 
national prestige and honour and principles of justice would be lost. Behind 
this disastrous policy could be seen the dread spectre of anti-German balance 
of power commitments - a rapprochement with Berlin had therefore become 
the essential precursor to the repairing of the Persian situation. Ponsonby's 
attitude to this issue and the Anglo-Russian Entente were summed up nicely:-
Democracies seek no quarrel; they desire to 
avoid quarrel. On the other hand...that cannot 
be said of autocracies.'^ 
Morrell, too, recited the usual list of concerns, and echoed Ponsonby's 
suggestion that it had been fear of a successful Shuster that had prompted 
Russia into forcing the crisis. He sought assurances from Grey that the 
government would press for a restoration of effective Persian self-
determination (to include for example, the recalling of the Mejiiss) and the 
complete removal of the Russian occupation force. In short, Morrell wanted 
evidence that the 'spirit' of the 1907 Convention as expressed by the Spring-
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Rice letter would be upheld. Because it failed to do this, neglecting Persian 
independence and self-administration, the Joint Note was roundly criticised.*" 
Dillon, O'Grady and Buxton all contributed to the recapitulation of the Radical 
position, bemoaning intervention, excessive secrecy, and the underlying 'balance 
of power' considerations that so dominated policy. The Liberal MP for 
Coventry, David Mason, rallied those concerned at the illiberal nature of policy 
of the time with an encouraging cry and a warning to those who currently 
abused their positions in power:-
If the lamp of freedom is, perhaps, burning 
dimly in the hands of those who at present 
hold it, it does not mean that it does not exist." 
Once more. Grey found himself unable to offer a telling counter to 
either satisfy or discredit his critics. Russian troops remained in the north of 
Persia. The diplomatic moves in progress, of which the Joint Note of 18th 
February was the prime example, followed all too well the route towards the 
erosion and collapse of Persian independence outlined by Curzon and the 
Radicals. Worse still, the reassurances that were offered began to sound both 
hackneyed and predetermined, inflexible non-answers designed to placate 
parliamentary worries concerning an issue which Grey either could or would not 
resolve. The Russian occupation, 'temporary and provisional' though it may 
have been, persisted. The Convention, the only hope for Persian recovery and 
the peaceful preservation of Britain's material interests in the region, was 
patently not fulfilling its brief. The Foreign Secretary could claim that 
in the end his policies would bear fruit and be vindicated, but no 
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consistent or lasting evidence to support his case could be found. And, of 
course, the upshot of these failures was to further convince his critics that it 
was the very nature of his policies that precluded a just solution, and 
consequently that a review of both the nature and machinery of policy was 
urgently required. 
It is therefore ironic that the very weakness of Grey's position as 
concerned Parliament was at the same time a crucial element in his eventual 
weathering of the storm of criticism. The Foreign Secretary's answers 
continued to sound contrived and unconvincing. The Persian Crisis continued 
to defy both Grey's predictions and his promises of an imminent return to 
stability. The seemingly endless incidence of events which contradicted his 
claims ensured that his policy was constantly brought into disrepute." In short, 
the Persian Question denied the beleaguered minister any respite. However, 
the result of this persistence was to remove the 'novelty' value of Persia as a 
vital, fresh issue for the Radicals to latch onto in their campaign. Gradually, 
outrage and concern dwindled, and were replaced by resignation and despair. 
It was feared that no answer would be forthcoming unless a new and radically 
different line of policy and set of responsibilities were adopted, not necessarily 
compatible with the Radicals' position.'^'' Just as Grey had argued during the 
debates of 27th November and 14th December 1911 concerning criticisms of 
his Entente policies, the failure of the Radicals to offer a practical policy 
alternative for British involvement in Central Asia seriously undermined their 
position.*" For all their criticism of the Convention, the Radicals failed to show 
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that any other policy could have achieved a more satisfactory state of affairs in 
Persia. By consistently pursuing a policy course which at least preserved a 
semblance of Persian independence, if not integrity, Grey could claim greater 
success than those who, tied by conscience to a set of laudable ideals, could not 
provide a practical alternative capable of achieving their idealistic ends. Just as 
their failure to formulate a workable format for a Parliamentary Committee on 
Foreign Affairs prevented the Radicals from achieving the creation of a 
parliamentary watchdog,so their inability to advance a practical policy format 
prevented them from achieving a radical change in policy 'matter'. At the 
same time, interest in domestic politics once again began to overshadow 
foreign affairs as Ponsonby for one knew it would.** Home Rule and Welsh 
Disestabhshment began to dominate both the minds of the majority in 
Parliament, and the time used up in debate.*' The very factors that had made 
the Persian Crisis the perfect vehicle for Radical agitation after Agadir were 
undermined. For want of a better analogy, the 'bubbling pot' went off the boil 
and could do no more than simmer, spitting occasionally to attract attention, 
but never sufficiently to engender any great enthusiasm. Precisely because 
Persia refused to stabilise; precisely because banditry persisted; precisely 
because aristocratic and tribal rebelliousness continued to undermine moves 
towards restoring a central authority; and precisely because no practical policy 
free from unsavoury compromise could be agreed upon to solve the crisis - for 
these reasons Persia lost the ability to keep the issue of policy control centre 
stage. Indeed, Persia may well have come to discourage uncommitted Liberals 
from grasping the nettle of foreign policy, especially as such a course could 
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only adversely affect domestic business and weaken the Government.** Grey 
found it increasingly easy to excuse Russian moves in the north as it became 
clear that chaos persisted and precluded withdrawal. He was at the same time 
able to show clearly why he was loath to commit himself to any active 
intervention for fear of accepting excessive levels of responsibility. As 
problems mounted in Persia, so paradoxically problems for Grey lessened vis a 
vis Westminster. As long as Persia remained no more than a disquieting 
nuisance, with only tertiary impacts upon fundamental British interests, it 
proved increasingly expedient to let sleeping dogs lie. 
That is not to say that Persia ceased to be of concern, or that it 
disappeared from the parliamentary schedules. The assessment of the 
problems facing the Radicals and the extent to which the Persian issue faded in 
importance can only be a retrospective judgement. It was certainly not clear 
that the Debate on the Royal Address marked the pinnacle of successful 
agitation. If, subsequently, the ability to motivate MPs into calling for a review 
of the foreign affairs process declined, it was not obvious at the time. Sir 
Arthur Nicolson's comments in a letter of 1st July 1912 to the new Minister at 
Tehran, Townley, reflects concerns to the contrary:-
We are always worried by thoughts of how our 
action will be viewed below the gangway of the 
House of Commons.*' 
The number of questions tabled on Persia showed no immediate 
decline, nor did the concern which they expressed. Morrell, Dillon and 
MacDonald continued to demand information about the documentary 
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definition of the 1907 Convention accepted by the Tehran government,™ the 
Joint Note of 18th February 1912 (and responses"), and recent events in 
Persia.'^ It was clear that the Radicals remained unconvinced that the spirit of 
the Agreement was being observed, and that as long as Russian moves to exert 
an undue influence in Persia remained unopposed, Grey's diplomacy remained 
suspect. The Radicals were able to claim at least one success. Some five 
papers were laid in the House concerning Persia between 10th March 1912 and 
3rd July 1912, a release of official documentation far in excess of usual levels." 
It would be wrong to forget Temperley and Penson's warning that as regarded 
the Blue Books 'much was omitted and texts were frequently curtailed"" (thus 
supporting Radical fears that information was being tailored to uphold policy). 
Grey stated privately:-
I desire to publish enough to show that 
declaration of Anglo-Russian agreement 
respecting integrity and independence of Persia 
were not lost sight of, but I do not wish to 
publish what would embarrass the Russian 
Government.'' 
However, the fact remains that any increase in the issuing of information, no 
matter the quality, was a victory for the Radicals. As one commentator has 
subsequently remarked, 'Grey had been forced from his Whitehall isolation'.'* 
Criticism of Grey's handling of the Persian Question continued 
throughout the summer. The Meshed Incident and outcry over apparent 
attempts at religious persecution by the Russian forces in the north made 
certain that the issue remained on the agenda." Once again, the lack of 
official reaction encouraged fears of acquiescence and collusion. The Radicals 
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were able to exploit the opportunity for further debate and inquiry offered by 
the Civil Services and Revenue Department Estimates Committee on Foreign 
Office supply on 10th July 1912.'* The Radicals and Curzonite lobbies once 
more sought to illustrate the flawed nature of policy. According to 
Ronaldshay, Russia had clearly failed to fulf i l its promises to respect British 
interests vis a vis the Persian 'buffer state' and as such had brought the value 
of the Convention into doubt. In particular, the antagonising of Islamic 
peoples that the atrocities caused had threatened to undermine stability in 
British colonies where the indigenous population were bound to support their 
co-religionists over and above dubious Entente partners." If, as was claimed, 
Persia was prone to 'periodic oscillations' which led to such chaos and disorder, 
and consequently military reactions, then it was surely the duty of Britain to 
clarify once and for all her position as to minimise her role as an element 
causing confusion. The Foreign Office should ensure that policy sought to reap 
maximum advantages for Britain's commercial and strategic interests in the 
region, but only so far as this proved compatible with Persian wishes. 
Ponsonby insisted that on no account should policy give Russia carte blanche. 
As regarded the future of Persia, it was felt essential that the constitution 
should be restored as a prerequisite for restabilisation and internal 
development. According to Dillon, progress had to be made free from further 
untoward external interference, true to the spirit of self-determination. Buxton 
demanded that 'balance of power' considerations be jettisoned as the essential 
precursor to the reaffirmation of the spirit of the 1907 Convention as the 
guarantee of independence and integrity. Ponsonby, who went so far as to 
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claim that Persia had become the dominant policy issue of the day, again 
offered the definitive statement as to the Radical position:-
Al l the fears which we expressed at the 
beginning of the Session, on the [King's] 
Address, have been justified.^ 
When, on 26th July, Curzon rose in the Lords to launch another tirade 
against the government's policy, ably assisted by Lord Lamington who had 
recently returned from Persia and thus enjoyed the rare luxury of first hand 
experience, the Radical campaign appeared to remain in the best of health.*' 
However, as I have already suggested, the virility of the campaign was 
on the decline. The number of difficult and embarrassing questions asked in 
the House fell steadily after the Meshed Incident in April. Grey had been 
forced to concede such 'acceptable' documentation as he had by July, but was 
loath to go further - and proved able to withhold further papers by adopting 
the old tactics of prevarication which so infuriated the Radicals. They were 
able to ask for more information, to express concern that the Russians had still 
failed to withdraw,*^ to enquire if the Balmoral Meeting in September 1912 had 
led to any redefining and reinterpretation of the 1907 Convention." They 
could apply pressure, trying to force the Foreign Secretary to provide 
unconditional emergency aid for Persia and to press for a restoration of the 
Mejliss.^ But, crucially they lacked fresh hard evidence that could prove that, 
amongst the series of ongoing problems in Persia, British and Russian policy 
contradicted Grey's reassurances and guarantees. Grey was able to explain 
no 
away developments playing on the Radicals' lack of concrete proof. Apparent 
Russian support for the Governor of Tabriz (a known adherent of the ex-Shah) 
against the Tehran government; perceived moves by the Entente powers to 
install a known royalist noble as regent; and suspicious reticence in the 
supplying of a long-promised and much-needed loan - these were all explained 
away because no Radical could prove that the position defined by Grey as the 
basis of his Persia policy the previous winter had been contravened.^ The 
'matter' of his policy was therefore intact, and as a result any short term 
failures in conduct could be explained away in the time-honoured fashion:-
The state of affairs is not very settled at present 
in Persia.^ 
His Majesty's Government has given...support... 
but not in a form that can correctly be described 
by any harsh word such as pressure.*' 
Grey argued that progress towards the establishment of independent 
internal development programmes and the removal of Anglo-Russian 
involvement in Persian affairs could not be made until stable government had 
been restored.** As a result, any Anglo-Russian initiative of apparently illiberal 
nature in the short term should be seen as intent on facilitating that laudable, 
long term aim. The failure of his critics to offer a different proposal, capable 
of catering for all the interested parties involved, made this position all the 
stronger. 
As the above examples suggest, without definite proof that diplomatic 
moves were flawed, the Radicals lost the ability to do much more than infer to 
that effect. No new Spring-Rice letter emerged to compromise Grey's position 
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and force further statements of intent explaining policy and allaying suspicions. 
Grey could thus rebuff Radical assertions safe in the knowledge that the 
effective ignorance of his critics was in turn his and the Entente's strength. As 
a result, and even though demands for information and questioning of specific 
issues persisted, the campaign centred around the Persian question ceased to 
be a significant concern. And, ironically, as Unionist MPs such as Rees and 
Lonsdale began to call for the adoption of British intervention a la Russe in 
south Persia to safeguard British interests, particularly after the death of one 
Captain Eckford, Grey was even able to pose as a moderate Liberal, intent on 
protecting policy from calls for excessive imperialistic interventions.*' 
How, then, should the historian view the Radical agitation over Persia, 
and the wider struggle for parliamentary control of foreign policy? A J P 
Taylor has argued that in the wake of the agitation against his policies. Grey 
adopted a new course more attuned to the demands of his Radical critics.** If 
the events in Persia and debates in Westminster of this period are considered, 
it is clear that such a view cannot be upheld, at least as concerns the Persian 
question and the related issue of policy control. McLean is correct to argue 
that the Radical campaign had little apparent success in changing Grey's 
attitude towards the Persian situation, nor indeed in prompting a change in 
policy to a position equating with the Radical cries for a defence of the 
'independence and integrity' of Persia with a concomitant hardening of 
attitudes to Russian interventions." However, it is necessary to put the Persian 
question and the Radical involvement in that crisis into a context which allows 
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for the point of the overall Radical campaign, that which this study seeks to 
evaluate. Persian Committee aside, it is important to remember that the 
Radicals were not concerned solely with Persia. The crisis provided them with 
the perfect test case with which to argue that the machinery of foreign policy, 
conduct and control, was flawed and in need of reform. A reflection back to 
the statement of 6th December 1911 issued by the Liberal Foreign Affairs 
Committee is apt at this juncture:-
The idea is prevalent that Parliament has 
abrogated its function in regard to foreign 
things...this is not in accord with the doctrine of 
democracy...the nature of this function should at 
least be considered...there should be more 
discussion, no discouragement of question, and 
fewer appeals for silence. 
The main reason for this was also outlined:-
It is obvious that a Liberal Government has 
difficulty in carrying out its views... This may be 
partly balanced by the expression of views in 
Parliament.'-
The Radicals were arguing that foreign affairs should be readmitted, 
or at least restored, to the orbit of parliamentary business on a wider scale 
such as had existed in the times of Gladstone. As a result, policy would be 
made accountable to the public. This would ensure, as Ponsonby's letter to 
Lloyd George in September 1912 recognised, that where problems emerged 
between practical policy alternatives and party political or ideological principle, 
all elements would receive due attention and policy would reflect and cater for 
both vital national interests and the conscience of domestic opinion." Liberals 
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would understand that initiatives seen previously as excessively 'conservative' 
were in fact dictated by circumstance and only adopted after careful 
consideration by the elected legislative. In the case of Persia in the period 
here under consideration, the policy in operation and problem under 
examination may not have been debated to the satisfaction of those involved, 
and a policy course based on the democratic compromise outlined above may 
not have been reached. Nevertheless, both as an individual issue and in the 
wider context of policy control, it was discussed. Indeed, as a central element 
in the struggle for a greater parliamentary role in the panacea of foreign affairs 
conduct, the Radical campaign assumes new proportions. With some six 
Commons debates and over 250 questions and supplementaries being 
considered between October 1911 and March 1913, quite a considerable 
amount of 'parliamentary function' was taken up. For a group who 
unashamedly admitted that the defence of principle was their major intention, 
such a success, the acknowledgement in practical circumstances that the 
function of Parliament included the debating of foreign affairs, merits at least 
qualified applause. This conclusion is all the more attractive when the 
successful campaign for the release of official information release is 
remembered. Murray, in his somewhat dubious contribution to the debate, is 
perhaps over-stating the obvious when he concludes that 'the most significant 
result [of the agitation] was that at last foreign affairs had a hearing'.*' Even 
so, it cannot be denied that the agitation over Persia, if failing to achieve any 
lasting practical changes such as the Radicals hoped for, at least ensured that 
the issue of parliamentary control received both an airing and a prolonged 
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trial. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to place the material failings of the 
Radicals' arguments into context with the situation facing them. It is important 
to remember that the Radicals could only base their arguments and criticisms 
upon such evidence as was available to them at that time; and that the view 
they took concerning developments could only be as accurate as that evidence 
allowed. Their failure to provide viable alternatives to Grey's policies should 
be considered in this light. If their sources were prone to inaccuracy, bias, or 
sketchiness, then it remained the responsibility of those with a greater 
understanding of affairs to either provide sufficient data to correct mistaken or 
unfair criticisms, or to accept those criticisms content in the stoic conviction 
that the eventual resolution of affairs would vindicate their position. It is of 
course possible with the benefit of hindsight to castigate the Radicals for their 
excessive attachment to principle, and their failure to perceive that the wider 
strategy-led view of affairs which Grey and his colleagues were forced to adopt 
precluded such inflexibility; but to what end? I have already argued that the 
weakness caused by ignorance of key material and strategic considerations 
provided the Radicals with one of their strongest cards - their ability to refute 
all attempts to blame them for problems caused by the weakening of Britain's 
'internal cohesion'. Buxton's staunch rebuttal of Grey's charge that 'mischief 
motivated Radical demands for a review of affairs embodies the whole point of 
the Radical position; the motivation behind their agitation was to secure a 
'clarification...bringing forward the facts' to enable the democratic role of 
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Parliament to function.'* The Radicals may not have understood the realities of 
power political developments, and may have launched attacks upon policy which 
in the light of day deserve censure because they undermined Grey's position, 
and by association the national interest, to no good effect. The point is that this 
was not their fault. They did not create the concern about foreign policy vis a 
vis Agadir or Persia; nor did they undertake their campaign seeking political 
advantage, or out of malice. Motivated by the liberal-democratic traditions they 
had inherited from their Radical forefathers, the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group 
pursued a campaign dictated by conscience, sustained by staunch belief. I f their 
fears were to prove unfounded, or if by accident they contributed to the 
problems facing the Foreign Secretary, then they were not to know. The 
Foreign Office always held the whip hand; it could have countered critics, either 
by releasing information to refute their mistaken claims, or by engineering 
diplomatic successes to end the fears and concerns which provoked them. 
Failure to do either could only increase fears that something was indeed amiss; 
and that consequently agitation for a review of policy content and conduct was 
justified. I f the practical exigencies facing Grey precluded him from taking 
Parliament into his confidence, or proved so complex as to frustrate his best 
attempts at solving the diplomatic problems which confronted him, the public 
faces of which were paradoxically the very causes of concern which prompted 
the Radicals' involvement, they were not to know. If their campaign for 
democratic control contributed to Grey's problems, they should not be censured 
for it. Morally, the Radical position defies reproach. 
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The ultimate success or failure of the Radicals in their struggle for 
democratic control was not resolved by the end of the 1912 session, and 
consequently the Radical position cannot be assessed here as if it were either 
vanquished or vindicated.** It has been possible merely to consider the nature 
of the ongoing campaign from a Radical perspective, highlighting their 
problems and assessing their position and arguments in terms of what they 
were capable of both knowing and undertaking. A wider understanding of the 
issue here at stake, and the placing of the Radical agitation into a wider more 
complete context, can only be achieved if the position of the Foreign Secretary 
throughout the crisis is considered. As a result, the only conclusion which may 
be drawn from this study of the Radical involvement in the Persian Question 
1911-12 is that there were indeed a series of dilemmas, inconsistencies and i l l -
defined responsibilities in need of consideration, and that their agitation 
brought some of them to the surface. The twin issues of parliamentary 
procedure and Liberal principle were addressed simultaneously, and with some 
success. Whether, in the light of practical considerations concerning the 
operation of foreign policy, the 'bringing to the surface' of such 'manner' and 
'matter' was desirable, is another question. Central to the issue of democratic 
control, it is this question that I shall consider in the following chapter. 
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Chapter IV: PARLIAMENT A N D THE PERSIAN QUESTION 1911-12: 
T H E REALITIES OF POLICY 
I stake everything upon pulling the Agreement 
through all difficulties 
Grey to Hardinge, 28th January 1912 
In the preceding chapters I have attempted a consideration of the 
background to and nature of the Radical campaign for greater parliamentary 
involvement in the business of foreign policy. As we have seen, the Agadir 
Crisis provoked renewed interest from a Radical lobby long concerned about 
the nature and operation of foreign policy, but frustrated in attempts to 
address the issue in Parliament. The re-emergence of the Persian Crisis 
further increased this interest; and, because of its persistence, provided those 
already critical of current diplomacy with the perfect opportunity to scrutinise 
Grey's policies as they operated in the field. We have seen how the Persian 
Crisis provided an embarrassing problem for the Foreign Secretary. Any 
diplomatic developments which brought into question issues of principle or 
procedure would inevitably provoke hostile reaction from his own backbenches 
and fuel the arguments of Radicals calling for a review of policy content and 
conduct. Developments in Persia from late 1911 and throughout 1912 saw just 
such a situation emerge. Moreover, because his critics all too often 
concentrated on abstractions such as principle (as opposed to more binding 
material considerations) and compounded this with an albeit unintentional 
habit of basing their arguments on incomplete information, the likelihood of 
practical diplomacy appearing to contradict the Radicals' ideologically strong 
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position was high. As a result, the ability of the Foreign Secretary to deflect 
their criticisms, and to resist their demands for changes in both the political 
and procedural nature of foreign policy, was compromised. 
He was forced to concede ground in some areas, notably the releasing 
of information; and reduced to uncomfortable prevarication, even dissembling, 
in others. Although it is impossible to gauge the extent to which Grey was 
influenced by the domestic agitation, it is fair to contend that the Radical 
campaign weighed heavily upon his mind. Their success in bringing apparent 
anomalies in diplomacy to the attention of Parliament cannot be ignored. 
Even if they failed to achieve a complete review of both the content and 
conduct of Grey's diplomacy, the Radicals ensured that it was aired in front of 
the legislature as a topic of debate. In this way, they successfully ensured that 
an element of principle and idealism was restored to the foreign policy 
equation - indeed, that the traditions of Liberal democracy which they valued 
were upheld. 
However, when it is remembered that considerations existed of which 
the Radicals were ignorant but of which the Foreign Office were only too well 
aware, it becomes necessary to consider a further dimension in the equation. 
What was Britain's scope for action? And, in the light of this, how should 
Grey's handling of Persia be placed in the context of the struggle for 
democratic control? It is clear that the Radicals tended to see matters in 
simplistic, single issue terms. They often failed to allow for the fact that 
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apparently separate developments in the diplomatic field could interact, linking 
events otherwise unconnected by geographical or chronological ties and with 
consequences for which they were quite unprepared.' Their campaigns tend to 
reflect this. The excessive attachment to principle, and failure to appreciate 
the nature of practical exigencies facing policy makers, was without doubt 
encouraged because the Radicals were denied access to the vast and accurate 
sources of information available to Whitehall. As I have discussed, unnecessary 
and excessive secrecy was an issue attacked strongly in the Radical campaign, 
and was often cited as a major qualification for erroneous claims and 
statements made from their positions of ignorance. Even so, it is important to 
remember that, if their ignorance and consequent ability to uphold principle 
enabled the Radicals to argue their case all the more convincingly, then the 
Foreign Secretary was not afforded a similar luxury as he dealt with the 
practical side of policy. Persia was but a single factor in a much wider and 
precariously balanced diplomatic infrastructure. To force any issue in Persia 
was to risk the collapse of that infrastructure.^ The entire facade behind which 
lay the truth of imperial and domestic security, and Britain's status as a stable 
Great Power, were considerations that dictated policy in Persia. Radical 
protestations against illiberalism on Grey's part, and general parliamentary 
disquiet, were of course factors of which Grey was obliged to take note' - but 
not to any greater extent than considerations of national security. As a result, 
any assessment of the Foreign Secretary's performance in Parliament at this 
time should be based on two levels. Firstly, by assessing the extent to which, in 
a quantitative sense. Grey was able to deal successfully with the problems and 
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criticisms that presented themselves in Parliament, it becomes possible to 
understand how contemporary parliamentary members viewed his policy - in 
both its aims, and its operation. Identifying these contemporaneous sentiments 
is crucial to any attempt at clear understanding of the events and issues that 
constituted the struggle for control of policy. It must be remembered that in 
1911-12 statements made on foreign policy issues were not influenced by 
knowledge of the cataclysm that would shortly result in the Great War, and 
which has tended to cloud post facto assessments of the period with hindsight. 
At the same time, it is necessary to place such attitudes as were adopted into a 
context where they may be assessed alongside the fundamental considerations 
that determined Grey's actions. It is therefore necessary to attempt as the 
second element in the overall assessment a qualitative survey of the issues at 
stake. I have already undertaken in the introduction a consideration of 
Britain's position and policy 1911-13, attempting to put into perspective Grey's 
position vis a vis the states system of the time." This chapter will seek to 
examine this position in light of the Persian Crisis. At the heart of the matter 
rests the extent to which the Foreign Secretary was forced to compromise 
principle in his Persian policy and pursued a pragmatic line commensurate with 
national interests - and to what extent his failure to provide a complete 
explanation for Parliament can be justified. Just as Persia provided Grey's 
Radical critics with a perfect opportunity for assessment of his conduct, so it 
provides the historian with a perfect opportunity for assessing the arguments 
over poHcy brought to light by recent historiographical work. By examining 
these complementary elements in Grey's handling of the Persian Question it 
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may be possible to understand more clearly the nature of the struggle for 
mastery over foreign policy, and consequently to reach a conclusion as to the 
role of Parliament in foreign affairs business. 
As the consideration of the Radical campaign has suggested, in 
quantitative terms. Grey's handling of the questions and criticisms which 
assailed him in Parliament over his Persian and Anglo-Russian policy does not 
appear to have been overly successful. It is clear that the Foreign Secretary 
wished to avoid the subject as far as possible, and that such 'tranquilising 
statements' as he made would be sufficient to alleviate concern and divert 
attention to other matters.' The volume of questions asked and the amount of 
debating time absorbed by Persia from October 1911 right through the 1912 
Session bears testament to Grey's failure to realise that aim.*^  He was unable 
to satisfy his critics that his conduct was true to Liberal principles. More 
damagingly, he also found it difficult to convince his detractors that he had 
been candid in his promises to the House, and that their acceptance of 
diplomatic initiatives had not been secured by insincerity, if not duplicity, on his 
part. In the months after the Agadir Crisis, those campaigning for greater 
parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs sought to use apparent flaws and 
inconsistencies in the British role in the Persian Question to sustain their 
position. As has been illustrated in the previous chapter, the Radicals were 
able to 'force Grey from his Whitehall isolation'.' The number of answers and 
statements that the minister found himself obliged to offer reflects both the 
measure of their success in achieving more debate, and the extent to which 
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Grey himself proved unable to restore confidence. His failure meant that his 
parliamentary position was significantly weakened. However, the concerns 
voiced over the impact that the Persian Question had upon British prestige, 
honour and security had a wider significance for Grey than parliamentary 
embarrassment. As a poor reflection upon 'internal cohesion', any sustained 
dissent was bound to impact adversely upon Britain's standing in the 
international states system.* Grey was only too aware of his predicament when 
he reflected that Persia 'tried my patience more than any other subject'.' For 
all his ability to restrict the amount of potentially damaging information to a 
minimum, and even though he found it possible to exploit the ignorant and two 
dimensional perspectives of his critics, the Foreign Secretary was denied the 
opportunity for offering a coup de grace with which to undermine the Radical 
position. As long as the Persian Crisis defied his attempts at a solution. Grey 
found it impossible to provide concrete evidence that would vindicate his 
actions without compromising his diplomatic position. It is ironic that whereas 
MPs such as Ponsonby complained that Grey all too often prevaricated and 
evaded their questions. Grey complained that the dictates of diplomatic 
courtesy and pragmatism overrode his genuine desire to supply the proof with 
which specific criticisms could be refuted and his integrity defended.'" McLean 
sums up the position nicely when he says that 'Grey himself had to be more 
circumspect' than his critics even though this did little to improve his 
parliamentary position." Put simply, had Grey provided the completely candid 
statements necessary for any attempt to allay fears, counter criticisms, correct 
misunderstandings, and remove the dissent that so troubled his parliamentary 
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and diplomatic position, he would have succeeded only in revealing and 
therefore deepening the more worrying problems of imperial security which his 
policy sought to cover. Viewed in this light, any reticence on the part of the 
Foreign Office in supplying accurate information for Parliament is 
understandable. Interference from that quarter did little to stabilise Britain's 
international position or relationships with other powers. To pursue a policy of 
good relations with foreign powers at the expense of domestic consensus would 
only serve in the long run to weaken those diplomatic relations. Similarly, to 
ignore international relations by providing exclusively for the whims of domestic 
politics could only provoke confrontations that would eventually upset short 
term domestic harmony. Some form of working compromise was essential -
but the interference of Parliament made such a compromise almost impossible. 
A l l too often it was found that the demands of one could not be met but at the 
expense of the other; and this was itself impractical. The only solution for the 
policy makers was to achieve success in one field sufficient to permit the 
establishment of a working equilibrium with the other. It was consequently 
expedient to let Parliament know of affairs in details only once matters had 
been resolved to a point where a reopening of negotiations was neither 
practical nor desirable. The stalling tactics used to distract Parliament during 
diplomatic negotiations and frequent refusals to permit debate once diplomatic 
settlements had been reached which so incensed the Radicals reflected a belief 
that the reconciling of domestic and diplomatic positions, and in particular the 
problems experienced over the release of sensitive information, provided a 
dilemma which defied solution. It may be that a wish to supply greater 
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amounts of information existed, on Grey's part if not on those of his Whitehall 
colleagues; but this wish was never allowed to overcome the restrictions of 
practical diplomacy.'^ 
This does not of course change the fact that in a quantitative sense 
Grey's handling of the Persian Question did little to improve his parliamentary 
position. The nature of both developments in Persia and related diplomatic 
initiatives, taken in context and contrasted with the Foreign Secretary's 
pariiamentary performance, seems to suggest that if anything the split between 
Grey and his Radical critics was widening. The major examples of apparent 
misconduct and confusion with which the Radicals confronted Grey caused him 
no little embarrassment. They argued against a policy that, as they saw it, 
ignored the independence and integrity of a sovereign power; independence 
and integrity which also happened to be guaranteed by an international 
Convention to which Britain was a signatory. They cast into doubt the extent 
and value of British honour and prestige, and questioned the continuation of 
close links with Entente partner Russia. Such a campaign could only reflect 
badly upon Grey's diplomacy; and indeed, if the arguments of subsequent 
political theorists are to be upheld, by association their agitation threatened to 
undermine Britain's international status. Grey found himself in a near 
impossible situation. He found himself unable to reveal such information as he 
had proving that his conduct had been as correct as possible, for fear that by 
clarifying specific issues he would destabilise wider positions. He also found 
himself able to do little more than hypothesise as to the effects on Britain and 
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Persia of alternative scenarios should the bases of his policy be undermined. 
His defence came to rest on the rhetorical but vital question: what would 
happen i f Anglo-Russian cooperation were to be ended?" Grey undoubtedly 
hoped that this would suffice until a solution to the Persian Crisis could be 
found that would prove acceptable to the majority of interested parties. With 
this, he would be able to issue a convincing statement which would at a stroke 
mollify Parliament and defuse the Radical campaign - and permit a restoration 
of the equilibrium between domestic and diplomatic considerations vital to the 
practice of stable foreign policy. 
However, precisely because no universally acceptable solution to the 
Persian Crisis could be reached, the Foreign Secretary's position remained 
particularly vulnerable. The Persian Question defied all attempts at resolution. 
As Grey himself put it, 'the condition of Persian Affairs being so distracting, so 
vacillating and so chaotic..in one or two things...there are [unavoidably] 
inconsistencies'." It was almost impossible for the Secretary of State to issue 
assurances or guarantees committing himself to a definite course of action on 
specific questions. The well-named 'periodic oscillations' to which Persia was 
prone defied any degree of certainty, and consequently any binding promise of 
action. Grey was forced to admit in the House that some albeit unavoidable 
inconsistencies existed in his conduct of policy. These inconsistencies were 
taken by his critics to be the proof they needed to substantiate their claims that 
serious flaws existed in the underlying principles that determined policy, and 
that examination and reform of the machinery of policy formation and control 
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was consequently in order. 
Unfortunately, diplomacy was by no means the exact science that many of 
the Radical critics appeared to take it to be. Grey argued from the outset that 
occasional failures of policy in the field (the 'manner' of policy) did not mean that 
the bases of that poHcy (the 'matter') had been flawed. He held fast to the fact 
that history showed that Persia had been beset by a general crisis which predated 
his involvement, and that as a result it was quite wrong to attribute all of that 
country's woes to his policy." Indeed, Grey answered his critics with the consistent 
claim that, but for the adoption of his policy, the predicament facing Persia would 
have been all the worse. It must be remembered that for Grey, the Persian 
Question was an issue of both wide scope and long-term perspective. Events such 
as the Shuster Affair, the Meshed Incident and the counter-revolutionary activities 
of supporters of the ex-Shah were all issues that in their severity caused great 
concern. However, they were also short term individual crises which required 
poHcy initiatives compatible with a long term and all-encompassing solution to 
Persia's problems. As Foreign Secretary Grey knew this, and concentrated upon 
searching for an all round answer instead of attempting ad hoc vidlly-nilly 
responses to separate crises. Because of this, it was and is neither practical nor 
fair to assess Grey's policy on the merits and failings of his handling of short 
term, single-issue problems. His Radical critics failed to realise that Grey's 
pohcy could not be designed with a solely Anglocentric settlement in mind. 
With their traditional aversion to diplomatic ties with other powers, epitomised 
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by the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, and their ill-concealed mistrust and 
loathing of illiberal imperialism and autocracy, as they felt was epitomised by 
Russia, the Radicals found it all too easy to see fault in Grey's Persian policy. 
They failed either to allow for the fact that, like it or not, Russia was a 
powerful factor in any Central Asian equation, or for the fact that in time 
Grey's policy of partnership and cooperation might produce benefit for Britain. 
I have discussed in the introductory chapter Grey's overall foreign policy 
position and the considerations facing Britain's policy makers at this time, 
issues such as 'balance of power' bias and 'Russophilia' or 'Germanophobia'. 
Radical understanding of such things in the context of Britain's international 
position at that time was arguably minimal. If the failure of Persia's 
constitution is considered as a case in point, it becomes clear that their position 
was riddled with intransigence and naivety: this caused them to fail to see the 
imphcations for Grey's policy of such 'abandoning' of Persian liberalism. The 
Radicals, and indeed initially Grey, had hoped that the constitution would 
provide the domestic political stability upon which socio-economic recovery and 
therefore Persian survival as an independent state could be based.'* They 
failed to see that the collapse of the constitution, over which he had little 
control, did as much to undermine Grey's position and force him to adopt a 
new attitude towards Persia as did any evil Machiavellian Russophile bias on 
his part.'' Many found it impossible to bridge the gap between idealism and 
pragmatism that both geographical distances and cultural traditions 
engendered.'^ The Unionist MP for South Somerset Aubrey Herbert 
highlighted the problem facing Radical MPs in their assessment of the Persian 
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political situation during the debate on the King's Address of 21st February 
1912:-
I think it is a very fine thing that there is this 
feeling...that His Majesty's Government should have 
done more for the integrity and Constitution of 
Persia...that a real spirit of chivalry...is anxious to 
hold out its hand to any people that strive 
towards...democracy through the gates of freedom 
and constitutionalism. 
But...a Constitution in Europe and a 
Constitution in the East are very different things 
indeed...the Persian people [are] not fully 
educated...of what the Constitution means." 
Put simply, the issues of 'manner' which provided the basis for the 
campaign over Persia and control of foreign policy were often misunderstood 
by the Radicals and taken, out of context, to be proof that policy aimed at 
solutions incompatible with Liberal principle or national interest. Grey's 
problem was simple. In light of his own admitted margin of error, and his 
inability to be completely candid as a result of diplomatic considerations, he 
had to allay Radical fears and suspicions to insure that his policies could be 
sustained until their successes could be appreciated, his position vindicated. 
Easy to say; but for Grey, this proved to be easier said than done. 
Entrenched as they were in a position of extreme scepticism, his critics proved 
to be anything but easy to satisfy. They persisted in their asking of awkward 
questions - questions for which the harassed Foreign Secretary appeared i l l -
prepared. The Stokes Affair can be seen as a case in point. The apparent 
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volte face by the Foreign Office over Stokes' appointment as the head of a 
Persian treasury gendarmerie was as I have previously shown seized upon by 
Dillon as evidence that Grey had taken Russia's side in a dispute to the 
detriment of Persian interests and in this case the personal liberty of a British 
subject. The Foreign Office had used its influence over the military to deny 
Stokes the opportunity of joining Shuster's proposed police force, and this after 
Stokes had received assurances that as long as he resigned his commission in 
the Indian army no objection or obstacle to the move would be raised.^" Grey's 
answers were hardly satisfactory. He attempted to shift the blame for the 
apparent change of heart away from Whitehall by claiming that Stokes had 
mistaken Foreign Office advice for definite promises, and that as a result had 
caused confusion by inaccurately claiming that he had official sanctioning of his 
move. This merely portrayed the handling of affairs by Whitehall in a bad light 
- their incompetence in failing to clarify matters with Stokes had led to 
confusion and embarrassment. Furthermore, when he argued that his 
influencing of the military to veto the appointment had been justifiable on 
grounds of political desirability and national interest. Grey did little to avert 
fears that illiberalism and a pro-Russian bias dominated policy considerations.^' 
However, close examination of the diplomatic exchanges between 7th 
July 1911 and 15th October 1911 produces a clearer understanding of the 
Stokes Affair in the context of the overall diplomatic position. Grey's initial 
position had indeed been to adopt cautious, conditional acceptance of the 
proposed appointment." It was seen as a justifiable part of Shuster's economic 
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recovery programme and consequently compatible with British long term hopes 
for the socio-pohtical restabilisation of Persia. However, this position was 
altered once it had become clear that Russia saw the move as being contrary 
to her interests in the north Persian sphere of economic influence allotted to 
her in 1907." The prospect of a British officer coming into conflict with 
expressed Russian interests in north Persia was hardly palatable. It must be 
remembered that Shuster had threatened to deploy his gendarmes against the 
forces of counter-revolution during Mohammed Ali Shah's abortive return^", 
and that in the near future his forces would clash with Russian representatives 
over Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property.-' A clash appeared a definite possibility. It 
was feared that the result of any antagonising of Russia would be at best 
demands by St Petersburg for compensations inimical to long term British 
hopes for Central Asia, and at worst the initiation of an aggressive policy 
directly opposite to the spirit of the 1907 Convention. Grey knew that in both 
cases he would be unable to offer more than token resistance, that Russia 
would impose her will upon the region, and the question of British imperial 
security and the defence of India would again arise to tax the government. In 
the light of such considerations, the sacrificing of Stokes was inevitable. Grey 
initially attempted to impose conditions upon Stokes' employment, and when 
the Persians refused to accept them, followed the suggestions of his Russian 
colleagues by blocking the appointment.''^ In terms of policy 'manner' Grey did 
indeed compromise over the Stokes Affair, letting Russian protests dominate 
pohcy and preventing the ex-attache changing allegiance. In purely 
parliamentary terms, the affair caused Grey both embarrassment and harm. 
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because it smacked of incompetence and malpractice, and because Grey could 
not successfully explain away his conduct without compromising his wider 
diplomatic position. However, if considerations of policy 'matter' are allowed 
for, and Britain's position vis a vis the states system as outlined in the 
introductory chapter is considered, then the affair assumes different 
proportions. It appears that Grey's diplomatic position was in fact 
strengthened by his handling of this issue. By sacrificing Stokes as a diplomatic 
pawn, Grey was able to increase both his influence and leverage over the 
Russians. As one Foreign Office official astutely remarked once the matter 
was settled, if in future the Russians attempted to increase their influence over 
the Persian government by offering 'military advisers' and the like, 'we may 
legitimately use some of their own arguments [against appointments 
incompatible with the spirit of the 1907 Convention] upon them'." The 
inabihty of the Secretary of State to use this success in his short term struggle 
with his Radical critics at home reflects the problem facing a Foreign Secretary 
in dealing with an open democratic legislature. To have revealed to 
Parhament the nuances of the diplomatic strategy being pursued would have 
been to expose them to the involved states, and would have rendered any 
advantages gained valueless. At the same time, had Grey followed the wishes 
of the pro-Stokes lobby and snubbed Russian objections as being unwarranted 
interference in Anglo-Persian relations, the most likely consequences would 
have been the collapse of the Entente policy, the recommencement of the 
Great Game in Central Asia (with Britain at a distinct disadvantage), and the 
re-emergence of the security dilemma which had prompted Anglo-Russian 
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rapprochement in the first place. It would be wise to reflect upon the view of 
affairs espoused by Nicolson:-
It would be disastrous to our foreign policy were 
the understandings between Russia...and ourselves 
to be weakened in any way.^ 
Her friendship is really of importance...even at the 
risk of being considered an infatuated 
Russophile...we should put up with perhaps 
occasional annoyances in Persia to remain on the 
best footing with Russia. 
In the light of the findings of recent historical studies of Britain's ante 
bellum security position, Nicolson's 'infatuations' can be sympathised with. The 
problem for the Foreign Secretary was that, just as Lord Selborne had found in 
November 1901 when attempting to apply a revised Two Power Standard naval 
formula, the ability of a minister to explain the dominant policy issues that 
dictated courses of action was minimal. His parliamentary reticence and issue 
fudging should be seen in this light. As Keith Wilson rightly says, attempting to 
reveal either the basis for or the likely consequence of foreign policy was 
bound to be an 'embarrassing and no doubt thankless task'.^ " 
When dealing qualitatively with the Foreign Secretary's handling of the 
Persian Question, it is important to remember that Grey faced a number of 
problems that weakened his overall position. All too often, Britain found 
herself in a position where she was forced to respond to crises precipitated by 
more dynamic participants; and in such circumstances, Grey had little influence 
or control over the initial developments that caused tension.^' The need to 
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maintain a working equilibrium between considerations of domestic politics and 
international security, already considered, complicated matters further. It was 
imperative that at all times policy should be pursued within the parameters of 
an accepted scope for action. Grey found that as a result of these combined 
considerations, and especially because he was forced to respond with little 
forewarning to events in which his scope for action was in any case restricted, 
that it was impossible to attempt much more than a recourse to the 1907 
Convention. The Agreement was after all meant to be the definitive statement 
of policy in this field, the embodiment of the principles upon which his 
diplomacy was based. Unfortunately, and as became increasingly obvious 
during the course of parliamentary debate, the 1907 Convention was not the 
definitive document that Grey hoped it to be." Indeed, it left such a margin of 
ambiguity as to be the basis for several incompatible interpretations of Anglo-
Russian partnership and policy vis a vis Persia." As a result, the Foreign 
Secretary was forced to deal not only with questions on the nature of current 
events in Persia and his attitude towards them, but also with questions 
concerning the very Convention he had hoped would provide a stable base 
from which to promote recovery. He had to explain and defend the very basis 
of his policy by offering a definition of the spirit and aims of 1907 at once both 
acceptable to Radical principles and the dictates of practical diplomacy. 
Already handicapped by relative diplomatic weakness as an involved but 
basically non-dynamic factor in the Persian equation. Grey faced potential 
hamstringing as the spectre of unsustainable yet irresistible domestic Liberal 
principle threatened to deny him the only practical policy courses out of the 
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crisis. 
The period from the start of the Shuster Affair through to the issuing of 
the Anglo-Russian Joint Note on 18th February 1912 provides the historian 
with a chronological test case with which to assess both the nature of the 
problems facing Grey, and his success in dealing with them. From 9th 
November 1911, the handling of Persia became as much an issue of abstract 
principle as of practical policy. When Morrell, Ponsonby and Dillon rose to 
question whether the military and diplomatic initiatives of Russia in the wake 
of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh property dispute were compatible with the spirit of the 
1907 Convention, the Radicals forced Grey to attempt to produce an 
acceptable definition of an ongoing aspect of his foreign policy, and to act 
accordingly.^'' It must be remembered that the Stokes Affair and the abortive 
return of the ex-Shah had already attracted parliamentary concern, and the 
issue of foreign troops on Persian soil was already an issue of some 
controversy.^' The Agadir Crisis and war scare had brought the question of 
parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs to the fore, as the debates of 27th 
November and 14th December would soon show. The Persian Question and 
the operation of the 1907 Convention provided those concerned over foreign 
pohcy with the perfect opportunity for testing Grey's diplomacy and, if 
necessary, pressing for change. The Radicals' position vis a vis Persia and the 
Convention, indeed as it concerned the issue of democratic control of foreign 
pohcy, has already been considered. The issue at stake here is whether or not 
Grey's parliamentary conduct can be explained and upheld in the light of 
135 
diplomatic considerations. 
It is important to remember that for Grey's policy to succeed, two aims 
had to be reahsed. Persia had to be preserved as a sovereign buffer state, 
capable of preventing Russian penetration to the Gulf and Indian frontier. In 
order to achieve this, it was essential that Britain establish and sustain close 
ties with St Petersburg; that a modus vivendi for Central Asian co-existence be 
reached.'* The 1907 Convention had been created to realise both these aims." 
Russia was persuaded that the recognition of defined interests in north Persia 
by Britain, and the hints of possible diplomatic support for further unspecified 
initiatives, was a diplomatic coup that she could not resist. It should be 
remembered that at the time those negotiations were underway, the Russian 
position had been weakened by the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese debacle, 
and the socio-political upheaval of the 1905 Revolution. Any form of 
diplomatic agreement which would allow her both to recover some diplomatic 
prestige, and the time to initiate internal recovery, with a concomitant review 
of her own foreign policy situation whilst free from pressures of imperial 
confrontation, was bound to prove attractive to the St Petersburg government. 
The price for Russia in this case, the acceptance of conditions preventing her 
from undertaking unilaterally any expansionist policy into Central Asia which 
could prove harmful to British interests in the region, proved acceptable. As a 
result, Grey was able to achieve a guarantee that, unless specified interests 
were compromised, Russia would not to increase her military presence in 
Persia or to work against that nation's independence without first securing 
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British support. The Foreign Secretary, having established this modus vivendi 
at a time of Russian weakness, had subsequently to ensure that once Russia 
recovered sufficient poise to again assume a dynamic role on the international 
scene, any new initiatives should remain compatible with the 1907 Convention, 
and Britain's strategic position. The Persian Question, because it threatened to 
compromise those Russian interests which tied her to the modus vivendi of 
1907, and posed frequent problems which necessitated Anglo-Russian 
involvement in Persia's domestic affairs, confronted Grey with his largest 
headache vis a vis sustaining the modus vivendi. We have already seen that 
even in the days before the crisis period of the Shuster Affair the Agreement 
had been placed under strain, and Grey had been forced on several occasions 
to accept Russophile interpretations of the terms of the Convention so as to 
ensure that its fundamental purpose was not undermined.^* It is against this 
background that the domestic contest for a review of policy should be set. 
In his memoirs on the subject, Grey states his case by putting the 
Persian Question clearly into perspective: 
The real cause of trouble was that the 'integrity and 
independence' of Persia, so tenderly cherished, did 
not in practice exist...Persia was honeycombed by 
concessions, particularly to Russia...I had never 
expected that the hands of the clock, which had 
already marked so much time in the lapse of 
Persian independence, should be put back, but I 
hoped that the clock might be stopped.-*^ 
In other words, any interpretation of the Convention that failed to 
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recognise that the situation as it existed in 1907 was the point from which 
future co-operation should start, and that Russia by that time already had a 
large series of interests in Persia which she subsequently retained a right to 
defend, was fatally flawed. The 1907 Convention marked the diplomatic 
ground zero. From that point on, the future conducting of relations would be 
tempered by both mutual recognition of and allowance for respective interests. 
Russia took this to mean that those interests that she had defined in the north 
could be pursued free from British interference. Unfortunately, Radicals in 
Westminster tended to see in the Convention only a duty to Persia. Russian 
moves in the north were not seen as consolidating accepted positions of 
interest, but as violations of arguably non-existent sovereign rights and breaches 
of faith. Grey sought to curb over-zealous Russian initiatives that could be 
mistaken for expanding imperialism so as to play down domestic Liberal 
outrage. At the same time he was forced to concede that for the Convention 
to succeed he could not deny Russia such interests as he had conceded. As his 
letter of September 1907 to Runciman shows, the only alternatives Grey could 
see to co-operation and tolerance were aggressive, exploitative policies pursued 
at one another's expense - and as Britain could not pursue such a course 
(indeed, no-one suggested that she should), only Russia could benefit from 
such a scenario."" As such. Grey knew that his hands were tied to the helm of 
his Entente ship. A 'free hand' policy for Persia and Anglo-Russian relations 
was indeed a fiction. 
Examination of Grey's conduct at home and in the diplomatic field 
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during the Shuster Affair tends to uphold this view of Anglo-Russian relations 
and the Persian Question. Grey had been aware of an increase in Russian 
activity from at least mid-Qctober, when Neratov outlined his fears that Persian 
chaos threatened to disrupt Russian interests, and complained that Shuster's 
reform programme showed no consideration for Russia's position."' Grey had 
criticised Russian proposals made at that time because he felt that they were 
not merited by existing circumstances.''' The Foreign Secretary was made 
aware of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh incident on 16th October, weeks before his 
denial in the House of having any information as regarded its causes. He also 
knew of the contents of the initial Russian Ultimatum on 2nd November, 
eleven days before the Earl of Ronaldshay brought a Times report on the 
matter to the attention of the Commons. '' The reason for the lack of direct 
involvement in the affair, either in response to Persian calls for aid and advice, 
or in answer to domestic parliamentary enquiries, riiay be deduced from Grey's 
highly revealing communication to Sir George Barclay on 8th November 1911:-
Though one feels that she [Persia] has a certain 
right on her side... we cannot interfere between 
Persia and Russia in matters in the Russian sphere 
of interest that do not concern us."" 
Grey clearly felt that Britain's position established by the Convention 
could not be sustained if he were seen to intervene; and, as a result, moved to 
dissociate himself from events as far as possible. He found himself obliged to 
take Russian promises of restraint at face value, and to work on the premise 
that trust was his only option."' However, and as has been discussed previously, 
the Secretary of State was unable to achieve the complete disassociation he 
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wished for. Like it or not, the Convention had devolved upon Britain some 
sense of responsibility for Persia; and the mistaken interpretations that 
emerged at home of exactly what that responsibility comprised, coupled with 
fears that Russia, ignorant of the political problems facing Grey at home, might 
push her claims too far, compelled the Foreign Secretary into a more dynamic 
role. Grey subsequently outlined his position clearly in a communication to 
Buchanan: 
I am afraid of new [Russian] demands...that I could 
not defend as being consistent with the Agreement. 
In that case the whole question of foreign policy 
would become involved. I doubt whether the 
Russian Government realise how easily one 
question might affect larger questions."* 
Unfortunately for him, he could not be so explicit in the Commons. 
The Foreign Secretary was forced to defend his policy in Persia, both 
from naive and erroneous criticisms at home, and Russian exploitation abroad. 
He knew only too well that his involvement could not be overly aggressive or 
controversial, at least until the situation had settled and clarified itself 
sufficiently to enable well-reasoned and sustainable arguments to underwrite 
pohcy. The employment of British nationals by the Persian Government as 
treasury officials in the Russian sphere was a cause of acute embarrassment."' 
Grey was forced to oppose such an increase in Britain's influence in the north 
because it was incompatible with the spirit of the Convention - and as a 
measure of good faith went so far as to offer tacit support for those Russian 
demands for satisfaction from Persia that were acceptable under the 
Agreement."* He dared not antagonise Russia, or give her grounds to doubt 
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the value of the partnership with Britain. Grey was well aware that reactionary 
elements in the Russian administration were seeking an opportunity to force 
Neratov into adopting extreme demands wholly incompatible with any 
Anglophile pro-Entente policy."' He knew that he had to prevent these 
elements from succeeding at all costs; and so he conceded as much as he dared 
to keep the pro-Entente members of the Russian administration in the 
ascendancy. Grey found it prudent, publicly at least, to assume an air of 
reasoned detachment, making it plain that Britain was not seeking to intervene, 
and that as long as certain interests were not compromised, she would remain 
a passive bystander. While this 'wait and see' attitude caused indignation 
amongst the pro-Persian lobby, it nevertheless enabled the Foreign Secretary to 
work behind the scenes, prodding the more dynamic protagonists towards a 
position of compromise. Initially at least, such a course appeared to be 
successful. Russia seemed to have moderated her position and offered 
assurances of good faith.'" 
However, it soon became clear that Russia was intent upon advancing 
her demands so as to secure maximum advantage from her northern interests. 
The military sanction with which she had applied pressure was to be 
maintained despite Grey's calls for a more restrained approach." The British 
Radicals saw only the spectre of imperial expansionism, and refused to accept 
the Foreign Secretary's explanations that attempted to justify the Russian 
initiative." The increase in domestic pressure for an explanation of policy, and 
the real threat that Russia was about to achieve an unacceptable influence over 
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the Tehran Government by seizing the Persian capital, forced Grey to deepen 
his involvement in the crisis. It began to appear that the Convention was 
under threat; that Russia, with her foi-ward policy, was 'restarting the clock' 
working towards Persia's collapse and making an Anglo-Russian collision in 
Central Asia unavoidable." Grey was forced to accept that to fail to take a 
hand was to risk the collapse of his diplomatic position and to give credence to 
Radical claims that his policy was flawed. 
Once again, the need to act confronted Grey with the dilemma of how 
to act. He was yet again caught between a need to placate domestic critics, 
who constituted a serious threat to his political position, and a duty to 
safeguard Britain's international position by sustaining a viable Anglo-Russian 
Entente. It was all well and good for outraged MPs to argue that there was no 
merit to be had in maintaining cordial links with Russia at the expense of 
principle and the moral high ground. It was quite another matter to provide a 
viable policy alternative by which Britain's international security could be 
upheld. Indeed, in terms of the Persian Question, no such provision was made 
by Grey's Radical critics. I have previously suggested that their displays of 
naivety and ignorance concerning crucial policy issues cannot in itself be 
allowed to detract from their overall argument, because ignorance and the 
issue of democratic control were central elements in their campaign."" 
However, because Grey's position in Persia has been shown to lack any real 
scope for complete openness, it becomes clear that for all the moral 
justification and parliamentary strength of the Radical position, diplomatic 
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considerations and especially the Entente of necessity took precedence. Policy 
was bound to work towards achieving a solution acceptable to both idealism 
and pragmatism. However, policy would always tend to favour Russophile 
considerations because as the principal dynamic factor in the diplomatic game 
they were of greater potential significance to Britain's national interests than 
abstract Liberal principles. Faced with a choice between a bruised conscience 
and a collapsing strategic position, Grey was bound to tolerate the former, and 
remedy the latter. 
Grey's conduct from the end of November 1911 on should be viewed 
with this in mind. By offering tacit support for the Russian position during the 
Shuster Affair, Grey hoped to tread a middle path." He had no doubt that the 
Persian authorities bore a large share of responsibility for both the nature and 
persistence of the crisis facing their country."^ He was also convinced that it 
was vital that the Convention be upheld. It was the only guarantee of 
diplomatic conduct which could allow Persia respite from foreign intervention 
and time to effect the social, economic and political recoveries essential to her 
long term survival as a sovereign nation - and therefore as a viable 'buffer 
state'. It was the basis for good Anglo-Russian relations, the means by which 
Russian policy could be drawn into an Anglocentric orbit and prevented from 
compromising British interests." To ensure that the clock towards Persian 
collapse remained stationary, and that the Great Game did not begin anew, 
Grey had to prove to Russia that co-operation was both viable and valuable. 
However, he was also quite aware that to go too far in appeasing Russia held 
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as much danger for his position as did any antagonism. If Russia was allowed 
to pursue an overly aggressive line, even if in good faith and within the spirit of 
the Agreement, then she might well unwittingly provoke the very problems that 
Grey hoped to avoid/* The issues of excessive demands and prolonged 
occupation of north Persia worried Grey; if her demands were not met 
satisfactorily, and Russia found it impossible to retain face without prolonging 
the occupation, it could prove increasingly difficult for the Russians to extricate 
themselves. The concomitant chance that the occupying forces would face 
escalating local resentment and increasing civil disorder, and would therefore 
find withdrawal even less practical without political and economic guarantees 
which the weak Persian government could not deliver, no doubt influenced the 
Secretary of State.'' A socio-political crisis of this nature could force the 
Entente powers into confrontation; the threat to respective interests posed by 
the internal collapse of Persia would force direct intervention and effective 
partition - and it was precisely this situation, given that no mutually satisfactory 
basis for partition could be found, that troubled Grey. Grey's policy was 
dictated by a dual imperative. He had to preserve the modus vivendi with 
Russia that allowed Persia to survive, by providing enough support for Russia 
to convince St. Petersburg that the Agreement was worth the price she had 
paid for it. He also had to insure that no developments be allowed to 
compromise the recovery or sovereignty of Persia, so as to prevent the moves 
to partition and confrontation that he feared would follow. 
The Convention dominated Grey's mind, because it was through this 
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Agreement that he hoped to achieve success in both elements of the dual 
imperative. It provided the diplomatic mechanism by which Russia had been 
ensnared within an Anglocentric orbit, and provided the stimulus to co-
operation which enabled Grey to exert his moderating influence over his 
Russian counterparts. Moreover, if Persia could be brought to accept the 
conditions upon which it rested, the Convention offered a realistic basis for 
Persian recovery.*" However, and like all compromises, the success of the 
Agreement was dependent upon the credibility it possessed and the value 
which the respective players saw in it. Furthermore, it was essential that the 
relative importance of each party be allowed for when compromising and 
conceding relative advantage. This itself hampered Grey's attempts to resolve 
matters, because finding a common basis for promoting Persian recovery and 
satisfying Russia that compromise was merited was fraught with difficulty. The 
result was of course that the premier consideration, the preservation of cordial 
Anglo-Russian relations, came to override that of the lesser, Persian survival. 
Anything that worked against this had to go; and in November 1911 Shuster 
was top of the list. His plans for making Persia economically viable again took 
too little account of Russian economic and commercial interests, and therefore 
the principal carrots which had lured Russia to accept the Convention in 1907. 
Furthermore, the methods used by Shuster to implement his plans had proved 
far too antagonistic.*" For that reason, he was faced not only by Russian 
demands for his removal, but by British support for those moves.*- Grey also 
found it expedient to join in Russian demands that in future Persian 
governments must recognise the Convention as a binding modus operandi.*^ 
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The Russians saw that as a result of this they could exploit their northern 
interests to the full and free from Persian interference. Grey hoped that, as 
well as this, Persian acceptance of the Convention would enable the 
undertaking of a recovery programme upheld by international law, based 
around negotiated co-operation, and precluding any further blatant intriguing 
against Persia by a Russia both committed by self-interest and shackled by 
duty. Of course, it was necessary to ensure that Russia did not upset matters. 
Grey's opposition to any increased military operations, the indemnity demand, 
and moves intent on promoting a counter-revolution in Persia in favour of the 
ex-Shah show that Grey was quite prepared to issue velvet-lined threats of 
confrontation should Russia go too far.'^ ' Even though the practical scope for 
pursuing any confrontation was minimal, and the chance of success even less, 
Grey was aware that for Russia to respect his position, a degree of bravura was 
necessary to sustain the bluff, the myth of British power. Without this, his 
position would have lost vital credibility, and his diplomacy may well have 
failed. 
The domestic problems facing Grey merely served to make matters 
worse. Grey could not afford to be seen as anything other than the champion 
of the Convention. Furthermore, and in spite of personal misgivings 
concerning the reliability of Russian promises, the Foreign Secretary was 
compelled to uphold the Russian position against the criticisms of the 
Radicals.*' By playing on the ignorance of his critics, blaming elements within 
the Persian government for the crisis, and arguing that the Convention 
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remained the basis of a policy compatible with national honour and prestige, 
Grey was able to weather the storm, if not outrun it. His playing upon official 
ignorance and diplomatic etiquette persisted. The posing of the hypothetical 
question that challenged his critics to offer a viable alternative to his policy 
further sustained his position. Their inability to provide an answer, or indeed 
to overcome fundamental inconsistencies in their moral as well as practical 
positions, allowed Grey to draw the sting out of their criticism without 
damaging his own position further.*' Grey no doubt hoped that he would 
eventually find a viable balance between domestic and diplomatic 
considerations. Nevertheless, he felt compelled to resolve his diplomatic 
problems before turning upon domestic issues. It would be wrong to assume 
that Grey was either unaware or unconcerned by the arguments of the Radical-
Indian lobby.*'' Certain diplomatic initiatives echoed the sentiments they 
expressed in the House.** However, whilst the Radicals viewed events from a 
single issue perspective, namely Liberal idealism. Grey, although sympathetic to 
their position, remained convinced that the wider context was by definition 
more important than any specific issue. It was absurd to place national 
security in jeopardy over affairs of comparatively trivial importance. To end 
close relations with Russia over the already transitory independence of Persia 
was ridiculous - especially i f in any case the ending of the former would signal 
the extinguishing of the latter. In a letter to J A Spender of the Westminster 
Gazette dated 24th September 1912, Grey laid bare his views on the subject:-
I am bombarded by letters here from people who 
want me to break with Russia over Persia; how on 
earth can we help Persia if we do?*' 
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It was much more sensible to promote good relations with Russia whilst 
allowing her to exercise a firm influence over Persia which, moderated by 
British diplomacy and the Convention, would help remove many of the causes 
of crisis within that country.™ As McLean puts it, 'he [Grey] could hope that 
sooner or later his critics over Persia, and indeed his policy at large, would...be 
duly silenced by some masterstroke of diplomacy'." 
Grey's formula for ending the ongoing Russo-Persian confrontation was 
outlined in the memorandum sent to Sazonov on 8th December 1911.^ In his 
presentation of this plan to Parliament, Grey displayed some sympathy for his 
critics' arguments and the position of Parliament as regarded the overall 
diplomatic equation." In this instance, the quantity and complexity of the 
issues at stake, compounded by the 'periodic oscillations' to which matters 
involving Persia were prone, had prolonged the negotiations and prevented him 
from issuing an early explanation of events. In spite of Radical claims to the 
contrary, it is evident that Grey was sincere in his wish to publish enough to 
defuse the domestic uproar that was damaging his overall credibility. He was 
unusually candid with Parliament. His statement to the House on 14th 
December was made unusually soon after the completion of discussions with St 
Petersburg.'"* It may well be that, by publicly announcing his initiative at the 
same time was the recuperated Sazonov resumed his duties from Neratov, 
Grey hoped to catch his Russian counterpart at a disadvantage and force him 
into compliance." The Russian position was in any case thrown into temporary 
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confusion and destabilised by the change of ministers in St Petersburg.'* Up to 
this time, Grey would have been hard pressed to offer any explanation to the 
House that would have been sufficient to appease both his domestic critics and 
his diplomatic counterparts. Just as he had claimed that, during the 
negotiations over the Agadir Crisis, he had been prevented from offering any 
definite statement to the House, so Grey had found himself constrained from 
premature commentary for fear of upsetting negotiations, and unable to offer 
idle speculation as to the possible outcomes for the events and initiatives 
underway in Persia over which he had little direct control." Because he was 
not a dynamic player in the Persian Question, and was temporarily impotent in 
the face of new developments. Grey had to be cautious when responding to 
them. Whilst not as ignorant as many of his critics of the nature and 
implications of on-going events in Persia, the Foreign Secretary was unable to 
provide the instant riposte to questions raised as the Radicals proved to be in 
understanding the full scope of his policy. In light of these handicaps, it is not 
unreasonable to recognise Grey's handling of the Shuster Affair as being 
unavoidable, given the inherent weakness of Britain's position. He proved able 
to maintain the loyalty of the Russian government to the 1907 Agreement, and 
at minimal cost. Moreover, he also ensured that Britain's role in the Crisis, 
and the settlement that re.sulted from it, was compatible with levels of honour 
and prestige befitting her apparent 'great power' status. Although unable to 
secure the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from north Persia or the 
abandonment of the indemnity demand. Grey was able to prevent the seizure 
of the Persian capital (with all the implications that would have held for 
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Persian independence and integrity) and to insure that the indemnity was 
symbolic rather than punitive in extent.'* Of paramount importance was 
establishment of the principle that the moves to secure the future quiescence 
and development of Persia, and therefore the basis for re-establishing cordial 
Entente relations free from the effects of regional instability, should be 
undertaken as a joint Anglo-Russian initiative, just as Grey's memorandum of 
8th December had suggested. The Foreign Secretary succeeded in reaffirming 
the spirit of 1907, ensuring that the premier British interests at stake were to 
be included in a joint diplomatic statement that would advocate consultation 
for all issues of dispute. It was no doubt hoped that the previous weakness of 
Britain's position as an initially peripheral non-dynamic player, could thereby in 
future be avoided. 
The memorandum to Sazonov of 8th December 1911 provided the 
impetus towards a joint package aimed at solving the Persian problem in the 
short term. This was eventually realised in the Joint Note of 18th February 
1912 (the work principally of Barclay and Poklewsky in Tehran)." The 
Russians agreed to offer a public guarantee aimed at dispelling fears that she 
would provide mihtary aid for a counter-revolution in Persia. They also 
agreed to open negotiations over a loan for Persia as the basis for promoting 
socio-economic and political recovery. The Persian Government, formed as a 
result of the December coup d'etat that had witnessed Shuster's departure, 
having already accepted the Russian ultimatums, accepted the terms of the 
Joint Note on 20th March, and therefore committed future administrations to 
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policies allowing for the premises of the Anglo-Russian Agreement.** Most 
importantly, the concessions given to Russia under the 1907 Convention which 
secured Russian interest in preserving cordial relations with Britain were 
reaffirmed. Grey's conduct had achieved the overall diplomatic balance he and 
his Foreign Office colleagues deemed vital to imperial security. In his letter of 
23rd January 1912 to a private critic, he had argued that the Agreement was 
vital not only to continuing Persian independence but also to the stability of 
Britain's imperial position in Central Asia.^ '^ In these terms, he argued that his 
policy throughout the crisis, by upholding the one and securing the other, had 
been the only policy available. In light of the considerations at stake that have 
been discussed here, this argument appears to have been vindicated. 
It would be quite wrong, however, to give the impression that the 
Persian Question or the domestic parliamentary agitation were resolved as 
quickly or as tidily as Grey might have wished. Persia was still in a state of 
socio-economic and political turmoil." As a result, the interests that had been 
guaranteed by the Convention and the diplomacy of the period up to early 
1912 were in reality no more guaranteed than they had been before those 
negotiated compromises. The diplomatic success enjoyed by Grey depended 
upon the establishment of a machinery for initiating joint diplomatic initiatives, 
and avoiding confrontation over an independent sovereign Persia in which 
improved socio-economic and political conditions would remove the old causes 
of argument. However, with the existing presence of Russian troops in the 
north as the only check against total anarchy, and with St. Petersburg 
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promising a withdrawal of those troops only once her interests were secure and 
Persian order was established, the chances of a swift return to even the relative 
and dubious 'independence and integrity' of the period prior to the Shuster 
Affair was unlikely.*' In short, Persia continued to pose an insoluble riddle, 
being a morass in which apparently irreconcilable issues and interests combined 
to defy attempts at rational settlement. The very nature of the political 
situation in Persia meant that the problems were bound to persist. The central 
administration found itself unable to reconcile conflicting political and tribal 
interests within the country; nor was it able to assert effective control over 
disaffected, rebellious regional governments.*'^  As a result, Persia's government 
could not fulf i l her promises to guarantee the Anglo-Russian conditions 
accepted in the statement of 20th March. Persia, through her government, had 
effectively recognised that her continued independence could only be 
guaranteed by accepting the Anglo-Russian conditions - and then found herself 
unable to meet those conditions as promised.*' A solution to the Persian 
Question was still needed, and it became increasingly clear that it would prove 
difficult to reach a solution in which both an independent Persian 'buffer state' 
and a viable Entente partnership could be sustained.*^ Persia resisted all 
attempts at restabilisation short of direct intervention; but the partition of 
Persia could only result in a head-on Anglo-Russian collision which was exactly 
the scenario British diplomacy sought to avoid. Even had the establishment of 
a contiguous frontier with Russia been tolerable, the fact remained that such a 
frontier itself defied easy establishment. H F B Lynch's comments in the 
Times no doubt haunted Grey:-
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England and Russia are engaged in the impossible 
task of finding a common formula for the 
expression of opposite policies.^ 
It is important to remember that, in spite of the Convention, it was still feared 
in Whitehall that Russia harboured long term imperial ambitions incompatible 
with Britain's strategic position.** Moreover, domestic critics were by no means 
satisfied by the diplomatic compromise of March 1912. Persia had been forced 
to compromise her integrity for an illusion of independence. Her constitution 
had been suspended indefinitely, sacrificed in favour of a government more 
amenable to Anglo-Russian interests. Her future economic and political 
development had apparently been mortgaged under pressure so as to suit 
Anglo-Russian concerns. Foreign troops remained, atrocities occurred, socio-
political chaos detrimental to long term recovery and economic stability 
persisted. Grey still had to find a formula with which to defuse matters 
sufficiently to enable some salvaging of his diplomatic position, and which 
would not provide any new ammunition for parliamentary critics intent upon 
forcing a domestic foreign policy revolution that could only destabilise Britain's 
international position by openly airing her dirty laundry. 
A n answer to the Persian Question was beyond Grey, at least until the 
cataclysm of world war sufficiently changed the nature of the Great Game in 
Central Asia. Delay and prevarication, drawing out the decline of Persia by 
means of controlled compromise, remained the safest course for Grey as he 
steered the ailing British position through the endless Persian minefield. 
Because he could not offer an answer in this field, his handling of Parliament 
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changed tack. Once it became clear that the diplomacy of November 1911-
January 1912 had not led to any marked improvement in Persia's condition, it 
became expedient to stress that the complexity of the situation conspired 
against swift recovery. The continued ignorance of his critics still enabled Grey 
to fudge issues, and when this proved insufficient to defuse their arguments, he 
was able to point out that it was impossible both to intervene to actively 
champion Persian recovery and to simultaneously refrain from violating Persian 
integrity. At the same time it proved expedient to continue the policy of 
conciliation towards Russia, to tolerate Nicolson's 'annoyances', and prolong 
the irreconcilable policies of 'buffer state' and Entente as long as possible and 
with a minimum of compromise.* It would be quite wrong to infer that Persia 
ceased to be a major cause of concern for the policymakers, especially in terms 
of the continuing Radical activity in Parliament. However, it is important to 
recognise the significance of the fact that, after 20th March 1912 right up to 
the end of the 1912 session, no further diplomatic confrontations occurred to 
rival the Shuster Affair. No major rupture in Anglo-Russian relations 
threatened as a result of Persia. Persia's failure to recover boded ill for long 
term regional strategy, but in preserving the 1907 Agreement as the basis for 
close links with Russia, the Foreign Secretary maintained perhaps the only 
basis from which a later diplomatic agreement commensurate with Britain's 
strategic position could be advanced, if and when Persia did indeed collapse. 
Grey's diplomacy never lost sight of the strategic implications at stake, and 
consequently his policy was always intent on upholding Britain's real interests 
much more than the idealistic intangibles his critics espoused. Parliament's 
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intervention in the Persian Question did little to help Grey or his diplomacy. 
Uninformed comments made in the House, and a failure to come to terms with 
all the issues at stake, meant that interference from Westminster tended to 
hinder and undermine foreign policy far more than it bolstered diplomacy. 
Had .the policy been truly flawed, this may have been excusable. The fact that 
ignorance was freely admitted, and cited as evidence of malpractice, suggests 
that the bulk of the Radicals indulged in their campaign without due 
consideration for its effect on the national interest. Those such as Ponsonby 
who recognised that an element of secrecy was inevitable for foreign policy to 
succeed, and yet still argued for as much openness as possible without outlining 
a practical means by which to achieve this, let idealism obscure the practical 
consequences of their stand. Grey told the House of his concerns in no 
uncertain terms:-
I am not sure that it is not public opinion which is 
more at fault very often than diplomacy.^' 
As a result. Grey's suppressing the truth and resorting to subterfuge should be 
seen not so much as a Machiavellian abuse of power, but as a recognition that 
recourse to open democratic debate, indeed to honesty, was not in the national 
interest. Grey's periodic abuse of Parliament, in this way, can arguably be 
defended as an unpalatable but unavoidable necessity, wholly in the national 
interest. 
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CONCLUSION 
Many of the situations that arose during the Persian Question and which 
caused Grey so much trouble forced the Foreign Secretary into active 
diplomacy where in all probability inaction would have been preferred. It 
would be wrong to portray Britain's involvement in the Persian Crisis 1911-12 
as either aggressive or dynamic. Instead, Grey's diplomacy was reluctant, 
compelled by ill-defined responsibilities to Persia and Russia, and more 
importantly a need to uphold the fundamental bases of imperial security. As 
individual issues, events such as the Shuster Affair and the Meshed Incident 
had little to do with British policy in Persia. There is little or no point in 
seeking to attribute those crises to any flaws in policy initiated from Whitehall. 
However, because Britain was at the same time a signatory of the 1907 
Convention and a power with extensive economic and political interests in the 
region. Grey could not ignore the fact that such events held implications for 
Britain's position. Furthermore, when Britain's overall diplomatic position is 
considered, and the problem of imperial security, indeed of 'great power' 
status, is allowed for, it becomes clear that the Persian Question provided as 
great a policy dilemma as any other on-going issue for the British Foreign 
Office. 
Nobody disputed the fact that the 1907 Convention, as well as securing 
for Britain a series of special interests in both the economics and politics of the 
region, had devolved upon her some degree of responsibility for Persia. Grey's 
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problems in the period presently under consideration seem to have been 
increased greatly because the nature of that ambiguous responsibility both 
needed and defied definition. The confusions caused by the 1907 Spring Rice 
letters, and the incompatibility of the definitions supplied respectively by British 
Liberals and Russian politicians, meant that Grey found it extremely difficult to 
operate any policy without offering offence to either domestic political opinion 
or the interests of Britain's indispensable Entente partner. To compromise 
either relationship could only serve to reflect badly upon national honour and 
prestige; and if Martin Wight is correct to argue that 'honour is the halo round 
interests [and] prestige is the halo round power', then to weaken either could 
only damage Britain's standing in the states system.^  Every time an abuse of 
the spirit of the 1907 Agreement was perceived, Grey found himself obliged to 
explain and guarantee the nature of Britain's official attitude towards events in 
Persia. Such explanations had to allow for both the British Radicals' and 
Russian Government's interpretation of the Convention, so as to sustain a 
viable policy base both at home and abroad. As a result, the Foreign Secretary 
was at the mercy of the dynamic factors that determined the course of the 
Persian Crisis. His parliamentary position was by itself precarious. He was 
bound to uphold national honour by ensuring that Persian independence and 
integrity was not compromised or sacrificed, and also to safeguard commercial 
and strategic interests in the teeth of regional socio-political chaos. His 
diplomatic position, taken in context v^ ath these parliamentary considerations, 
made it almost impossible to avoid causing some degree of offence. 
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How could Grey adopt an attitude acceptable to all the interests at 
stake? Each and every element in the Persian Question appeared to be riven 
with irreconcilable inconsistencies. Russia was at the same time the co-
signatory to the Convention, the major external threat to Persia (and as such 
the Convention), the premier Radical bugbear, and (if Wilson is to be 
believed) the major strategic concern for the Whitehall policymakers. Persian 
independence and her position as a 'buffer state' against Russian expansion to 
the Gulf and Indian frontier, provided the cornerstone for Grey's regional 
policy and imperial security; and yet the continued independence of a Persia 
which refused to recover internal stability and persistently threatened to 
undermine close Anglo-Russian relations and consequently Britain's overall 
diplomatic position appears to have been incompatible with Britain's prevalent 
strategic interests. Britain could not adopt an aggressive policy in the region 
for fear of compromising her domestic and diplomatic position and revealing 
material shortcomings; nor could she stand idly by and watch her regional and 
overall position collapse. The solution adopted to this problem was to 
concentrate upon the essential issues, and to suppress as far as possible any 
lesser considerations. Consequently the problem posed by parliamentary 
rebellion against foreign policy, which, until diffused, threatened potential 
disaster by destabilising the overall diplomatic position, was nevertheless put to 
one side, because it offered less immediate danger to the national interest. In 
the same vein, Persian integrity was sacrificed to consolidate the Entente. Just 
as Grey found himself forced in the diplomatic arena to respond to events (as 
opposed to initiating them), so his domestic critics could only respond to events 
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and 'abuses' as they learned of them. As a result, Grey found it easier to play 
upon their ignorance and naivety than to confront the diplomatic problem head 
on. By resorting to subterfuge it proved possible to minimise the extent to 
which his critics' well-meant but impractical interventions could harm both 
domestic and diplomatic positions. The limited and often edited nature of 
information released to Parliament, and the unsatisfactory nature of the 
explanations he offered in the House, should be seen as necessary expedients 
vital to the preservation of the overall diplomatic position. Grey was in effect 
conducting a rearguard action, defending an increasingly fragile position. He 
was delaying as far as possible the point when dissimulation could no longer be 
sustained and the fagade of British pre-eminence would be exposed; the point 
when the extent of her weakness would be such so as to force her to reveal 
how far she was unable to defend her imperial interests and compromise the 
Ententes by revealing openly their true nature. Grey's policy used compromise 
and concession to achieve what material strength could no longer sustain, 
hoping to preserve Britain's position until such time as a redistribution of 
power amongst the leading nations would work in her favour to permit self-
sufficiency. With this in mind, as Wight says, internal cohesion was and is an 
important element in power politics.' Grey knew this, and in spite of personal 
sympathy with many of the principles which motivated his critics, he eventually 
secured sufficient cohesion by denying them access to controversial and 
dangerous information. By thus starving the Radical MPs of the evidence they 
needed to continue their campaign, and aided by the emergence of other 
domestic political controversy. Grey was able to restore the degree of stability 
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to Parliament and his domestic position necessary to enable the pursuing of the 
policies that circumstances elsewhere dictated. The idealist may frown at this 
knowing abuse of democratic power and Parliament. The pragmatist can only 
accept that he had little choice. 
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59 Wight, Power Politics, p. 181 
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Foreign Policy, pp.178-192 
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xxviii 
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65 In this vein, Lloyd George's Mansion House Speech of 21st July 1911 
provided a clear statement that Britain would not allow her interests to 
be ignored in any international settlement in which she had a stake. It 
also intimated support for France against German aggression along the 
lines expressed in above.". This is discussed in detail in Chapter I I , 
Section I I , below. A similar example as provided by the resistance shown 
to Russia over the restoration of the Persian ex-Shah (B.D. X I , Ch.XC), 
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relationship had he failed to persuade Sazonov that the diplomatic cost 
of any schism outweighed any localised gains 
66 See note " 
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28 Nicolson to Barclay, 24th October 1911, cited by Steiner, Foreign Office 
and Foreign Policy, p.l30 
29 Nicolson to Buchanan, 22nd April 1913, cited Steiner, op.cit.. p.l31 
30 Wilson, Empire and Continent, pp.41-2. Previously cited in the Introductory 
Chapter, p. 17 footnote " 
31 On many occasions Grey answered concerned MPs with the response that 
His Majesty's Government was not directly involved in the events under 
scrutiny, or that no definite information was available. Whilst it would be 
fair to say that Grey often stretched these points to the limit, it is fair to 
point out that a modicum of truth may be attached to such answers 
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32 The most obvious evidence of this was provided by Ponsonby with his 
questioning of Spring-Rice's letters to the Persian government in 
September 1907. See above p.95 f f 
33 One of which, the Radicals' interpretation, provided the justification for the 
protracted parliamentary agitation analysed in Chapter I I I 
34 Hansard. 5 s, X X X , 1794ff, 9th November 1911 
35 See above pp. 128-32 for the Stokes Affair. As McLean points out, there 
had been a consistent Russian occupation of the north from April 1909 
onwards (McLean, 'Russia, Radicals and Persia', EHR 93. p.342), but as I 
have discussed in Chapter I I I , the Radicals rarely missed the chance to 
embarrass Grey by making questions about its persistence 
36 McLean, Buffer State, outlines the importance of Persia in the 'Great 
Game' (pp.14-16); and provides a detailed survey of how the Anglo-Russian 
Entente of 1907 attempted to remove the perceived threat to Britain's 
strategic position which Russian ambitions were thought to pose (Chapter 5 
passim) 
37 A great deal of material has been published concerning the 1907 Anglo-
Russian Entente. Amongst the most interesting, in addition to David 
McLean's works (op.cit.) are: R P Churchill, The Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907 (Cedar Rapids 1939); R L Greaves, 'Some Aspects 
of the Anglo-Russian Convention and its working in Persia 1907-14' in 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 31, (1968); I 
Klein, 'The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problem of Central Asia' 
in Journal of British Studies I I , (1971); B S Williams, 'The Strategic 
Background to the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 1907' in 
Historical Journal 9 (1966); F Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 
1864-1914 (London 1968); D W Sweet and R T B Langhorne, 'Great 
Britain and Russia 1907-14' in Hinsley (ed). The Foreign Policy of Sir 
Edward Grey (Cambridge 1977) 
38 See above pp. 129-34 
39 Grey, Twenty Five Years. Vol I pp. 166-7 
40 Cited by G M Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon. (London 1937), pp.137-8 
41 aa X I , no.828; 19th October O'Bierne to Grey 
42 B ^ X I , no.831, 23rd October, Grey to O'Bierne: R D , xi, no.845, 14th 
November, Grey to O'Bierne 
43 B.D. X I , No.834; 2nd November 1911 Barclay to Grey cites 16th October 
telegram in footnote. Morrell first questioned Grey about the property 
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dispute on 9th November (Hansard. 5 s, XXX, 1794); Ronaldshay's citation 
occurred on 13th November (Hansard. 5 s, X X X I , 44) 
44 B.D. X I , No.841; 8th November, Grey to Barclay 
45 As he put it on 16th November; 'We are quite satisfied that [the] Russian 
Minister...is loyal to the Agreement.' B.D. X I , No.849 
46 R D , X I , No.885; 2nd December 1911, Grey to Buchanan 
47 B.D. X I , No.840; 6th November, Grey to Barclay 
48 The Russians demanded Shuster's removal because his gendarmes had 
been at least partially to blame for the clash with the Consul-General's 
men, and that as this had damaged Russian prestige, his position under the 
Convention was untenable (B.D. X I , No.848; 15th November 11, O'Beirne 
to Grey). Grey found it ea.sy to accept this demand because he saw both 
the Stokes and Lecoffre appointments and Shuster's letter to the Times as 
a wanton provocation of Russia by Shuster. This provocation was of 
greater immediate concern to Grey than the deepening of the socio-
economic crisis that Shuster's removal would cause. (B.D. X I , No.851; 17th 
November Grey to O'Bierne accepting Russia's demand in principle: B.D. 
X I , No.840 op.cit. for appointments of Stokes and Lecoffre: Shuster's letter 
to the Times of 21st October is reproduced in Shuster, Strangling of Persia. 
p.358ff.) 
49 See R D , X I , No.849; 16th November, Grey to O'Bierne 
50 See BJD, X I , No.854; 19th November, Buchanan to Grey 
51 B.D. X I , No.860 22nd November, Buchanan to Grey - the footnotes to this 
are of particular interest 
52 On 23rd November Grey told Ponsonby in the House that he had received 
an assurance from St Petersburg that Russian troops would remain only 
until her demands were met by Persia (Hansard. 5 s, X X X I , 1354). When 
on his return to Whitehall Grey learned from Buchanan's communication 
of 22nd November that this assurance had been undermined (B.D. X I , 
no.860), he left the ambassador with no doubts as to his anger; ' I have 
given in reply to questions in Parliament only a general assurance that the 
advance of Russian troops was temporary [but] it is deplorable that 
specific assurances given [by the Russian Government] should have been 
set aside' (B.D. X I , No.861) 
53 See above pp. 136-7 for Grey's 'stopping the clock' metaphor 
54 Above pp.114 f f 
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55 B.D. X I , No.845; ' I see that the Russian government having taken their 
view must carry their point...it is for them to make their own case' (Grey to 
O'Bierne, 14th November) 
56 Grey made certain that his views were understood. See B.D. X I , 
no.864 (24th November):- 'We cannot in view of renewed attacks by 
Shuster on the Russian Government raised objections to proposed 
Russian demands': B.D. X I , no.871, 28th November, Grey to 
Buchanan:- 'The situation certainly became intolerable when the 
official of one government distributed attacks upon another 
government'. This echoes the statement made to the House on 27th 
November, op.cit. 
57 Grey's statement to the House during the debate of 14th December may be 
taken as the definitive exposition for his public position vis a vis the 
Convention (Hansard, 5 s, X X X I I , 2598-2613). Grey agreed with a Russian 
proposal demanding Persian acceptance of the Convention as a condition 
in any settlement - ' I do not see why we should not join in demanding 
recognition...it might be proposed as an alternative to one or two [excessive 
demands]' (B.D. X I , No.866 footnote. This was issued as an instruction to 
Buchanan on 30th November, B.D. X I , No.878). This view concerning 
restraint of Russia was echoed by Buchanan in his communication to 
Nicolson, 24th Januaiy 1912 - 'Our only chance...is to be on the friendliest 
possible terms with Russia... We shall then be able to exercise a restraining 
influence on her and to keep her in line with us' (cited McLean, Buffer 
State, p. 104) 
58 Grey continually instructed his representatives in St. Petersburg to argue 
for the removal of troops because he feared the consequences of 
mismanagement. See B.D. X I , no.887 paragraph 4, Grey to Buchanan as an 
illustration of this 
59 Curzon in his speech to the Lords on 7th December, offered a well-
informed critique of both the Convention and the Persian Question, 
outlining his fears in just such a fashion. It is certain that Grey was aware 
of these arguments, if not convinced like Curzon that the Convention was 
likely to help in their realisation. See Hansard. 5 s (Lords), X, 678-700 
60 Grey argued this point consistently in the House; but as McLean points 
out, Grey and the Foreign Office increasingly pursued policy recognising 
that this recovery was unlikely and that the pragmatic maximisation of 
influence was necessary. McLean reflects upon this, citing Hirtzel - 'In the 
order of moral ideas we ought no doubt to stand for the independence and 
integrity of Persia' (27th May 1913 to Crowe) before concluding that 'in 
implementing...policy officials found themselves obliged to compromise 
standards of official conduct'; McLean, Buffer State, p. 140 
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61 See McLean, Buffer State, pp.83-4. Grey argued in the Commons on 14th 
December that Persia could not ignore the existing interests of her 
neighbours (Hansard, 5 s, X X X I I , op.cit.) but in practice that was precisely 
what Shuster did, as his involvement in the Shoa-es-Sultaneh property 
dispute and anti-Russian propaganda in the press show (op.cit.) 
62 Above p. 142 footnote 
63 Above p. 142 footnote " 
64 The opposition to the military intervention is covered in footnote above. 
Grey to Buchanan, 30th November (B.D. X I , no.878) condemns the 
indemnity demand; as does Acland's answer to Morrell in the Commons on 
4th December (Hansard, 5 s, X X X I I , 1165). Grey was no doubt aware of 
the political capital that Russia could gain should Persia prove unable to 
meet any indemnity. However, his concern over possible Russian support 
for another attempt by the ex-Shah to return to Persia exceeded even this, 
as his communication to Buchanan of 5th December, which complained at 
Neratov's reticence in ruling out such an operation (B.D. X I , no.897) 
65 See above p.l40, footnote " for an example of this 
66 On the one hand the Radicals condemned policy for sacrificing Persian 
integrity in order to maintain a 'balance of power', and called for the 
government to intervene against Russia so as to defend Persia. On the 
other hand, they opposed any intervention which would increase 
commitments for Persia and a diluting of her sovereign status; or indeed 
any policy which would force increases in Britain's defence budget. These 
two demands were hardly compatible 
67 See McLean, 'Radicals, Russia and Persia', EHR 93, pp.347-8 
68 His opposition towards military occupation, concern over atrocities, and 
reactions against the indemnity demand, for example 
69 Cited McLean, 'Radicals, Russia and Persia', EHR 93, p.349 
70 The memo enclosed in Bertie's communication to Grey of 8th December 
1911 highlights this view. fB.D. X I , no.900) 
71 McLean, 'Radicals, Russia and Persia', EHR 93, p.346 
72 See B.D. X I , no.900, 8th December 1911, Bertie to Grey - especially the 
attached memo. Sazonov had been convalescing, after an illness, in Paris, 
and was but newly returned to duties in St. Petersburg 
73 Grey outlined his proposals in the debate of 14th December, op.cit. His 
response to Swift McNeil's complaints about excessive secrecy show 
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particular candour (Hansard. 5 s, X X X I I , 2611-2) 
74 Indeed, as Buchanan's communication to Grey of 13th December shows, 
Sazonov had only resumed his duties on 13th December (B.D. X I , no.903) 
75 Grey used this form of leverage on several occasions, through Buchanan; 
see B.D. X I nos.875, 878, 904 for particular instances of this 
76 Buchanan to Grey, 14th December, highlights this, especially the footnote 
(B.D. X I , no.904) 
77 This was all the more important in the light of inconsistent Russian 
behaviour. For Grey's position vis-a-vis Parliament and Agadir on this 
issue, see above pp.53-5 
78 Grey had long feared that the presence of Russian troops on Persian soil 
would itself provoke trouble which would prevent their withdrawal. 
Barclay's report of clashes between Russian forces and Persian nationalists 
at Resht and Tabriz on 22nd December 1911 (B.D. X I , no.907, Editor's 
note), and Buchanan's communique of 27th December, which stated that in 
the light of Russian casualties, Sazonov could not order a withdrawal (B.D. 
X I , no.909), merely confirmed those fears. However, the success enjoyed in 
preventing the imposition of an excessive indemnity went some way to 
compensating for this. As Buchanan reported on 14th December, 
'[Sazonov] assured me that the Russian Government would not be hard on 
Persia and had no intention of extorting a large sum from her' (B.D. X I , 
no.904) 
79 This was reproduced in the Blue Book, 'Persia No.2, 1912' (Persia No.2 
1912-13. Cd 6103. CXXII , 55, Copy of Notes exchanged between the 
Persian Government and the British and Russian Ministries in Tehran, 18th 
February 1912 to 20th March 1912) 
80 ib id 
81 Letter to Dr Hodgkin, R D , X I , no.914 
82 And Grey was forced albeit grudgingly to concede that, in spite of his 
diplomatic activity, progress was slow, and problems remained. See above 
p. 125 footnote 
83 Grey was forced to concede that the Russians could not be expected to 
remove their troops whilst chaos persisted, in spite of his opposition to 
their presence already documented, and in the face of Radical criticism. 
See the answers given to Morrell and Dillon, 30th July 1912 
(Hansard. 5 s, X X X X I , 1819), and Ponsonby, 10th October (Hansard. 5 s, 
X X X X I I , 495) 
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84 The activities of Shuja-ed-Dowleh, the Russian backed Governor of Tabriz, 
aroused Radical concern in October 1912, and reflected the weakness of 
the central administration. See O'Grady, 22nd October, Hansard, 5 s, 
X X X X I I , 1891ff 
85 This in turn provoked the Unionist lobby in Westminster to press for more 
aggressive intervention on Grey's part to defend British interests in the 
south of Persia along the same lines as the Russians had in the north. 
Attacks upon consular offficials prompted Lonsdale to demand action on 
27th March 1912 (Hansard, 5 s, X X X V I , 417); Rees demanded that greater 
measures be initiated to defend commercial activity in the wake of 
complaints made by the Viceroy of India (Hansard, 5 s, X X X V I I I , 5, 6th 
May 1912); and the death of Captain Eckford in December 1912 merely 
added weight to their campaign (see Hansard. 5 s, X X X X V , 1268, 17th 
December, Rees). Grey refused to initiate moves along Russian lines, 
fearing the cost of commitment - but he did admit that their more direct 
action had improved regional stability, (see his statement made during the 
10th July debate op.cit.) 
86 'Russian friendship and Persian integrity...proved incompatible', McLean, 
Buffer State. p.l39 
87 Cited McLean, Buffer State, p. 138 
88 This fear is clearly expressed in statements made by senior officials 
throughout this period, as epitomised by Nicolson's comments cited on 
p.l32 above (footnotes ^ and -'). McLean, Buffer State, pp.144-5 argues 
this point convincingly, and concludes by observing that British hegemony 
on the Persian Gulf (always an aim of the 'Buffer State' policy) was only 
realised once the Great War forced Russia to abandon her expansionist 
drive through Persia. The success of the 1907 Convention rested in its 
'halting of the [Russian] drive' - but even Grey came to admit that despite 
'stopping the clock' in 1907, by 1914, a new approach was needed, and that 
'Our whole policy in Persia calls for reconsideration' (cited McLean, Buffer 
State, p. 138). In the final analysis, the maintainance of the principle behind 
British foreign policy - close ties with Russia - forced Grey to consider 
abandoning the apparatus by which the principle had been attained (the 
'Buffer State' and restraining clauses of the 1907 Convention vis a vis 
Persia). The Great War, paradoxically, proved a blessing in disguise, at 
least as far as Britain's Central Asian strategy was concerned. 
89 ibid. 
90 Sazonov's visit to Balmoral, and the discussions he had with Grey on 
possible changes in the regency in Persia, illustrates Grey's readiness to 
concede ground in the interests of the Entente. B.D. IX (i), nos 803-810 
91 Hansard. 5 s, X X X I I , 2610, 14th December 1911 
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